


NEPAL TIBET RELATIONS 1850-1930

Years of
Hopes, Challenges
and Frustrations



Nepal-Tibet relations, 1850-1930 : years of hope
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Nepal-Tibet Relations

1850-1930

*Years of Hopes
Challenges and Frustrations*

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Kathmandu

Kathmandu

Puga Nara

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To
*The Living Memory Of My Grandfather Subba Bijaya Ram
Uprety Who Took Part In Nepal-Tibet Negotiations
With Dexterity After The Massive Loot
Of The Year 1883*

PREFACE

The subject of this study developed out of my curiosity over Tibet. Two factors served as catalysts to stimulate my research in this direction. My real interest to enter into this arena of study was roused in 1976/77 when I edited the diary of Tofu Lama, a Tibetan traveller in Kathmandu, in a series of four articles published in the monthly journal of *Vasudha*. Then, my family had also been intimately associated with Tibet. One my remote ancestors, Pandit Hari Deva Uprety, was sent by the Gorkha ruler, Prithivi Narayan Shah, as an "envoy" to purchase gold. My grandfather, Subba Bijaya Ram Uprety, had served with dexterity during the peace negotiations at Kerong after the massive loot of the year 1883. Furthermore, two of my uncles, Nil Raman Uprety and Hari Kant Uprety had served as the heads of Nepalese office at Kuti during the crucial years from 1913 to 1921. It was, therefore, natural for me to be fascinated by the name and theme of Tibet.

In such a study the use of a large number of Nepalese, Tibetan, and Urdu words is inevitable, which may sound strange, unfamiliar, and often even exotic to the general reader but are necessary due to the lack of English equivalents. However, whenever, such words occur I have explained them either within parentheses or with the aid of footnotes. The reader must also excuse my transliteration of South and East Asian words without diacritical marks. In transliterating words I have generally followed the transliteration adopted by the British Government of India in the catalogues and manuscripts. I have, thus, retained the term "Nepalese" instead of "Nepali" which is also being increasingly used by South Asian scholars. The spelling of a number of Tibetan and Nepalese names and titles in the Roman script presented, yet, another problem for they not only have other equivalents but are also spelled differently. In addition many Nepalese and Tibetan names are extremely long. Thus, when the names occur for the first time I have given them in full, but when they reappear I have given them in abbreviations. For example, I have given abbreviations like Rana, Bhuvan and Cheng to refer to

names like Rana Gamvir Singh Gharti Chhetri, Bhuvan Bahadur Bikrum Rana, and Cheng tare sol Wang Dhal Chen respectively. As one goes through these pages one is bound to be impressed by the conflicting interpretations of even minor and insignificant episodes. This is, thus, not a definitive study because it raises more problems than perhaps it answers.

Although I conceived, designed and pursued this study to a logical conclusion on my own initiative, yet, a work which took me almost half a decade, obviously could not be done by an individual alone. A number of institutions and friends made this undertaking fruitful and rewarding. I would first like to thank Dr. Parthiveshwar Timilsina, the then Dean of the Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, for providing funds for my five-month research in the National Archives, New Delhi. To my esteemed colleague Dr. Krishna Kant Adhikari I feel a sincere sense of gratitude for providing me a wealth of primary records of the time of *Maharaja Jang Bahadur* without which it would have been difficult to pursue this study. I owe a major debt to Shri Anand P. Shrestha for reading and criticizing the manuscript at the various stages of its development. While I was working in the India Office Library, London, the National Archives, New Delhi, and the Archives of the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu, the help rendered by Miss. R. Wilkie, S. Sircar and Hari Prasad Chhetri respectively was extremely valuable. I owe obligation to Shri Chirin Shumsher Thapa, the Press Secretary of His Majesty, and to Shri Narendra Bikram Shah, Joint Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, for their keen initiative in opening the Archives of the Foreign Ministry to reasearch Scholars.

This is not all. There are names of my colleagues at Tribuvan University whose help was valuable and who, in turn, do deserve credit and commendation: Dr. Pitamber Sharma and Shri Hementa Shumsher Rana, for going through the pages of the manuscript meticulously and offering valuable suggestions and comments; Shri Tri Ratna Manandhar, for his valuable companionship during my research in India; Shri Tej Ram Poudyal for sparing his time and learning generously; Dr. Gajanand Agrawal, for his continuing and stimulating encouragement; and Shri Indra Narayan Manandhar, for preparing the jacket design. My grateful thanks also falls

upon Shri Narayan Sharma Gazurel for his utmost zeal in all the stages of the printing of the book. Then, finally, I owe much to my wife Susma Devi Uprety, whose counsel and companionship sustained me throughout this endeavor.

While these persons may often detect their influence on following pages, I suspect that they will frequently see my stubbornness too. However, the incorporation of their suggestions ought in no way shift to them any errors and inaccuracies: it lies with me alone.

Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu
September, 1980

P. R. U.

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ABBREVIATIONS

FMAN	Foreign Ministry Archives, Nepal (Kathmandu)
GI	Government of India
IOL	India Office Library, London (now the Commonwealth Relations Library)
MAN	Military Archives, Nepal (Kathmandu)
NAI	National Archives, India (New Delhi)
NAN	National Archives, Nepal (Kathmandu) (also known as Rashtriya Avilekhalaya)

PART I
INTRODUCTION

The Groundwork of Nepal-Tibet Relations

Nepal-Tibet relations have been dominated by varied and complex factors that range from physical and economic to political and cultural components. The cultural and physical components in Nepal-Tibet relations are certainly key features that have shaped Nepal-Tibet history. Both these components could form a thesis or a complete monograph by themselves. This study, however, is confined to economic and political relations between Nepal and Tibet for a period of eighty years, or in other words, from 1850 to 1930, the most crucial period in Nepal-Tibet relations. A close scrutiny of Nepal-Tibet relations reveals that the economic aspect had always regulated the sphere of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Kathmandu, being the entrepot of Trans-Himalayan trade from the medieval period to the turn of this century, has added a significant dimension to Nepal-Tibet relations.

The Geographical Setting

A study of landscape pattern of Nepal reveals that, topographically, Nepal is more closely wedded with Tibet than with her southern neighbour, India. The Terai and Dunes (inner Terai), whose topographic features resemble those of India, constitute only 22 per cent of her total land mass, while 75 per cent of her mountain-valley landscape resembles that of Tibet. Nepal, thus, forms a transitional mountain barrier between the rich alluvial Gangetic plain of India and the Tibetan plateau, known popularly as the "roof of the World". It is true that the Nepalese Himalayas are only 520 miles out of 1500

miles of the stupendous Himalayan mountain chain; yet it occupies the central core of this mountain system. It has more than 240 peaks above 20,000 feet, which are, in fact, challenging the insolent stars in their race to kiss the moonlit sky. Her spatial location has been a key element in determining Nepal's political role in South Asia, which has become more important today than ever before.

The territory encompassed by the political expression 'Nepal' has been varying in different periods of history. In the ancient and medieval periods, Nepal, for all practical purposes, included the Kathmandu Valley and the adjoining regions. However, during the first decades of the nineteenth century Nepal had carved for herself a small "Himalayan Empire", which was one third larger than her present size. But this was a very short-lived phenomenon in Nepalese history. It is, however, to be noted that throughout history Nepalese politics was centered in Kathmandu for two reasons. First, traditionally, Kathmandu Valley had served as the province of the elites, and even today, after thirty years since the overthrow of the Rana regime, "Kathmandu politics" is still the primary means of political expression. Secondly, the ruling dynasties of Kathmandu have generally controlled two principal passes of Kuti and Kerong, which controlled the Trans-Himalayan trade between South Asia and East Asia (that is, Tibet and the regions beyond). The fertile valley of Kathmandu, enriched by the wealth that poured in through the Trans-Himalayan trade, did provide a firm foundation for the Valley kingdoms that have nourished themselves and matured on them.

Throughout the remote ages, Nepal and Tibet communicated with each other through the 24 high passes (averaging 17,000 feet). The lowest of these are the historic Kuti and Kerong passes reaching an elevation of 6,000 feet, located at Kodari and Rasuwa respectively. The other important passes are located at Takla, Mustang, Hati and Wallanchung.¹ It was through these passes Nepal exported to Tibet food grains, in particular, corn, rice, spices, and manufactured goods in exchange for mountain salt, wool, yak-tails, sheep, and goats. The two passes of Kuti and Kerong, better known in Tibet as Nyi-lam and Kyi-rong respectively, had often been a source of dispute between Nepal and Tibet from the medieval period to the modern times. Nepal had always tried to control these two vital passes and extend

her territory up to the watershed. The control of these two border towns of Kuti and Kerong was important not only economically but also politically. Ram Shah of Gorkha and Pratap Malla of Kathmandu both fought wars with Tibet for the control of the two strategic passes in the seventeenth century. Kathmandu was successful in obtaining joint control with Lhasa over Kuti and Kerong for a quarter of a century. It should also be noted that the conquest of Kuti and Kerong was one of the two principal war aims of Nepal during the Third Nepal-Tibet war (1855-56). However, it is an irony of history that except for a short span of time Nepal's attempt to gain political control of Kuti and Kerong had always been frustrated.

The topography of Nepal basically constitutes the rugged mountains interrupted by a maze of spurs and valleys. However, some kind of order can be given to what appears to be a chaotic Nepalese mountain system. Three parallel ranges of mountains run at different elevations from east to west. The first range of mountains is the Chure Range, which shoots up abruptly from the Nepalese Terai to a general elevation of 750 metres to 1,500 metres. Immediately north of the Chure Pahad runs the second mountain system, known as the Mahabharat Lekh, with an elevation ranging from 1,500 metres to 2,700 metres. According to legends of hoary antiquity this was the theatre of many battles and romantic episodes of the Mahabharat.² The third range, which lies 90 kilometres north of the Mahabharat Lekh, is the main Himalayan mountain system. The fascination of this mountain chain is its towering sky-line which gives Nepal the distinction of possessing eight out of the world's ten highest peaks. In Western Nepal another small mountain chain is discernible, which is politically highly significant, for it forms a natural demarcation of the boundary between Nepal and Tibet. This range of mountains, lying only 30 to 40 kilometres from the main Himalaya, varies in altitude from 6,000 to 7,000 metres. In spite of the fact that this range is smaller than the main Himalaya, topographically they are extremely important, for they form the chief watershed between the river Ganga and Tsang-po (Brahmaputra).

Another geographical region of Nepal that resembles the Tibetan topographical structure is the Trans-Himalayan Bhot valley system,

found only in western and central Nepal. The Bhot valleys are specially more extensive in the upper reaches of the Karnali river. Here the Tibetan marginal ranges are more clearly defined than the main Himalaya. These Bhot valleys, with the sole exception of Mustang and Mugu valleys that run north-south, run east-west. The Bhot valleys of Nepal are in fact elevated valleys exceeding 3,600 metres in general elevation and are distinguished by the dry climate which reminds one of the Tibetan climatic features.

The complex river drainage system, which cuts through the country in general in the north-south direction, constitutes another prominent topographic feature of Nepal. Three prominent river systems in Nepal, the Gandaki, Koshi and Karnali, all have their source in Tibet and enter Nepal through the spectacular gorges beautifully bisecting the Himalayas. The main rivers of the Karnali river system that drain Western Nepal are the Humla-Karnali, Mugu-Karnali, Tila Nadi, Seti river, Buri Ganga, and Bheri river. The Gandaki river system, draining central Nepal, includes Kali-Gandaki, Bari Gad, Seti, Marsyangdi, Darondi, Buri-Gandaki and the Trishuli-Gandaki rivers. The Koshi, which drains the eastern part of Nepal, is made up of Indrawati, Sun Koshi, Tamba Koshi, Likhu Khola, Dudh Koshi, Arun and Tamor rivers.³

The Cultural and Ethnic Pattern

Nepal's civilization developed in many unique ways under the care and protection of her Buddhist and Hindu rulers until the middle of this century. Nepal could evolve and nurture a distinct culture of her own, primarily because she was shielded from the direct political developments in both her southern and northern neighbours. Thus, inspite of brief periods of invasions from North and South, Nepal's political culture has remained free and intact. These invasions, being mere flashes in Nepalese history, left no direct impact on the steady flow of Nepalese national life. Culturally speaking, Kathmandu Valley still is the center of Nepalese life around which the Nepalese civilization gravitates. It is Kathmandu that even today sets the tone for Nepalese dress, hair style, social etiquettes and manners, and the evolution of new norms and values, which

ultimately permeates into different walks of Nepalese life in both urban and rural areas.

Nepal has always been a haven for the waves of migrants, who were attracted, partly by her fertile valleys, and partly by the sheer beauty of her majestic peaks, and for the political and religious refugees who fled from both Tibet and India due to the fear of persecution from the medieval to the modern period. The Nepalese Himalayas have thus sheltered and shared their resources with the migrating Mongoloid groups from the north-east and the caucasoid groups (Indo-Aryan) from the south-west for at least two thousand years. It is, however, difficult to trace the origin of the different tribes in Nepal or even determine their degree of admixture, for a systematic ethnological study in Nepal is still in a formative stage. The most economically and politically dominant group in Nepal is the Indo-Aryan group. They comprise the high class Hindus, namely, Brahmans and Kshatriyas, who inhabit the mid-mountain country. However, the valleys and the mountains of the high Himalayas are inhabited by the Nepalese of Tibetan origin, whose dialects and culture are, too, rooted in Tibet. The most dominant group among them are the Sherpas of Solu-Khumbu or the Sagarmatha region. According to tradition, the Northern Himalayan people, including the Sherpas, are known as Bhote, after the Nepalese term Bhot denoting Tibet. The expression Bhote for the northern mountain folks of Nepal is indicative of their degree of affinity, linguistically, economically, and culturally with Tibet.

The Newars are another important group of people who primarily live in Kathmandu Valley and the urban centres of this kingdom. The Newar community, though distinguished by its own script⁴, language and a sophisticated culture, is not an ethnic group. This community embraces people of both Mongoloid and the Mediterranean physical types. Their admixture is too evident from the dual language they speak (Nepali, the Indo-Aryan language, and Newari, the Tibeto-Burman tongue), and the dual religion they practice (Brahmanism and a distorted form of Mahayan Buddhism). Kathmandu Valley has always been a melting pot for diverse groups of people and different trends of ideas. This trait is visibly manifested in the syncretic process of cultural assimilation of

the Kathmandu Valley people. This partly explains the enterprising spirit of the Newar community who have established their trade-marts not only in the remote regions of Nepal, but also in Lhasa, Gyantse, Kuti, and Kerong in Tibet, and Darjeeling, Kalimpong, and Calcutta in India.

The assimilative character of the Nepalese culture is further indicated by the fact that out of the 36 dialects spoken in Nepal as many as 24 belong to the Tibeto-Burman group. If one were to point out to two basic components of Nepalese culture, they would be the stream of syncretism, and the glowing spirit of martial tradition, which pervades the different walks of Nepalese life even today. Throughout her history Nepal was exposed to two different kinds of invasions, the peaceful, and the violent type: The latter, though less frequent, infused in the Nepalese "a martial tradition", while the former helped in the steady evolution of a "glacis culture,"⁵ whose primary expression is manifested in the concept of syncretism. The presence of different socio-religious groups and ethnic communities made the Nepalese people less caste-ridden, more open-minded, and thus, more tolerant than her sister neighbours, India and Tibet. The result was that Nepal became a fertile ground for the emergence and evolution of different faiths like Hinduism, Buddhism, and Lamaism.

The syncretic element is the most visible character of Nepalese culture. This is seen not only in the free give-and-take of ideas and symbols between the different schools of Hinduism (Shaivism, Vaishnavism, and Shaktism), but also in the way the Hindu religious symbols and ideas cut across the heterodox schools like Buddhism and Lamaism. The Nepalese Hindu, Buddhist and Lama devotees have gone to the extent of building statues and monuments of the opposing faiths within their sacred precincts as well as coining joint expressions like *Halahal Lokeshwar* and *Nilakanth Lokeshwar*, both of which embody the personality of Shiva and Shakyamuni. The decoration of the Hindu deities like Shiva and Vishnu with the symbols of the Bhairav cult as well as the image and headdress of Akshovya Buddha, is a manifestation of the same phenomenon.

The martial tradition of the Himalayan folks constitutes another dominant feature of Nepalese culture. It is this element that tempted

the British Government in India to classify the Nepalese (Gurkhas) as a martial race. The growth and development of the *Shakti* cult in Nepal is really the fusion of martial tradition in the religious sphere. Accordingly, Bhawani Durga, the embodiment of the terrible aspect of the Mother Goddess, is the most favourite deity of the Nepalese. Among the Nepalese people the worship of the terrible aspect of *Shakti* has taken the form of national Durga Puja festival during which even the humblest cottage of Nepal is converted into the temple of Mother Goddess Kali, and goats, buffaloes, chickens, pigs and ducks are sacrificed in thousands. Durga is thus taken as the national symbol of heroism, courage and valor.

It was in the seventh century A. D. that Buddhism in Nepal developed in richness and profusion. Accordingly, she was able to export Buddhism to Tibet, but only to be imported back in the form of Lamaism in the medieval period. Nepal was always influenced by the socio-cultural and artistic movements, whether they be of India or Tibet. She took ideas freely from the different schools of India and Tibet and gave to it a distinct "Himalayan" character. To conclude, one may say that the socio-cultural interaction between Nepal and Tibet did provide a firm foundation for economic and political relations between the two countries which forms the basic thrust of this study.

Scope and Limitations

It is true that Indo-Nepalese relations have been a subject of exhaustive studies by both historians and political scientists, but Nepal-Tibet relations have been virtually untouched. The reasons are not far to seek. First, the study of Nepal-Tibet relations cannot be completed only by the scrutiny of the imperial records housed in the India Office Library, London, and the National Archives of New Delhi. The most important repository of documents on Nepal-Tibet relations is undoubtedly the archives of the Foreign Ministry of Nepal which has been formally opened to scholars only since July 1978. Secondly, a study of Nepal-Tibet relations presupposes basic skills in the use of South Asian and East Asian languages, particularly Nepali, Hindi and Tibetan. These two factors explain,

to a reasonable extent, why scholars have kept themselves aloof from the arena of Nepal-Tibet relations. The only scholarly study on Nepal-Tibet relations is the doctoral dissertation by Bishnu Prasad Poudel. This work is, however based almost entirely on the records of the National Archives of India, and is confined to the period between 1792 and 1856. It has thus omitted the period between 1856 and 1930, the most crucial period in Nepal-Tibet relations, not only politically, but also economically. Leo E. Rose has also surveyed Nepal's diplomatic relations with Tibet from the medieval period to our times.⁶ But his treatment of Nepal-Tibet relations is very sketchy, partly because of the spatial dimension of its chronology, and partly because the author seems to be more at home in discussing the Indo-Nepalese relations where the materials are more abundant.

This study attempts to focus on the economic and political dimension of Nepal-Tibet relations between 1850 to 1930. The economic parameter of Nepal-Tibet relations has been particularly stressed, for it has not only guided diplomatic relations between the two countries, but often directed the path and momentum of their overall relationship. This study is, however, not a definitive study on Nepal-Tibet relations between 1850 to 1930 because it raises more questions and problems than perhaps it answers. The socio-economic relationship between the Nepalese and Tibetans in Lhasa was certainly a very important aspect of Nepal-Tibet relations. It is true that the Nepalese shops were patronized by the inhabitants of Lhasa as were the other urban centers in Tibet, yet the Tibetans did resort to the boycott of Nepalese shop whenever they were psychologically disturbed by the domineering attitude of the Newar-Thakali merchants.⁷ It was not possible within the limited scope of this study to deal with the socio-economic interaction between the Nepalese and the Tibetans. This could be the subject of a separate study by itself and could shed an extremely valuable light on Nepal-Tibet relations. It was equally not possible to survey all the riots and killings that plagued Nepal-Tibet relations between 1880 to 1900. However, the anatomy of these riots, even the minor ones, could provide the psychological base for an understanding of the social relationship between the Nepalese and the Tibetans, which, in turn, shaped the political relationship between the two countries.

During my research I have almost exclusively relied on the official and semi-official records, secret registers, and the abstract translations of conversations preserved in the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu; National Archives, New Delhi; Military Archives, Army Head Quarters, Kathmandu; and India Office Library, London. The vernacular newspapers like the *Gorkhapatra* and the English newspapers like the *Statesman*, *St. James Gazette*, *The Pioneer* and the *Peking Gazette* have been frequently used.

This study presents an overall picture of Nepal's economic and political relationship with Tibet during the most crucial period of eighty years. It is true that Nepal cooperated with the Tibetans during the China-Tibet conflict between 1908 and 1913 but this was dictated more by her instinct of self-preservation and her desire to hold on to the extra-territorial rights than by her love for the Tibetans. This is evident from the fact that immediately after the exit of the Chinese soldiers from Tibet in 1913 Nepal-Tibet relations underwent through a period of crisis till 1930.

Organization of Study

The first part of this study is this introduction, which sets the groundwork of Nepal-Tibet relations and discusses the scope and limitations of this study. The second part is a preview of early Nepal-Tibet relations from the earliest times to 1850. This sets the stage for the present study. The third part focuses on Nepal's independent posture in South Asian Politics. It was in this period that Nepal fought a war with Tibet and concluded a treaty of peace on her own initiative without help or interference of an outside power. The fourth part surveys the post-war decades (1862-1896), which served rather as an anvil for the testing of the treaty of 1856. In retrospect, the provisions of the treaty proved to be too rigorous to be observed, thus both sides began to interpret the provisions of the agreement according to the needs of the hour. The fifth part deals with the diplomatic relations of Nepal with Tibet from 1900 to 1930. These were years of challenges, hopes, and frustrations. With the dawn of the twentieth century Nepal had to struggle against all odds to preserve her extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Crisis in Nepal-Tibet relations

further continued from 1912 to 1930 in the form of Gyalpo Affair, the *Khachara* Problems and the border disputes. The sixth part deals with the Trans-Himalayan trade from 1850 to 1930. This period analyzes the last days of Nepalese hegemony in Trans-Himalayan trade and then goes further to study the eclipse of Nepal's monopolistic position in this trade. The seventh part, finally, deals with the political status of Nepal through the Sino-British eyes during the crucial years 1850-1930. Each part takes the theme of Nepal-Tibet relations further and highlights the magnitude of Nepal-Tibet relations, which brings into picture also the major powers like Britain, China and Russia.

Foot Note

1. For a more detailed account of the passes leading to Tibet from Nepal, see C.J. Morris, *Hand Book for the Indian Army: Gurkhas* (Delhi: Manager of Publication of Government of India, 1930), pp. 178-79. The Kuti pass has been fairly elaborately described in de Filippo Filippi (ed.) *An Account of Tibet: The Travels of Ippolito Desideri of Pistoia, S. J., 1712-1727* (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1932), pp. 32-33.
2. It is very difficult to define the Mahabharat period in South Asia, with an element of precision and exactitude. However, the period of the Mahabharat, Sutras and Law books overlaps that of Buddhist India. For a more detailed analysis of the chronology of the Mahabharat period see E. Washburn Hopkin's "The Period of Sutras, Epics and Law Books" in E.J. Rapson (ed.) *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. 1 (Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1962) pp. 197-202.
3. The geography of Nepal is best treated in Pradyumna P. Karan, *Nepal-A Cultural and Physical Geography* (Lexington: Kentucky, 1960) and His Majesty's Government of Nepal, *The Physical Development Plan for the Kathmandu Valley* (Kathmandu: H. M. G., Nepal, 1969). See also, Harka Gurung "Landscape Pattern in Nepal", *The Himalayan Review*, Vol. IV, 1971 pp., 1-10; also Harka Gurung, "Geographic Foundation of Nepal", *The Himalayan Review*, Vol. 1, 1968, pp. 1-10.
4. The Newari script is really a stage in the development of modern Deva Nagari between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries. The paleographic characters of this script are the stylistic hooked characters known as *Ranjana Lipi*. For more on Nepalese hooked characters, see G. Buhler, *Indian Paleography* (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1962, reprint), p. 95-96.
5. For a detailed account of "glacis culture" see Indubhusan Banerjee, *Evolution of Khalsa*, Vol. I (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee, 1963), pp. 1-4.
6. Bishnu Prasad Poudel, "Nepal's Relations with Tibet, 1792-1856" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Indian School of International

Studies, 1963), Leo E. Rose, *Nepal Strategy for Survival* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1973.)

7. See telegram from W. P. Rosemyer, Lhasa to Political officer, Sikkim, undated, *Foreign and Political Proceedings* No. 33 of 1929, File No. 228-X, 1929, p. 15, NAI.

PART II

**NEPAL-TIBET RELATIONS : A HISTORICAL
PREVIEW**

During my research I have almost exclusively relied on the official and semi-official records, secret registers, and the abstract translations of conversations preserved in the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu; National Archives, New Delhi; Military Archives, Army Head Quarters, Kathmandu; and India Office Library, London. The vernacular newspapers like the *Gorkhapatra* and the English newspapers like the *Statesman*, *St. James Gazette*, *The Pioneer* and the *Peking Gazette* have been frequently used.

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This study presents an overall picture of Nepal's economic and political relationship with Tibet during the most crucial period of eighty years. It is true that Nepal cooperated with the Tibetans during the China-Tibet conflict between 1908 and 1913 but this was dictated more by her instinct of self-preservation and her desire to hold on to the extra-territorial rights than by her love for the Tibetans. This is evident from the fact that immediately after the exit of the Chinese soldiers from Tibet in 1913 Nepal-Tibet relations underwent through a period of crisis till 1930.

Organization of Study

The first part of this study is this introduction, which sets the groundwork of Nepal-Tibet relations and discusses the scope and limitations of this study. The second part is a preview of early Nepal-Tibet relations from the earliest times to 1850. This sets the stage for the present study. The third part focuses on Nepal's independent posture in South Asian Politics. It was in this period that Nepal fought a war with Tibet and concluded a treaty of peace on her own initiative without help or interference of an outside power. The fourth part surveys the post-war decades (1862-1896), which served rather as an anvil for the testing of the treaty of 1856. In retrospect, the provisions of the treaty proved to be too rigorous to be observed, thus both sides began to interpret the provisions of the agreement according to the needs of the hour. The fifth part deals with the diplomatic relations of Nepal with Tibet from 1900 to 1930. These were years of challenges, hopes, and frustrations. With the dawn of the twentieth century Nepal had to struggle against all odds to preserve her extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Crisis in Nepal-Tibet relations

further continued from 1912 to 1930 in the form of Gyalpo Affair, the *Khachara* Problems and the border disputes. The sixth part deals with the Trans-Himalayan trade from 1850 to 1930. This period analyzes the last days of Nepalese hegemony in Trans-Himalayan trade and then goes further to study the eclipse of Nepal's monopolistic position in this trade. The seventh part, finally, deals with the political status of Nepal through the Sino-British eyes during the crucial years 1850-1930. Each part takes the theme of Nepal-Tibet relations further and highlights the magnitude of Nepal-Tibet relations, which brings into picture also the major powers like Britain, China and Russia.

Foot Note

1. For a more detailed account of the passes leading to Tibet from Nepal, see C.J. Morris, *Hand Book for the Indian Army: Gurkhas* (Delhi: Manager of Publication of Government of India, 1930), pp. 178-79. The Kuti pass has been fairly elaborately described in de Filippo Filippi (ed.) *An Account of Tibet: The Travels of Ippolito Desideri of Pistoia, S. J., 1712-1727* (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1932), pp. 32-33.
2. It is very difficult to define the Mahabharat period in South Asia, with an element of precision and exactitude. However, the period of the Mahabharat, Sutras and Law books overlaps that of Buddhist India. For a more detailed analysis of the chronology of the Mahabharat period see E. Washburn Hopkin's "The Period of Sutras, Epics and Law Books" in E.J. Rapson (ed.) *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. 1 (Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1962) pp. 197-202.
3. The geography of Nepal is best treated in Pradyumna P. Karan, *Nepal-A Cultural and Physical Geography* (Lexington: Kentucky, 1960) and His Majesty's Government of Nepal, *The Physical Development Plan for the Kathmandu Valley* (Kathmandu: H. M. G., Nepal, 1969). See also, Harka Gurung "Landscape Pattern in Nepal", *The Himalayan Review*, Vol. IV, 1971 pp., 1-10; also Harka Gurung, "Geographic Foundation of Nepal", *The Himalayan Review*, Vol. 1, 1968, pp. 1-10.
4. The Newari script is really a stage in the development of modern Deva Nagari between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries. The paleographic characters of this script are the stylistic hooked characters known as *Ranjana Lipi*. For more on Nepalese hooked characters, see G. Buhler, *Indian Paleography* (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1962, reprint), p. 95-96.
5. For a detailed account of "glacis culture" see Indubhusan Banerjee, *Evolution of Khalsa*, Vol. I (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee, 1963), pp. 1-4.
6. Bishnu Prasad Poudel, "Nepal's Relations with Tibet, 1792-1856" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Indian School of International

Studies, 1963), Leo E. Rose, *Nepal Strategy for Survival* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1973.)

7. See telegram from W. P. Rosemyer, Lhasa to Political officer, Sikkim, undated, *Foreign and Political Proceedings* No. 33 of 1929, File No. 228-X, 1929, p. 15, NAI.

PART II

**NEPAL-TIBET RELATIONS : A HISTORICAL
PREVIEW**

Genesis of Nepal-Tibet Relations

Nepal's relations with Tibet in the prehistoric and the proto-historic period cannot be determined with precision and exactitude due to the lack of positive documentation. Nevertheless, the interaction between the peoples living in these two neighboring geographical regions must have been close, open and significant as it has been preserved by the legends of hoary antiquity. The *puranic*¹ as well as the chronicle literature of the period records the coming of Manjushri, a religious divine, from Tibet in the *Tretayuga*² with his disciples to the Nepal Valley.³ He is often given the credit of having drained the Nepal Valley, which was then a lake, thus making it possible for human habitation.⁴

Socio-Cultural Contacts

The socio-cultural contacts between Nepal and Tibet have been long and intimate. This interaction benefited both the sides and helped to develop sophisticated cultures of their own. It was primarily through Nepal that the Tibetan people received their Buddhist religion in the ancient period. However, in the medieval period, Nepal was herself to receive a greater dose of Tantric Buddhism from Tibet that was to affect every aspect of her life and practises. The Tibetan influence is also seen in the dialects of Nepal in the Northern regions. Again, the modern Nepalese family names like Tsang, Lama, Sherpa and Tamang reflect Tibetan origin. They were probably the descendants of Tibetans who migrated to Nepal for food and shelter in the distant past. The impact of the Nepalese culture in Tibetan monuments and epigraphs as well as the life style

of the people themselves is also significant.

The seventh century A. D. constituted a watershed in Nepal-Tibet relations. Two factors contributed to this change. First, the growth of mercantilism in South and East Asia in this period; secondly, the emergence of a powerful kingdom of Tibet with its capital Lhasa under Song-Tsen Gampo and the rise of a consolidated prosperous Nepal under Amsuvurma. This gave a necessary impetus for opening the Trans-Himalayan route to promote inter-regional trade between South and East Asia. A limited trade between Nepal and Tibet was not new, however, the establishment of a strong viable authority in both Tibet and Nepal coupled with the growth of mercantilism in Asia led to the evolution of inter-regional trade thus linking commercially these two major land masses of this continent. Nepal thus became the entrepot for artifacts and ideas between South and East Asia.

A new culture which may be labeled as "mass culture"⁵ began to grow and mature in Nepal. This "massing" is seen in two directions: physical massing of goods and the intellectual massing of ideas. Kathmandu valley, in a way, again turned into deep lake where ideas and goods began to float and formant. These ideas and artifacts from East and South Asia helped to develop in Nepal a "glacis culture" characterized both by assimilative and accomodative spirit.

Institutionalization of Political Relations

These socio-cultural contacts did pave the way for the institutionalization of political and diplomatic relations between Nepal and Tibet in the seventh century A. D. The Tibetan chronicles tell us that Song-tsen Gampo ascended the throne of Lhasa in 630 A. D. A few years later he deputed his trusted minister Gar Tong Tsen with presents and letters to the Nepalese King Amsuvurma with the sole objective of asking the hand of the princess Vrikuti in marriage. Amsu, as the chronicles goes, sent his daughter to Song-tsen Gampo and with her went the Nepalese image of Aksobhya Buddha. This image was considered sacred by the Tibetans for it was said to have been blessed by Buddha himself. The Tibetans always referred to the

Nepalese princess Vrikuti as Belsu, which means the Nepalese Consort. Belsu desired to build a temple of Aksobhya Buddha to install the sacred image she had brought from home. The temple was finally built by filling a small lake with logs and earth brought by a large number of goats. The temple was named Rasa Trulanang Tsakla-Khang, which later was better known as Jokhang. The door of the Temple faced Westward toward Nepal and in front was placed the image of a goat to honor those little animals that served as little porters during the construction period. The foundation of a secular monument, the palace Tritse Marpo, which was the precursor of the modern Potala Palace, is too attributed to Belsa.⁶

The authenticity of this episode hinges over the identification of Song-tsen Gampo with Gocha in the Tibetan chronicle, Ba-stan, and Ladak chronicles. The Tibetan scholars supported by the force of tradition accept the above identification, while the Nepalese scholars deny it altogether and even to go to the extent of saying that Vrikuti was the sister of Narendradeva. It is difficult to reject Song-Amsu matrimonial alliance as a figment of imagination for it is supported by such a powerful tradition as well as the literary evidences; while at the same time it is not possible to accept all the details of the story as infallible truth until we have more documented evidences. Thus, as long as we do not have anything to negate the above contention one has to accept the probability of the above hypothesis.⁷

Friends in peace, Nepal and Tibet were allies in war. Nepal came into a more intimate political alliance with Tibet during the days of the Licchavi king Narendradeva. Tibet, besides giving a political asylum to Narendradeva, helped him to train his army and provided him with arms and ammunition. It was with this well equipped and well trained troops that Narendradeva was able to defeat the Kathmandu ruler Vishnu Gupta and regain his throne.⁸ The Chinese records, in particular, the history of the Tang Dynasty, tends to indicate that Nepal had helped the Tibetan Monarch Song-tsen Gampo in his military exploits of North India.⁹ On the basis of the above evidence the Tibetan and the Chinese records assert that Song-tsen Gampo had exercised some kind of authority over Kathmandu valley. Without entering into this controversy, it would be sufficient for us to say that the nature of political relations

between Nepal and Tibet from 630 to 650 A. D. is still shrouded with mystery. However, it would be more proper for us to assert that Nepal during the first half of the seventh century did offer her help in opening up a new venue of communication between South and East Asia across the Greater Himalayas. Incidentally, it paved the way for Nepal's first direct contact with China via Tibet. The pilgrims and the political missions were the first to take advantage of this direct route. The celebrated Chinese pilgrim Yaun Tsang visited the present Terai regions of Nepal in 637 A. D. and has left a very interesting account of Nepal during the closing years of Amsu-vurma.¹⁰ According to the Tang annals two Chinese envoys too used this new route. One of them was Li-I-piao, an army officer, sent by the Chinese Emperor as an ambassador to India round 627 A. D. to 649. He arrived in Nepal through the Kerong pass and was welcomed by the then sovereign Nating-lipo (Narendradeva). The second Chinese mission led by Wang Hsuan Ts'e passed through Kuti, Banepa and Deopatan enroute to India and was warmly received by Narendradeva.¹¹ Its aim like the former was a goodwill mission to the court of the Emperor Siladitya, Harsha of Kanuja, so that "the principles of humanity and justice which has been difused in that country should have a protector and representative there."¹² But before he arrived in North India the country was in a state of anarchy. Arjuna (O-la-nu-Shunar or Arunsva), a minister who succeeded Harsha, was anti-Buddhist, so this goodwill mission was slaughtered and the tribute seized. But Wang Hsuan Ts'e and one of his men managed to escape to Nepal. It was from Nepal that Wang appealed Song-tsen for help and accordingly received 1200 mountain troops, and together with 700 cavalry supplied by Nepal, attacked India. A three day battle ended in the capture of Arjuna, who was taken to the Chinese court as a vanquished foe.¹³

The official linkage between Nepal and China continued when a Nepalese envoy visited China with presents to the Chinese Emperor, in 647.¹⁴ Four years later, shortly after the death of Song-tsen Gampo, King Narendradeva again sent presents to the Chinese Emperor. Tibet, apparently, was not happy with the developing Sino-Nepalese relations, thus no more Nepalese mission went to China for another 700 years. The death of Song-tsen Gampo too

saw the thawing of Nepal-Tibet relations. As China and Tibet began to assume a hostile posture, the Trans-Himalayan route that linked East and South Asia was also blocked.

In the eighth century A. D. Nepal again formed a venue of cultural communication between Tibet and India. It was the Tibetan Monarch Trisong Detsen who sent Ba-Salnag to Nepal to invite the Indian Pandit Santirakista to come to Tibet and teach the doctrine of Buddhism. But once he started preaching the good news Tibet experienced floods, storm and lightning. This was taken to be a bad omen and hastened his retreat. The minister was again sent to Nepal to extend invitation to another Indian divine Padmasambhava, who was in Nepal at that time. He preached the *tantric* form of Buddhism, which was more acceptable to the Tibetans than the abstract reasonings of Santirakista.¹⁵ The collapse of the Tang Dynasty at the beginning of the tenth century too led to the suspension of Nepal-China relations for about 250 years.

It is said that in the thirteenth century A. D. Kubla Khan was planning to attack India and Nepal. However, Shang Tsun, the administrator of Sakya and the religious divine Ugyen Sengge strongly appealed to resist from such a plan. Thus this ambitious project of expansion was never materialized.¹⁶ The Ming dynasty (1368-1644), though it failed to maintain any meaningful influence in Tibet, however, was successful in establishing a diplomatic relation with the Ram family of Patan (one of the three cities in Kathmandu Valley). The result was that between 1384-1427 five Chinese and seven Nepalese missions were exchanged between the two royal courts.¹⁷ The Mallas of Kathmandu Valley terminated all diplomatic contacts with the Ming after the unification of the Valley under one Malla ruler.¹⁸

Modern researches indicate that Kathmandu Valley did not solely enjoy the distinction of having trade and diplomatic relations with Tibet, in the medieval period. The Chinese records, in particular, the writings of Abbe Hue, informs us that in the fourteenth century the Nepalese merchants in Lhasa were the subjects of the Raja of Palpa (pe-peu or pe-ban.)¹⁹ The Manchus of China had heard of Nepal under the name Palpa.²⁰

An Assertive Nepal in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

As the seventeenth century began to mature we find Nepal asserting herself over Tibet: By the year 1600 Tibet was in a state of Civil War between the two rival Buddhist sects whose headquarters were Lhasa and Sigatse. This state of turmoil in Tibet was exploited by two farsighted Nepalese monarchs: Pratap Malla of Kathmandu and Ram Shah of Gorkha. Ram Shah's Tibetan adventure took place sometime between 1625 and 1630. His first attempt ended in a defeat, however, his second attempt was rewarded with success as he was able to take his army across Kerong up to Kukurghat. This gave Ram Shah Kerong, one of the principal routes between Nepal and Tibet.^{2 1}

The capture of Kerong, though a triumph for Gorkha, was also a direct blow to the *Raja* of Kathmandu for it closed the traditional route between Nepal and Tibet. Pratap Malla, the ruler of Kathmandu, instead of declaring a war with Gorkha for the control of the traditional trade route, decided to capture the second most important route to Tibet, namely, Kuti. He deputed his trusted brother Bhim Malla to accomplish this urgent task. The first attempt of Bhim Malla was also a failure while in his second attempt he was successfully able to march toward Sigatse, where he met the deputies of the Dalai Lama and negotiated a treaty of peace sometime between 1645 and 1650. The treaty stands as a monument to the statesmanship of Bhim Malla and in summary runs as follows:^{2 2}

1. Kathmandu obtained a joint authority over Kuti and Kerong, two trading centers in the border.^{2 3}
2. The trading community in Kathmandu (Newari Merchants) was permitted to establish 32 *kothis* (trade-marts) in Lhasa.

3. The Kathmandu court in Lhasa was represented by a *Naya* (Resident) to look after the interests of the Nepalese community in Lhasa.²⁴
4. Tibet promised not to impose any custom duties on goods bought and sold by the Nepalese merchants in Tibet.
5. Tibet agreed to make a token payment of one *tola buki* gold (worth 12 rupees), 13 *masa* of silver (worth one rupee) and one *pathi* of salt.²⁵
6. Nepal was to mint coins for Tibet bearing the name and symbols of Kathmandu *Raja* for which Tibet was to make payment in gold and silver.
7. Tibet agreed to channelize all her trade with South Asia even that passing through Sikkim, Bhutan via Kathmandu.
8. The property of the deceased Nepalese merchants in Lhasa was to be returned to Nepal.

With a treaty solidly concluded within his fist and with pockets full of gifts, including gold and silver, Bhim Malla returned from the Tibetan border. Accordingly, Nepal received the monopoly of the Trans-Himalayan trade and Kathmandu emerged as the entrepot of this lucrative trade. However, Kathmandu's joint sovereignty over Kuti and Kerong seemed to have lasted only for a quarter of a century. Father Desideria, who was visiting Kuti in 1721 observes "not long ago the fortress and the province of Kuti were subject to the Kingdom of Kathmandu. Now they are subject to the Kingdom of Lhasa."²⁶ Though Nepalese jurisdiction over Kuti lasted for a brief span of 25 years, the Nepalese right to mint coins for Tibet lasted for a longer period. For more than a century the Nepalese currency known as "Mahendra Malli"²⁷ remained the sole legal tender of Tibet. However, the last Malla ruler of Bhadagon, Ranjit Malla, is reported to have sent a large quantity of silver coins and received in exchange quantities of gold and silver. But "tempted by the bait of easy profit" he did not hesitate to debase coins, which became a source of future conflicts with Tibet.²⁸ Other peaceful intercourses continued during the twilight of Malla rule in Nepal. A Tibetan Lama came to Nepal and cured Ranjit Malla, who was in his death-bed. As a reward for his services the Tibetan physician received from the Monarch land money, as well as a title.²⁹

A New Political Context: The War Years (1770-93)

The unification of the Kathmandu valley by 1769 under the Gorkha rule, and its bid for the creation of the Greater Nepal, set the stage for the period of confrontation politics in the Central Himalayas for a period of half a decade. Two factors contributed to the introduction of this new political climate. First, the troubled state of Tibet characterized by disorder and disunity provided a suitable occasion for Kathmandu to revive her traditional territorial and commercial interests in Tibet and, secondly, the control of the Central Himalayas became a necessity if Nepal was to materialize her expansionist program.

However, Nepal did try to maintain her normal commercial interests in Tibet. Accordingly, after the conquest of the Nuwakot valley, Jayaprakash Malla of Kathmandu and Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha signed a treaty in 1757. This agreement gave to Kathmandu and Gorkha equal rights in Tibet. The provisions of this treaty included

1. Kathmandu and Gorkha were to mint coins for Tibet of the same standard, weight and size. These coins and other goods and artifacts were to be sent to Tibet in equal number and quality.
2. Kathmandu and Gorkha representatives were to be stationed in Lhasa, who were to inspect all the goods and loads that passed to and fro between Nepal and Tibet. Goods not examined by the representatives should be confiscated and shared equally by the *Raja* of Nepal and Tibet.
3. Kathmandu-Gorkha traders going to Tibet should use the Nuwakot valley route.
4. The *Raja* of Kathmandu and Gorkha should share the gold and silver coins coming from India and Tibet.³⁰

This treaty only symbolized a pious aspiration of Gorkha and Kathmandu. It was never implemented for it failed to receive the seal of approval of the Tibetan government. Even if the Tibetan government had agreed to the new trade arrangements with Nepal it would have remained a dead letter for the Gorkhals brought about an economic blockade of the Kathmandu Valley in 1763.³¹

This was the beginning of the Gorkha-Malla war, which lasted for a little more than half a decade, during which India's trade with Tibet was seriously disrupted. Once Kathmandu Valley was unified and the quest for Greater Nepal continued, it was hoped that the Trans-Himalayan trade would again flourish with a new impetus. However, this hope was only frustrated for the circumstances compelled the Gorkha ruler to follow a different policy. The rise of the Company Government in India and the policies pursued by the Gorkha ruler of Kathmandu made any meaningful understanding between Nepal, Tibet, and the company government impossible. It is within this framework of political developments that Nepal's relations with Tibet deteriorated into a hostile confrontation which even dragged China and, to a lesser extent, India into the conflict.

The Framework of Trans-Himalayan Trade

The lure of Trans-Himalayan trade was Lhasa; India and Tibet were the principal trading partners while Nepal formed the principal venue through which this trade was conducted. Two factors, both physical and political, helped to strengthen this artery of commerce. First, the barren waste-land of Tibet with little agricultural potentials, yet rich in minerals like gold, rock salt, tinsel, coral, musk and wool made Tibet a fertile ground for the congregation of South Asian traders, and secondly, the policies of the Tibetan government was favorable for trade and commerce. No duties were levied on goods, and trade was protected and free of extractions. Many foreign traders like the Kashmiris and the Gosains,^{3 2} encouraged by these laws, or in other words, allured by the prospect of gain, had settled in Tibet. The Nepalese Newars and Thakali traders had, too, settled in Lhasa and established trade-marts of their own. The genius of the Nepalese government in the encouragement of the Trans-Himalayan trade was no less significant. Nepal under the Malla rule had given every encouragement for the promotion of this trade. Nepal not only levied moderate duties on goods but also made available her valuable surplus manpower for the purpose of transportation.^{3 2} Fathet Desideri, describing Kathmandu in 1722, depicts Kathmandu as the commercial capital in Central Himalayas.

Here many Tibetans as well as the heathens came from Hindustan for trade.³⁴

However, the emergence of new patterns in South Asia, namely, the rise of the British supremacy in the sub-continent and the emergence of the Gorkha power in the Central Himalayas served greatly to politicize this Trans-Himalayan trade. The British, who had come to India as traders and merchants, had by 1760's become a political power. As long as the British were only an economic power in South Asia it was easy for them to establish their factories in the Himalayas. But once they became a political power in the sub-continent they became an object of jealousy and, even fear, to all their neighbors like Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. Thus, it was quite natural for the Trans-Himalayan states to follow a policy of seclusion and splendid isolation.³⁵

It is difficult to assess the value of the Trans-Himalayan trade that passed through Kathmandu in the 1760's. However, it was significant enough to justify a direct military intervention by the British to protect it in 1767, and was in equal estimation later on as seen in George Bogle's mission in Tibet in 1779 and that of Turner in 1873.³⁶ The defeat of Kinloch's military expedition introduced an element of Anglo-phobia in the minds of Prithvi Narayan Shah, which matured with the advent of time. The Gorkha ruler too came to the conclusion that the Kashmiris and the Gosains had encouraged the Kinloch expedition, which the East India Company had sent to help the Mallas of Kathmandu in 1767. Thus, once the Valley of Kathmandu came under the Gorkha rule, the Gosains, who had extensive settlements in the Valley, were the first to be driven out by Prithvi Narayan. Many of them were stripped of their possessions or exposed to severe extraction; thus they had no alternative but to desert. A few of them who, henceforth, risked entry into Nepal had their ears cut off, and then deported.³⁷ They could not enjoy the twin requisites of trade and commerce: freedom and security. The Gorkha actions against the Kashmiris were less severe, for they were not expelled.³⁸ But they too, were not only exposed to crushing taxes on all transactions but also compelled to pay heavy fines on the slightest evasion of taxes.

When Prithvi Narayan came to the throne of Kathmandu the

Teshu Lama of Tibet wrote to him asking him to protect trade and commerce by permitting the merchants, whether Hindus or Muslims, to trade freely. However, he continued, "every body now is afraid to enter your country and it will become poor and desolate"³⁹ The prophesy of Teshu Lama was partly fulfilled for Nepal-Tibet trade came to a virtual halt and by 1774 there were only two Kashmiri houses functioning in Nepal. Two Kashmiris, who had fled from Nepal, established themselves in Lhasa and began to trade via the country of Deba Raj. The Gorkha ruler then formulated two strategies. First he decided to block the access to the Nepalese Himalayas and the Tibetan highland beyond; and secondly he thought of prohibiting all Indian goods in Nepal. But as a total ban on Indian goods was not possible he decided to stop the flow of all English goods into his country.⁴⁰ Ultimately, he shut his passes to all European merchandise and in a letter to the Dalai Lama implored that in return for the access of Indian goods in Tibet the Lama government should join with him in forbidding all goods associated with the East India Company of Bengal. This policy was not acceptable to the Tibetan government thus by 1770's all trade routes via Nepal to Tibet were suspended. However, the Tibetan government needed badly the co-operation of Nepal in the promotion of the Trans-Himalayan trade. Thus, in 1770, the Tibetan government sent presents to Prithvi Narayan with a letter explaining the background of Nepal-Tibet trade and asked for trade intercourse with India via Nepal, and the free movement of peoples between the two countries. The reply sent by the Gorkha *raja* was courteous but non-committal.⁴¹

The policies of Prithvi Narayan, which ended up in closing the Trans-Himalayan trade through Nepal, was however, intended to have the opposite effect. Prithvi Narayan wanted to make his capital, Kathmandu, the only entrepot in the Himalayas, with the Nepalese enjoying the monopoly of this lucrative trade-an idea that never occurred to the Mallas. The visionary program of Prithvi brought, however, more hardship to Nepal than Tibet. The picture of Trans-Himalayan trade in 1760's sharply contrasted with the volume of trade three decades ago. Horce Sella Penna, who passed to and fro through Nepal to India in the latter Malla period paints a very rosy picture of the Trans-Himalayan trade and attributes this pros-

perity to the enlightened policies of the Lamas of Tibet and the Newar kings of the Valley.⁴² But with the advent of the Gorkha rule in Nepal, the Gorkha ruler was looked upon with terror by the Indian merchants so much so that a Gosain who had traded between Tibet and Bengal via Nepal saw the danger of returning through Bijapur (Nepal), where he believed that his wealth would be confiscated. He, thus, preferred to proceed through Bhutan, with the permission of Deba Raj.⁴³

Another source of Nepal-Tibet friction was trade and currency matters. Since the sixteenth century the Mallas of the Nepal Valley had acquired minting rights. Accordingly, Nepalese coins known as "Mahendra Malla", which had an undisputed guarantee of weight, value and fitness, became the sole currency of Tibet for a long time. However, two factors, namely, greed and the exigency of the time paved the way for the loss of this trust. First, the prospect of growing rich by debasing currency took hold of the Malla rulers. Thus, the practise of offering adulterated coins in exchange for pure bullions continued uninterrupted. One source puts Nepal's annual profit through minting coins for Tibet at 100,000 rupees,⁴⁴ a very high sum for the time. Secondly, the exigency of the time, namely, the need to finance a war with the Gorkha ruler had compelled Jayaprakash Malla and Ranjit Malla, the last Malla rulers of the Nepal Valley, to adulterate their currency export to Tibet.

Prithvi Narayan found himself in the middle of this knotty problem the moment he stepped into the shoes of the Malla rulers of the Valley. The trouble sprang from the fact that Lhasa was no longer willing to accept the Nepalese coins unless the new Nepalese ruler could compensate Tibet's financial losses. Prithvi, was aware of this complex problem. As early as 1749, when he was only the *raja* of Gorkha, he had started to mint coins for Tibet.⁴⁵ Prithvi had too successfully concluded a treaty with Lhasa legalizing the circulation of Gorkhali coins in Tibet.⁴⁶ However, now he had to deal with the complex currency problem he inherited from the Mallas. His first move after the conquest of the Nepal Valley was to send a deputation to Tibet with a specimen of his newly minted coins. The Tibetan government refused to accept the newly minted coins of Prithvi. The Tibetan answer in part ran, "we will take your coins

if you take back all money of Nepal that is under circulation."⁴⁷ The Gorkhali court in Kathmandu was in no position to concede to such an uncompromising request of the Tibetans, though it did promise to guarantee the weight, value and fitness of all its new coins. The logic behind Prithvi's rejection of the Tibetan proposal were two in number. First, it was the financial constraints that compelled Prithvi Narayan to reject the Tibetan proposal outright and secondly, the Gorkha ruler argued how he could be made responsible for all the debased coins that went into circulation in Tibet during the Malla period. Kathmandu felt that the new unadulterated coins being issued by the new regime should be exchanged according to its relative merit or in other words the rate of its exchange should be one new coin to two old coins. It was the national interest that took both the governments poles apart thus making even the semblance of a compromise distant and remote.

English Direct Involvement in Trans-Himalayan Trade

As the second half of the eighteenth century began to unfold itself the Company Government was increasingly involved in the Trans-Himalayan trade politics. Two factors helped to accentuate this process, namely, political developments in the Himalayas and the British perception of Tibet. First, towards the close of 1760's Bhutan saw the need of controlling the access through the Himalayan mountains into the Tibetan plateau for mutual benefit thus communicated often with Tibet.⁴⁸ Between 1768 to 1769 Bhutan under the leadership of Deb Raj Desi Shidariva captured the Chumbi valley portion of Sikkim, thus brought an important trade route to Tibet under its control. Before two years had lapsed Bhutan too captured the Indian principality of Kutch Bihar. Among other political developments in the Himalayas was the extension of her victorious arms by Nepal across the East up to the river Tista. This new conquest brought the Gorkhali territory directly in touch with that of the Sikkim *Raja*, a disciple of the Dalai Lama of Tibet. While this expansion was being undertaken Prithvi had too deputed a trade delegation to Tibet to negotiate the crucial currency problem.⁴⁹

However, in 1775 Nepal did attack Sikkim.⁵⁰ The Tibetans

were quick to offer assistance to Sikkim; the Sikkimese though declined troops but accepted food supplies. At Walung a treaty was signed between Nepal and Sikkim in the presence of the Tibetan representatives Shalu Khempo and Dapon Padtsal. Although the issue between Sikkim and Nepal was settled by this truce Nepal was very much annoyed by the role played by Tibet.⁵¹ The initial success of Bhutan was too short-lived for Sikkim with the moral support of Tibet was able to drive the Bhutanese away from the Chumbi valley in 1772; and the *Raja* of Kuch with the help of British was able to do the same.

Secondly, the English perception of Tibet gave a new dimension to the Trans-Himalayan trade. Tibet assumed importance in the eyes of the East India Company not only because she paid all her imports in gold but also due to the fact that the British thought that Tibet could be used as a gateway to Southern China for trade and commerce⁵²

The failure of Kinloch's military expedition did not bring the British effort to open the Trans-Himalayan route to Tibet via Kathmandu to a close. But two missions were despatched shortly for the purpose. The first was that of James Logan, who was due to visit Nepal during 1769-70. He carried with him two letters: one to Jayaprakash Malla and the other to Prithvi Narayan⁵³ and was given the discretion to decide according to circumstances which of the two letters was to be delivered. When Logan arrived in Kathmandu, Prithvi had already crowned himself as the monarch of the Nepal Valley. The British envoy attempted to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Gorkha ruler but was unsuccessful. The East India Company insisted on the route via Nepal as a medium of Trans-Himalayan trade after having rejected the other possible routes. A few words on the other possible routes to Tibet would not be out of context. Two other routes were available to the British. The route via Bhutan was one possible option. Bhutan, though close to the seats of commerce in North and South, had however, no route equal to those that passed through Nepal proper. Another route was the Kumaon route. This route was rejected for two reasons: first it was so remote from Calcutta and the commercial cities of India on the one hand and the Eastern part of Tibet and China on the other.

Again, the people of Bhutan or Kumaon neither had the capital nor the enterprising zeal found in the Newars and the Thakalis of Nepal. Resident Hodgson, while writing to the Governor General of India in 1830 observes:

Nepal is subjected to no one of these disadvantages. Its locality for trade with India, Eastern Bhote and China is excellent. Through it lies the best and the only known roads. Its people (the Newars and the Thakalis) are much superior in wealth, civilization and enterprise to either Kumaonees and Bootaners. They have long used this commerce and are disposed eagerly to increase it as far as they can.⁵⁴

However, the failure of Kinloch⁵⁵ and Logan mission compelled the British to find new trade routes to Tibet. With this objective in mind the British first of all contacted the *raja* of Morang in the Eastern Terai to open up the route via Dhankuta through the Wallanchung pass to Tibet. However, the conquest of Morang and Darjeeling by Prithvi between 1773-74 too blocked this route. Under these circumstances the British turned to Bhutan as their best bet. The British, thus, did not hesitate to respond to the appeal for help made by the *raja* of Kuch against the Bhutanese aggression. Prithvi, hearing that the Deb Raj had seized Kuch Bihar, and made the *raja* a prisoner had asked the Bhutanese King to desist from open hostilities with the British. But this advice came too late. The British intervened militarily and defeated the Bhutanese forces. Humiliation and defeat did help to bring about a political upheaval in Bhutan. Accordingly, the Deb Raj Desi Shidariva was removed from office and the new Deb Raj who succeeded to the throne of Bhutan sued for peace resulting ultimately into a peace treaty between Bhutan and the East India Company.⁵⁶ The treaty, though it contained a little more than extradition clauses, was significant not only because it was the first treaty negotiated by the British with a Himalayan Kingdom but also because it paved the way for the mission of George Bogle in 1779. Bogle was commissioned by the Governor General Warren Hasting to negotiate with Bhutan a passage for the European traders to Tibet. But Bogle found that it was impossible

for him to come to a compromise with both Bhutan and Tibet on the question of the presence of the European merchants in the two countries; but had to be satisfied with the presence of the Hindu-Muslim merchants in these two regions. The Deb Raj politely, yet, firmly said "No" to Bogle's idea of opening the gates of Bhutan to the English traders in one sugar coated sentence. First, he asserted that he was unable to guarantee the security of the English traders in the wooded mountainous terrain of Bhutan and secondly, the choleric temperament⁵⁷ of the Bhutanese would lead to an endless chain of disputes and misunderstandings with the Company, which he would be unable to cope with.⁵⁸ The report presented by George Bogle in part ran:

After many tiresome conferences and fruitless negotiations in which I was assisted by Teshu Lama's people, I at length obtained Deva Raja's consent to allow Hindu and Muslim Merchants to pass through Bhutan under some restrictions and concessions. . . .⁵⁹

In spite of the agreement with the Deva Raja Bogle continued to cherish the necessity and the urgency of opening a trade route through Nepal. In this connection Bogle was quick to observe that "the opening of the road through Nepal and obtaining the abolition of duties and extractions which has lately been imposed on trade in that country appears to be object of great importance towards establishing a free communication between Bengal and Tibet."⁶⁰ He too visualized that the death of Prithvi Narayan Shah would offer a favorable opportunity in this direction. As a student of *laissez-faire* theory,⁶¹ he saw that once the road was opened to Tibet via Nepal the merchants left to themselves would discover the laws that are necessary for the conducting of this trade and self interest would promote the trade to the maximum extent.⁶² The opening of an alternative trade route to Tibet would have sounded a death knell to Kathmandu's hitherto premier position in Trans-Himalayan trade, which Prithvi was attempting to restructure on his own terms. Prithvi tried to outmanoeuvre the British by sending a diplomatic mission to Panchen Lama aimed to persuade the administrative head of Tibet to use his good office to mediate between

the Company and Bhutan so as to prevent the growth of English influence in the Himalayas. Panchen Lama in his reply admitted the wisdom of the Gorkha ruler but did not hesitate to remind him that had Nepal been more open and practical on the question of trade and had not encouraged Bhutan in the way she did things would have taken a different turn.⁶³

Panchen Lama, however, did act in the line of Prithvi Narayan's thoughts and did offer a mediatory role in Bhutan-Company dispute. This incidentally proved to be the first official contact between the Company Government and Tibet and to the surprise and even anger of Nepal paved the way for Bogle's mission to Tibet. It is an irony of history that the counsel of Prithvi to Panchen Lama only helped to accelerate British influence in the Himalayan belt, the very evil it hoped to combat. Prithvi reacted to Bogle's mission both physically and diplomatically. On the diplomatic front he hurriedly despatched in envoy, Lal Giri, to Tshilhunpo carrying letters to the regent of Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama; while physically, he was able to occupy the Morang district, thus gaining control of the Wallang Chung pass to Tibet. His letters to the Tibetan rulers contained the following features:

1. desired Lhasa to put a ban on the importation of luxury articles from India like glasses and other curiosities.
2. hoped that Tibet would encourage no relationship with the Mughals, thus uphold the ancient custom.
3. wished that Tibet would circulate his coins. A specimen of 2,000 rupees was sent.⁶⁴

In this way Prithvi was able to use his physical prowess as well as diplomatic skills simultaneously in an effort to obtain the desired goal. Unfortunately, his premature death in 1775 brought an end to Nepal-Tibet negotiations at least for the time being for she was absorbed in the domestic front with the problems associated with the succession of a minor king.

The death of Prithvi Narayan brought a sign of relief in both the British and the Tibetan camps and hoped that the new administration of Nepal would be more cooperative in the promotion of the Trans-Himalayan trade. The Panchen Lama, with the hope of concluding a satisfactory trade and coinage pending between the

two countries wrote to Singha Pratap Shah, the new ruler of Nepal. The letter, besides expressing heart-felt sympathy at the sorry demise of his father and an advice that he should not let his heart down too contained these lines:

You have now succeeded to the throne, and it is proper that you attend to the happiness of your people and allow the merchants as Hindus, Musalmans and the four castes, to go and come and carry on their trade freely, which will tend to your advantage and to your good name. At present they are afraid of you and no one will enter your country. Whatever has been the ancient custom let it be observed between you and me. It is improper that there should be more on your part, and it is improper that there should be more on mine.⁶⁵

The Nepalese new administration responded immediately and directly. A group of Nepalese officials under the leadership of Rup Narayan Karki was deputed to the border town of Kuti, where he met the Tibetan counterpart Shelu Khenpo and Depon Padstal.

An agreement was concluded on the monetary question in August 1775 (V. S. 1832). The chief provisions of this treaty may be summed up as follows.

1. Nepal agreed to send gold and silver coins to Tibet according to the specimen given by the Tibetans. However, representatives of both countries would determine the composition of the sample of the gold and silver coins.
2. Tibet was to close the Eastern trade route and conduct trade through Kerong and Kuti.
3. In case of default the defaulting party should pay to the defaulted party 50 *dharnis* of gold.⁶⁶

This treaty, through it was a valuable legal document designed to regulate the commercial well-being between the two governments, was not strong enough to make its effect lasting and enduring. The reason being that the treaty was silent on two crucial issues, namely, the exchange rate of the debased Malla currency, and the nature of trading structure that was to institutionalize the commercial relations between the two states. To make the matters worse Tibet refused to

stop the circulation of the old coins; and even went to the extent of opening a new trade route in the East, which was a gross violation of the treaty of 1775.⁹⁷ The most one can say of this immature treaty is that it provided a brief span of peace. This temporary lull was welcomed by both the states for they faced the task of setting their own houses in order. However, those three years of peace were not entirely uneventful in the diplomatic front. Nepal agreed to allow the presence of the representative of the court of Sikkim during Nepal-Tibet deliberations. Accordingly, Nepal was able to fix her boundary with Sikkim. Another interesting development in this period was that Tibet agreed to pay to Nepal a sum of 4,000 rupees as compensation to Nepal for the death of the four Nepalese Brahman envoys to the court of Sikkim. Kathmandu on the other hand agreed to sever all connection with Bhutan and to stop her encroachment against Sikkim. However, as soon as Nepal had set her house in order she violated her agreement with Tibet and invaded Sikkim late in 1775.⁹⁸

First Nepal-Tibet War: 1788-89

Almost two decades of negotiations could not bring the South Asian states to agree to an acceptable compromise on the structure of Trans-Himalayan trade. The inability of Nepal and Tibet to compromise their national interests on the monetary question stood as the major setback. Moreover, the change of leadership in South Asia introduced an element of political uncertainty during which a viable economic order in the Himalayas could not be worked out. In Tibet we witness the passing of the third Panchen Lama, the most powerful figure in the Tibetan politics. In Nepal the power of the minor king Pratap Singh was being slowly concentrated in the hands of his uncle Bahadur Shah, whose ideas on trade and commerce was different from that of Prithvi Narayan; and finally, in India, Warren Hastings who wanted to use the Trans-Himalayan route to trade with Tibet and beyond, was replaced by Lord Cornwallis. The new Governor General feared the Company's involvement in the endless disputes with foreign powers. In short, the interest of Cornwallis in the Trans-Himalayan trade was at best the minimum.

These new political developments helped to shape the politics of physical confrontation in the Himalayas, which brought China and even to some extent India into the conflict.

The death of the third Panchen Lama during a good will visit to China and the quarrel between his two brothers, Drungpa Truluk and Shamer Truluk, over his property compelled Shamer Truluk to flee Tibet and come to Nepal via Sikkim. The decision of the Court of Nepal to give a political asylum to Shamer Truluk, and according to one source even a *Jagir* (fifedom)⁶⁹ brought a new wave of turmoil in the Trans-Himalayan politics, which lasted for nearly half a decade. The regent Bahadur Shah took a calculated risk in welcoming the Tibetan political refugee leader. This provided Nepal an opportune moment to intervene in the Tibetan internal politics. With Shamer Lama as a hostage, Bahadur Shah became optimistic of a new treaty on currency matter. Shamer on the other hand hoped that he could use Nepal's help to have himself reinstated into the regency council or even occupy the high office of the Panchan Lama.⁷⁰ The Indian records point out that, once in Nepal, Shamer Truluk became an advisor to the Regent on the Chinese affairs⁷¹ and as such must have played a crucial role in shaping Nepalese mood to go to war with Tibet.

At the time when Shamer was busy giving advice to the Regent, a Tibetan pilgrim was making a routined trip to Kathmandu to purchase some medicine and to offer prayers to Budhist deities. The Regent sent through him a message to the Tibetan government, which contained two grievances as well as hinted to future Nepalese actions if the grievances were not met. The content of the letter in summary were:

1. Tibet was asked to discontinue the old debased Malla coins and in return Nepal promised to mint only pure coins.
2. Lhasa was also to see that the salt exported to Nepal was unadulterated.
3. Nepal was to keep Shamer Lama as a hostage; and would occupy the districts of Nyanag Rongsar and Kyrong untill the Nepalese demands were met.⁷²

Shamer Lama also sent a letter to Tibet asking himself to be ransomed on the Nepalese terms. Tibet, however, was in no mood

to listen to Nepalese demands. But her reaction to the above demands was direct and significant. First, the *Kashag* (Tibetan Cabinet) alerted the border districts to a possible Gorkha invasion; and secondly, it sent a reply to the Nepalese letter placing the entire blame of the currency matter on Nepal herself. Tibet, asserted that the currency problem was Nepal's own creation and it was for her to come up with a solution that would be satisfactory to both the countries. *Kashag* rejected the Nepalese suggestion to devalue the old debased Malla coins for it would upset the Tibetan economy. As to the quality of salt imported by Nepal it was the duty of the inspectors on both sides to determine its purity. Finally, on the question of Shamer Lama the Tibetan position was that Shamer had gone to Nepal according to his own sweet will, thus *Kashag* was not interested in his safety and welfare, though he would be welcomed if he returned.⁷³

Nepal's reaction to this Tibetan letter was sharp and immediate. As diplomatic moves had been futile, Nepal decided to use the last option left to her to fulfil her objective, namely, resort to war. Nepal's war aims had been disputed ever since the war broke out. The Tibeto-Chinese and the English sources mention that the desire to loot and plunder constituted a principal war aim of Nepal.⁷⁴ Nepal did plunder the Tibetan religious establishments in this war; but this was only secondary or even "accidental". The antecedents as well as the follow-up of this war indicate that Nepal was more concerned with the fundamental issues like the structure of Trans-Himalayan trade and coinage than with mere booty that could be derived from the monasteries. Again the thesis that the Nepal regency was tempted by the stories of great riches in Teshu Lama's palaces brought by the refugee Lama Shamer, is, at best, controversial. Nepalese had heard of the wealth and affluence of Tibet from times immemorial and did not have to wait for the Lama to tell them.⁷⁵

Nepal's war aims in this conflict were two in number: first, she wished to settle the issue of the debased Malla coins that had been shelved since the twilight of the Malla rule; and secondly, Nepal hoped to monopolize the Trans-Himalayan Trade and make Kathmandu, the commercial capital between South and East Asia. The arrival of the Tibetan reply was a green signal for the regency to be

on the offensive. The Nepalese army invaded Tibet from two major passes: Kuti and Kerong. The Kuti force was led by Kazi Damodar Pandey. The other prominent officers were Bum Shah, Sardar Parwal Lama, Deva Datta, Pratiman Rana and Tika Keshari. The Kerong troops were led by Kalu Pandey, with Madhav Subha being his principal supporter. Both Kuti (Nyanag) and Kerong (Rongshar) fell with little resistance. However, at Jhunga (Dzongka) the Tibetans offered a stiff battle but ultimately had to surrender it to the Gorkhalis. The principal theater of war was, however, the Kuti region. Damodar Pandey was able to capture Tingri and move ahead to lay siege on Shekar Dzong, which controlled the principal defence route to Sigatse. The Tibetans were able to put a strong defence line at Shekar Dzong, which compelled the Gorkhalis to retreat, but finally they did retain control over Kuti, Kerong, Jhunga and Shekar Dzong.⁷⁶

Nepal's advances into Tibet caused a sensation in Lhasa. The usual course for Tibet would have been to appeal to the Chinese Emperor for help. But the Teshu Lama of Tibet did not even inform the Chinese Emperor of this new political development but rather appealed to the Company Government in India for assistance.⁷⁷ The English, however, denied help to Tibet on the ground that Tibet was a vassal to China, and that such a step would affect British trade with China. One can only conjecture why the Tibetan administrative head moved toward India for help rather than China. It seems that the Tibetan government felt that it was not advisable to bring the military presence of China in to Tibet,

However, the Manchu Emperor, after being informed by the Amban in Lhasa of the Nepalese invasion of Tibet, asked his General Pa-Chung and the governor of Szechuan to proceed toward Tibet to investigate the situation. Accordingly, an advance unit under Chueng-teh (Shen-T'ai-tu) arrived in Lhasa in early 1789. He informed the Tibetan authorities that he had been sent to drive the Nepalese away. The Tibetan *Kashag*, which had been denied help from India was more than happy to use the Chinese army to drive the Gorkhalis. The Tibetans immediately deputed Tenzin Paljor Doring to guide the Chinese army. Doring writes in his memoirs that when the Chinese army reached Sigatse it began to show

signs of reluctance to push forward. After staying in Sigatse for five days the Chinese commander made two lame excuses for delaying the advance. First, if they advanced without waiting for the main body of the Chinese army it would only invite defeat and disgrace and secondly, to wait for the Imperial army at Sigatse would be equally disastrous, for the total number would be too great to be supported by the local population and the resources of the town.⁷⁸

His twin excuses hinted that he preferred to retreat. His state of mind becomes more clear in his suggestion that Doring should communicate to the Dalai Lama about the possibility of negotiating a peace treaty with the Gorkhalis. But the Tibetan guide replied boldly with emphasis that "we have been sent to fight and fight we must",⁷⁹ Finally, the Imperial troops decided to advance half-heartedly to Shekar. The Tibetan records indicate that the Chinese army proved to be more of hindrance than help. The Tibetan army had no intention to make a truce with the Gorkhalis. However, the father of the new Panchen Lama and the secretary of the Sakya Lama yielded to the Chinese pressure and negotiation was opened.⁸⁰

Nepal Tibet Negotiations: The Kerong Treaty of 1789

The Tibetan side was represented by Kalon Doring, the father of the Panchen Lama and the secretary of the Sakya Lama; while the Nepalese side at Kerong was represented by Bam Shah, Harihar Upadhyaya, Nara Singh Shahi, and of course, Shamer Truluk. As the negotiations proceeded Nepal demanded 50 *dharnis* of gold, for the Tibetans had violated the treaty of 1775. This was, however, not acceptable to the Tibetans, so Nepal asked for the cession of Kuti together with the payment of 1000 *dotseds* of silver (more than 150,000 rupees). But these stiff demands unnerved the Tibetans and the negotiations virtually collapsed. Ultimately, after several days of tough bargaining, the Tibetan side brought forth a compromised formula, which was acceptable to both parties and the treaty was finally signed by June 2, 1789. There is no authoritative text of the treaty and the Tibeto-Chinese and the Nepalese versions are full of discrepancies. The main provisions of this treaty may be summarized as follows:

1. Tibet decided to accept the new coins of Nepal and fixed the rate of exchange of the old coins at the rate of two Malla coins to one new (Nepalese) coin.
2. Tibet promised to pay an annual tribute of 300 *dotseds* of silver (57,600 rupees)
3. Nepal agreed to withdraw her troops from the occupied areas (four districts of Tibet). This clause of the treaty was conditional, that is, it was to be carried out only after Nepal received her first year of tribute.
4. Nepal was to have a representative in Lhasa to guard her trading interests.
5. If a Nepalese committed crime in Tibet he would be punished by the Nepalese representative in the area, or in other words, the Tibetan officials would have no jurisdiction over cases in which Nepalese were involved.
6. Tibet agreed to give to Nepal unadulterated salt.
7. Nepal promised not to invade Tibet any more.
8. A Tibetan Lama was to visit the sacred shrines of Kathmandu every year to pay homage to the Buddhist deities.
9. Though the Nepalese could trade in Tibet, yet the Tibetans could not enter Nepal for the purpose of trade.
10. Tibet agreed to close the trade routes through Sikkim and Bhutan, and thus direct all trade between Tibet and South Asia via Kathmandu.⁸¹

The terms of the treaty looked more like the conditions imposed by a conquerer upon the conquered. Many of the stipulations of the treaty are one-sided; for example, the right to station a representative, the sending of traders, and the method of punishing the Nepalese offenders in Tibet. The Tibetan government did not enjoy the same privileges in Nepal. Besides unequal clauses what was more humiliating to the Tibetans was the imposition of 300 *dotseds* of silver as an annual tribute.⁸²

The role of China in drafting this peace treaty has been controversial. Nepalese sources indicate that the Chinese Amban had acted as a mediator in the negotiations;⁸³ while the Chinese accounts indicate that the Chinese Ambans came to know of the treaty only after it was signed. However, the Tibetan accounts indicate that

the Chinese Ambans had taken part in the negotiations. Kalon Doring writes in his memoris that the Chinese were afraid of the conduct of the Ambans in the peace negotiations, thus they took the original treaty with them and removed parts with their own seal before they showed it to the Emperor.⁸⁴

The Gorkha troops withdrew from the occupied lands after the receipt of 300 *dotseds*. A senior Tibetan official also visited Nepal and asked for the reduction of the annual tribute and which Nepal did promise to consider. After the war Tibet felt the lack of leadership, so she summoned the regent Ngawang Tseltrim from Peking for his administrative experience was sorely needed. Once in office at Lhasa, he scolded the Kashag (cabinet) for entering into a humiliating treaty with Nepal. He demoted generals, who had surrendered their territory to the Gorkhalis and promoted those who had carried their duties. He, also started a new gesture of friendship to Nepal by sending two officials⁸⁵ with one half of the annual tribute for 1790-91. Nepal refused to negotiate with the two senior Tibetan officials on the ground that they were of the fourth ranking cadre.⁸⁶ But she made it clear that the door of negotiation would be kept open if Tibet was to send a person of ministerial rank like Kalon Doring. The Tibetan cabinet (*Kashag*) was even willing to send Kalon Doring but the Regent refused to send any delegation to Nepal to beg to reduce the tribute. The reason he gave was that Nepal had the habit of refusing the Tibetan envoys. He further asserted that if Nepal wanted tribute she could come to collect it. Unfortunately the Regent died of heart attack in Potala on April 29, 1790.

The death of the Regent brought a reversal of the Tibetan tactics. The *Kashag* decided to send two members of ministerial rank, Kalon Doring and Kalon Yuthok, together with seven assistants, to Kuti to meet the Nepalese counterpart. The official reason given by the Tibetans for the purpose of this delegation was to carry out the repair of the Buddhist establishments, but the real reason was obviously political. At Kuti the Tibetan party met Bam Shah Damodar Pandey, Subba Bhajinath and Shamer Truluk. The Tibetan ministers too brought with them 150 *dotseds* of silver, which constituted a balanced payment for 1790-91.⁸⁷

What followed in Kuti is difficult to assess for, the Nepalese and

the Tibetans give different versions. The Nepalese sources tell us that while the Nepalese delegation was one day's march from Kuti, the Tibetans made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Shamer Lama. The Nepalese captured the Tibetan delegation and sent them to Kathmandu, and continued their deeper penetration to Tibet.⁸⁸ The Tibetan version asserts that at Kuti the Nepalese representative sought permission to hold the *Mahadeva* festival. Accordingly, the Nepalese sepoy entered into the fort of Tibetans in the guise of coolies and rice traders amidst song and music. In the early hour, the Nepalese attacked the Tibetans who had been watching the celebration. The minister and his party were then put in chains and despatched to Kathmandu.⁸⁹

Whatever be the truth in these two positions, one point is clear: both sides were not able to bury their differences and the war rolled on with increasing vigor and swiftness in the middle of 1791. Also, whoever may have been responsible for this second phase of war, it had far-reaching consequences which helped to shape the domestic and foreign policies of Nepal and Tibet.

The Second Nepal-Tibet war (1791-92)

The second Nepal-Tibet war was more significant and of greater magnitude than the first war of 1789 both in its theater of operation as well as in its consequences. This, besides being confined to Nepal and Tibet, saw the involvement of both China and India. Nepal sent an army of 4,000 to Tibet on the ground that the latter had not been true to the treaty obligations of 1789, under the command of Damodar Pandey, Bam Shah and Deva Datta Thapa, on August 6, 1791. The Nepalese army marched along the main trade route of Sigatse. Tingri was captured in the middle of August and the Nepalese army reached Sigatse on September 17. Drungpa Truluk, the Regent of the young Panchen Lama fled away leaving Tashilhunpo treasury to the invading Gorkhali army just half a mile away. Once Sigatse (Digarche) was captured Damodar Pandey demanded from Tibet 50 *dharnis* of gold for the violation of the treaty of 1789 and also a tribute of 600 *dotseds* of silver due to Nepal for 1790 and 1791. When the Nepalese demands were rejected the Nepalese army plundered

the Tasilhunpo monastery and carried away gold, silver and jewels of the altar.⁹⁰ The value of the artifacts looted by the Nepalese from the monastery will always be debated: the Nepalese always trying to minimize the loot, while the Tibetans always exaggerating it. However, the damage done by the raid on Gorkha-Tibet relations was irreparable. Among others, the psychological impact of the Gorkhali invasion was more significant for it led not only to the desecration of a holy place but also the plunder of its ornaments.

But at the height of Gorkhali success misfortune poured in from two directions in the form of foreign intervention and an epidemic. An epidemic attributed by the Tibetans to the divine curse caused much confusion amidst the Gorkha ranks compelling many of the sepoys to retire along with their officers.⁹¹ At this juncture the Chinese Emperor too decided to throw his weight behind the Tibetans. China decided to intervene in the Trans-Himalayan politics for two reasons: first, the Lama of Digarche, who was the spiritual father of the Emperor of China, had asked the court of Peking for assistance; and secondly, the conquest by the Gorkhali of Tashilhunpo, the capital of Tsang Province, put the defenses of Lhasa at a stake, thus China was naturally drawn into this conflict.⁹²

The Chinese Emperor, being enraged by the religious and political crimes committed by Nepal sent a large army of 70,000 men under his trusted general Fu-k'ang-an, to punish the Gorkhalis.⁹³ This army was divided into two divisions of 30,000 and 40,000 each. Damodar Pandey faced the odious task of stemming the tide of Chinese invasion. The small Nepalese army was ill-prepared, ill-equipped and in ill-health and hence, was in no position to meet such a show of Chinese strength. The Nepalese defences crumbled down and the army began to retreat rapidly until it came to Nuwakot, (13 *Kos* or 26 miles) from Kathmandu. A final showdown occurred at Betravati on the banks of the river Tadi above Nuwakot.⁹⁴

This Trans-Himalayan war inflicted a heavy toll on both sides. The Chinese army lay exhausted and war-weary for it was so far from their home base. The losses in terms of men and money was by no means small, though the exact data are not available. The Nepalese army, on the other hand was to face the hazards of a rapid retreat from Tibet, through the Hatia pass. Damodar Pandey conduc-

ted the first retreat from Tibet. The luxury of the Tibetan adventure paid a heavy price: two thousand Gorkhalis were frozen to death and no doubt many more were crippled and maimed or life.⁹⁵

The Nepalese Court panicked, and, in an effort to avert the rising tide of misfortune, decided to do two things: first, Nepal decided to surrender Shamer Truluk, but as the Lama committed suicide, apparently by poisoning himself, Nepal lost the trump card; secondly, she quickly sent a deputation to Lord Cornwallis for military assistance. The Governor General, however decided not to burn his finger in the Trans-Himalayan politics, though he did promise to act as a mediator in the dispute.⁹⁶ Thus Nepal was left by herself to settle this unequal war.

In an hectic move Bahadur Shah, the Regent, transferred the royal treasury to Makwanpur⁹⁷ and the war took its own course. The Nepalese army built its final defense on the banks of the river Tadi. The Tibeto-Chinese army was far superior in number and possessed a light artillery. The two armies faced each other for some time. The Chinese army had, by this time, suffered very heavily due to climate, wind and the psychological blow of the sheer distance, and was in no mood to push forward. The Chinese general in fury had to turn his guns against his own men. The result was the army advanced and won a decisive victory against the Gorkhalis in September, 1792.⁹⁸

With the enemy only a day's march from the capital Nepal sued for peace. The peace terms of the treaty signed between Nepal and Tibet were as follows:

1. Nepal and Tibet were to maintain friendly relations, or in other words, avoid hostilities against each other.
2. The future disputes between Kathmandu and Lhasa were to be submitted to the Chinese Ambans in Lhasa for settlement.
3. Nepal was to send quinquennial mission to China with gifts⁹⁹ to the Emperor. The Chinese government was to bear the cost of the Nepalese mission, provide transit facilities, and send gifts in return.
4. The boundary between Nepal and Tibet was to be demarcated by the Chinese officials.
5. China would help Nepal if she was invaded by a foreign power.

6. Nepal would return the articles seized from Tasilhunpo monastery and would send back the remains of Shamer Truluk together with his family and his followers.
7. Nepal would never again bring the coinage problem or claims based upon the treaty of 1789.¹⁰⁰

Impact of the War in Nepal and Tibet

The war ended. A stone pillar was erected by the Chinese in Lhasa to commemorate this monumental victory. The inscription in part ran:

They (Tibeto-Chinese army) captured the important places and at the same time captured the roads in the gorges. Not considering injustices to hands and feet they fought seven battles. The thieves (Gorkhalis) were panic stricken.¹⁰¹

The Nepalese chronicles, however, point out that having cut the Chinese army to pieces the Chinese Emperor thought it better to make peace with the Gorkhalis.¹⁰²

Both the Nepalese and the Chinese versions have made claims of having compelled each other to sue for peace terms. But one thing is certain: the war took a heavy toll on both sides. The Gorkhalis were virtually driven to the threshold of their capital; while the troops of China had both psychologically and physically suffered much, for, by the time they had arrived at Nuwakot it refused to push further. Kirkpatrick argues that

A little more firmness on the part of the Regency would have speedily compelled the Chinese who had suffered greatly from sickness and scarcity and were not less impatient to quit Nepal, than the Nepalese were to get rid of them.¹⁰³

Whatever, may have been the truth in the above argument Nepal and China were both not victors in this war, the greatest losers were the Tibetans. Nepalese merchants continued to trade in Lhasa as before; and the Nepalese currency continued to circulate. To Tibet

the Chinese help in the war proved to be catastrophic. Tibet was made more dependent upon China than before. Charles Bell gives the following account of the Chinese control over Tibet:

The Tibetan officials both lay and ecclesiastical were ordered to submit all important matters to the Amban. Even the Dalai and Tashi Lama were instructed to refer their request to the Ambans; they were prohibited from direct communication with the Emperor. Chinese officials were posted at Sigatse, at Tingri on the Nepalese border and at Cham-do and Tra-ya in the Eastern Tibet. ¹⁰⁴

Nepal, though defeated in the war was fortunate enough to negotiate terms that were either fully humiliating or catastrophic. In short, the war left little impact in the general way of Nepalese life. Her military capability remained undisturbed; and the people soon forgot about the Chinese invasion.

English Involvement in the Second Nepal-Tibet War

The British, being a major power in South Asia with their frontier joining both with Nepal and Tibet, and, having commercial relations with China naturally, came to be involved in this conflict. The English involvement, though direct, was non-militaristic in character. Both Tibet and Nepal approached the Company Government for help during the war for different reasons. Nepal corresponded to seek military assistance, while Tibet's objective was to negate any possible British help to Nepal. Nepal in the middle of August 1792, had asked for ten guns and the same number of men who could use them.¹⁰⁵ However, as the Chinese invasion rolled on, within a short span of about two weeks, Nepal asked for British troops in an effort to turn the tide of the catastrophic war.¹⁰⁶ The letter of the Dalai Lama of Tibet to Lord Cornwallis of August 3, 1792 was in the form of information as well as an appeal. First, the Governor General was informed of the unprovoked aggression of the Gorkhalis against the peace loving Tibetans; and secondly, His Lordship was requested to remain neutral in the conflict, or in other

words, "not to despatch any troops in the conflict." This letter also showed that the Tibetans were confident of victory and the ultimate capture of the whole country. Accordingly, the Governor General was requested to hand over all the Gorkhals fleeing to India to the Chinese officers.¹⁰⁷

Lord Cornwallis, after considerable hesitation decided to send a one-man mission in the person of Captain Kirkpatrick, who would act as a mediator between Nepal and Tibet in an effort to bring the hostilities to a close. However, mediation was not the only factor that motivated the Governor General to despatch this mission. His real object was to oblige Nepal so that her territory could be used as a convenient route to promote trade between Tibet and Bengal; and, if possible, even establish an English representative in Kathmandu, to look after the English trading interests.¹⁰⁸ The letters written by Lord Cornwallis to Dalai Lama and the *Raja* of Nepal was that war would only contribute to the misery of their subjects; thus he would send an envoy, who enjoyed his full confidence for the purpose of mediation.¹⁰⁹ But before Kirkpatrick's mission arrived in Nepal a treaty between Nepal and Tibet was already concluded. Nepal, thus, no longer needed the English assistance, so the envoy was politely asked to leave the country without the package of commercial treaty he had hoped. The mission of Kirkpatrick only had a negative effect. It only served to alienate China from the British, for the former was convinced that the latter had helped the Gorkhals in the conflict. Accordingly, Tibet closed its door to all European influence. The door of Tibet, which Warren Hastings was able to open a little was closed until 1904, when Younghusband's military expedition to Tibet established the direct formal relations between India and Tibet.¹¹⁰

Nepal and Tibet (1793-1853); A Period of Live-and-Let-Live

Nepal Tibet relations for a little more than half a century can be characterized by the expression "Live-and-let-live." Both countries preferred not to interfere with each other in their foreign and domestic policies. In 1807 (V.E. 1864) Nepal's attempt to introduce its currency in Tibet was rejected by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Then as the

year 1814 approached Nepal realized that the English invasion was imminent and thus began to search for allies. First of all, Nepal asked for assistance from the Tibetan government. The records do not show whether Tibet sent an official reply or not; yet letters were written by the Tibetan administration to the heads of all the monasteries in Tibet which asked them to offer prayers for Nepal's success in the war.¹¹¹ It appears that the Tibetan Regent wrote a letter to the Nepalese *Raja* advising him to settle the dispute with the English in the best possible terms.¹¹² Nepal, too, sent a "tribute" or (gift mission) to China in 1813, which sought military help from China but was refused. When the mission leader tried to seduce China into the Anglo-Nepalese conflict by saying that the English would probably disapprove the tribute being sent to China, the Chinese Emperor angrily replied:

Tell me you dare not report this language to me. As a matter of fact they can join the Feringhi rule if they like, so long as they send us tribute and so long as the Feringhi (English) does not cross Tangut (Tibetan) frontier.¹¹³

In the 1830's the senior queen of Nepal together with her allies, the Pandeys, twice communicated with the Chinese Emperor. The first occasion was when queen complained that the king was selling his kingdom to the *Firinghi* (English) and the other was when She sent a tribute mission in a private capacity. the objective was to win the favor of the Chinese Emperor but the Emperor decided not to listen to those complaints. Again in 1841, Nepal seemed to have offered assistance to the Chinese Emperor but was declined. It was in the 1840's that Nepal was reported to have asked from Tibet compensation for British encroachment in South. Asia This appeal was sent both to China and Tibet. But the Emperor, however, not only refused to give Nepal land, money, and troops but also scolded her for making such a "silly request."¹¹⁴ This was followed by another curious proposal Nepal is said to have made to Tibet. This proposal in short, desired permission from the Emperor to rule Chirong and Niram¹¹⁵ for three years for each ten years of Tibetan rule of these two districts.¹¹⁶ There is little logic in either

one of these requests; and if they were ever made they only reflect the political turmoil Nepal experienced between 1841 and 1846 during which we see a dearth of mature judgement and sound leadership.

In 1847 China, for the first time, appears in the diplomatic annals of the two countries. Accordingly, King Surendra informed the Chinese Emperor of the abdication of his father and his own accession.¹¹⁷ This was a new foreign policy innovation in the diplomatic history of Nepal. Two factors led to this innovation. First, since by this time, Nepal was in close political communion with the British, Nepal thought that it was her duty to inform a powerful neighbour like China of the political developments within the country. Secondly, the abnormal times characterised by alarms, change in ministries and increasing suspicion that culminated into the explosive night of Fourteenth September 1846 and its after events, led Jang Bahadur to seek legitimacy for his actions by external powers. Above all, the government of Jang Bahadur felt that the recognition of both India and China would help to institutionalize his government. Thus, the abnormal situation led to this new foreign policy innovation, which ever since became a distinct feature of her foreign policy. This background sets the stage for the beginning of this study, which analyzes Nepal-Tibet relations from 1850 to 1930—a crucial period in Trans-Himalayan politics.

Foot Notes

1. The word *purana* refers to a story of ancient origin dealing with the origin of the world, lives of warriors, heroes and other people of merit and distinction.
2. *Treta yuga* is one of the four *yugas* (ages), which make up one great age. They are named from number on dice, *satya*, *dvapar*, *reta* and *kali*, and are accordingly supposed to last for periods represented by proportion of 4:3:2:1. For a more elaborate analysis of the Hindu division of time and space see E. J. Rapson's "The Purnas"; E.J. Rapson(ed.)*The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. 1(Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1962), pp. 264-84.
3. The term Nepal valley has been used throughout this study to denote Kathmandu valley only.

4. Daniel Wright (ed.), *History of Nepal (Vamsabali)* (Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1958), pp. 45-46.
5. For a detailed analysis on "mass culture" see Raymond William, *Culture and Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 295-338; Ronald Stromberg, *European Intellectual History, Since 1789* (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1968), pp. 247-255.
6. Tsepon, W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), p. 25; D. R. Regmi, *Ancient Nepal* (Calcutta: K. L. Mukopadhyaya, 1969), p. 364; Sylvain Levi, *Nepal: Historical Study of Hindu Kingdom* vol. 1, Trans. into English (trans. n. k.) typed copy in Kaisher Library, p. 190
7. Three scholarly studies perpetuating the above Tibetan hypothesis are: Sylvain Levi, *Nepal op.cit.*, p. 190; Francis Tucker, *Gorkha: The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal* (London: Constable & Co., 1951). p. 17, W. D., Shakabpa. *Tibet, op. cit.* p. 25. The clearest expression of the Nepalese position is seen in, D. R. Regmi, *Ancient Nepal, op. cit.* p. 364; H. N. Jha, *The Licchavis (of Vasali)* (*Banaras: Chowkhamba, Sanskrit Series Office, 1972*), pp. 159-60.
8. Kavita Govind Shrestha, "King Narendradeva and His Times" (Unpublished Matster's Dissertation, History Dept., Tribhuvan Univ., 1975), p. 29; see also Narendradevas Anantalingesvara Inscription, D. V. Vazracharya (ed.) *Licchavikalka Avilekha* (Kathmandu: Institute of Nepal and Asian Studies, 1974) p. 485.
9. For a more detailed account of alliance between Nepal and Tibet during this Tibetan invasion see, Leo E. Rose, *Nepal Strategy for Survival* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 11-12.
10. Watters, *Yaun Chwang's Travels in India* (Delhi: Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, 1961), p. 83
11. D. R. Regmi, *Ancient Nepal, op. cit.* p. 192; H. N. Jha, *The Licchavis (of Vasaili), op. cit.*, p. 137
12. *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Bengal VI* (1837) p. 69
13. *Ibid.*
14. Huang Sheng-Chang., "China and Nepal", *Peoples China* May 1, 1956, p. 9.
15. Tspen W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History, op. cit.*, p. 36.
16. *Ibid.*; C. R. Nepali, "*Nepal ra Tibbat ko Sambandha*" (Nepal-

- Tibet Relations), *Pragati* Year, II, Issue IV, No. X, 2013 V. E. (1956 A. D.), p. 102.
17. Records of Ming Dynasty, quoted by Leo E. Rose, *Nepal Strategy for Survival*, p. 12; Luciano Petech, *Mediaeval Nepal History of Nepal (750-1480)* (Roma Instituto Italiano per Il Medio ed Estreme Oriente, 1958)p. 210
 18. Radha Krishna Choudhary, "Nepal and the Karnatas of Mithala (1047-1500)," *Journal of Indian History* XXXVI: 1 (April 1958), p. 130
 19. Pe-peu or Pe-ban has been identified by E. H. Parker with Palpa, a powerful kingdom in Western Nepal, in the medieval period. The Palpali Nepalese traders were present in Lhasa even after the conclusion of the Second Nepal-Tibet War (1791-93). In the seventeenth century arrangements were made to establish a sort of *peregrinus* at Lhasa in order to deal justly with the possible commercial questions raised by Palpa and the *Khachs* traders; and to watch the quality of salt to be imported. Incidentally, the Chinese discovered that in this period the Palpali merchants in Lhasa were not kow-erh-k' (Gorkhalis) or friendly with the Gorkhas thus permitted them to carry on their trade in Lhasa.
 20. E. H. Parker, "Nepaul and China", *Asiatic Quarterly*, 1889, Vol. VII, pp. 64-82
 21. S. V. Jnawali, *Ram Shah ko jivan Charitra* (A Biography of Ram Shah, (Darjeeling: publisher n. k., 1933), pp. 108-9.
 22. C. R. Nepali, "Nepal ra Tibbat ko Sambandha", *op. cit.*, pp. 104-106; Sylvain Levi, *Tibet...op, cit.*, p. 214
 23. It appears that the Gorkha control over Kuti was short-lived and the Tibetans were able to regain control over it by 1645.
 24. The stationing of the Nepalese representative in Tibet was, however, a one sided contract for the Tibetans did not have a reciprocal right to post their resident in Kathmandu. Tibet, however, raised this question only in 1926. For more information see conversation between the Tibetan Commander-in-Chief, Tsarong Shape and the British resident in Kathmandu, W. F. T. O' Connor, demi-official correspondence between the resident and the Government of India, *Foreign and Political (Sec., Ext.)* Nos. 1-9, File No. 328-X, 1926, p. 1, NAI.
 25. *Pathi*, *masa* and *tola* are Nepalese measuring units. *Buki* denotes

Tibetan gold, which came in the form of gold dust from river beds.

26. Manuscript, National Library Florence, pp. 82-84. see, Father Filippo de Filippi (ed.), *The Travels of Ippolito Desderia of Pistoia, S. J., 1712-1727* (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1933). p. 130.
27. Mahendra Malla, who had clearly seen the profit he could derive by minting coins for Tibet gave the early *mahendra malla* semi-Nepalese and semi-Tibetan character with the representation of Lhasa on the reverse and the emblem of the Nepalese monarch on the obverse, Sylvain Lev, *Nepal, Historical Study of Hindu Kingdom*, Vol. I., *op. cit.*, p. 279.
28. *Ibid.*, P. 215. The practise of offering adulterated coins in exchange for pure bullions continued uninterrupted. One source placed Nepal's annual profit by this adulteration to be 100,000 rupees, a very impressive sum for the time, see, William Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal Being the Substance of Observations Made During a Mission to that Country in the Year 1793* (London: W, Miller, 1811) p. 211.
29. See an unpublished *Kanak patra* (a gold plated inscription) of the time of Ranjit Malla in possession of Hem Raj Sakya.
30. *Dharmapatra*, given by Jayaprakash Malla to Prithvi Narayan Shah, Poush badi, 1854, V. E. , see C. R. Nepali, "Nepal ra Tibbat ko Sambandha", *op. cit.*, pp. 112-14.
31. Even during the period of economic blockade of Kathmandu Valley Gorkha-Tibet relations continued. Prithvi Naryan Shah, who was in dire need of money, sent his representative Pandit Harideva Uprety to Khasa to buy gold in the year 1767 from his war camp at Nuwakot. Six letters pertaining to this gold purchase has been published in the *Uprety Vamsabali*, see Tikadeva Bhakta Uprety, *Uprety Vamsabali* (Uprety Chronology) (Parsa Bazar (Chitwan): Tikadeva Bhakta Uprety, 2029 V. E. (1972), pp. 16-22 These letters indicate that Harideva Uprety served as a representative of Gorkha ruler at Khasa in the period around 1767. He certainly played an important role in the expansion of the Gorkha-Tibet trade. The profit from this lucrative trade must have immensely helped Prithvi Narayan Shah to materialize his war plans.
32. The Kashmiris (Muslim merchants) and the Gosains (Hindu merchant-pilgrim mendicants) were in the true sense South

Asian traders who had their trade-marts stationed from Lhasa to Coromandel and from Kashmir to the Bay of Bengal and of course in Kathmandu, the entrepot of Trans-Himalayan trade. Their headquarters were, however, Banāras and Patna.

33. A more detailed account on the Trans-Himalayan trade is in Memorandum by George Bogle on trade with Tibet, *Proceedings of the Select Committee*, Jan 16 to Feb. 28, 1775, see George W. Forrest (ed.) *Selections of Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Foreign Department of Government of India, 1772-1785*, Vol. 1 (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1892), pp. 251-253, 1073-1074.
34. Mss. A, Book III, pp. 8-18, Fl. Mss., 210-13, Father Filippo de Filippi (ed.), *The Travels of Ippolito Desderia of Pistoia, S. J., 1712-1727 op. cit.*, 318
35. Three scholarly studies devoted to the emergence of the East India Company from an economic to a political power are: Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders*, Vol. I (New York: Schocken Book, 1953) pp. 19-122; Percival Spear, *Twilight of the Mughals* (Cambridge: University Press, 1951); Edward Thompson and G. T. Garrat, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1934).
36. A. Cambell, "Sketches of Relations Between the British Government and Nepal from Their Commencement to A. D., 1834" (Officiating Resident, Kathmadu) *Foreign Political Consultation* No. 50, June 23, 1835, p. 6, NAI.
37. Sylvain Levi, *Nepal*. . Vol. I, *op.*, *cit.* 216.
38. Prithvi Narayan Shah decided not to expell the Kashmiris because many of the Kashmiris had become a part of the Kathmandu social fabric, thus it was difficult to distinguish the Nepalese Kashmiris from the Indian Kashmiris. Prithvi decided not to burn his finger by this extreme move, for it would alineate a powerful section of Kathmandu society.
39. Clements R. Markham (ed.), *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa* (London: Trubner, 1879), pp. 24-129.
40. Memorandum by George Bogle on trade with Tibet, *Proceedings of the Select Committee*, Jan 16 to Feb. 28, 1775, see George W. Forrest (ed.) , *Selections of Letters*. . . . *op. cit.* pp. 124-126. John MacGregor, *Tibet: A Chronicle of Exploration* (London:

- Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). PP. 124-26; Levi, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 216; see also Hodgson Mss. Vol. 1, IOL.
41. Yogi Naraharinath and Babu Ram Acharya (ed.) , *Shri Panch Bada Maharaja Prithvi Narayan Shah ko Divya Upadesh* (Divine Counsel of the Great King Prithvi Narayan Shah) (Kathmandu: Sri Bageswari Press, 1953,) p. 10.
 42. Clements R. Markham (ed.), *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet. . . . op. cit.* p. Liv.
 43. *Ibid.*, pp. 182, 192.
 44. William Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul op, cit.*, p. 211
 45. Babu Ram Acharya, *Nepal ko Samkshipta Britanta* (A Concise Account of Nepal, Part I (Kathmandu: Pramod Shumsher and Nir Bikram “Payasi”, 2022 V. E. (1965), pp. 44-45.
 46. Ramji Tiwari (ed), *Aitihāsik Patra Sanghra*, Part II (Collection of Historical Documents Part II (Kathmandu: Nepal Samskritik Parisad, V. E. 2021 (A. D. 1964), pp. 78-90.
 47. Memorandum by George Bogle on Trade with Tibet, *Proceedings of the Select Committee* Jan. 16 to Feb. 28, 1775, See George W. Forrest (ed.), *Selections from Letters and Despatches op. cit.* pp. 76-77; Clements Markham (ed.), *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle. op. cit.*, p. 129.
 48. S. V. Jnawali, *Nepal Vijeta Shri Panch Prithvi Narayan Shah ko Jivani* (Life of Prithvi Narayan Shah, the Conquerer of Nepal) (Darjeeling: publisher, n. k., 1935), p. 78.
 49. *Ibid.*
 50. Bhutan seemed to have played a significant role in influencing Nepal’s belligerent attitude.
 51. Ludwig F. Stiller, *The Rise of the House of the Gorkha* (Rachi: The Patna Jesuit Society, 1975), pp. 136-39; Babu Ram Acharya, *Nepal ko Samkshipta Britanta*, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-65; Tsepon W. D. Shakbpa, *Tibet. op., cit.*, p. 157.
 52. John MacGregor, *Tibet. op. cit.*, p. 195; For more on British interest in the Trans-Himalayas see Hodgson Mss. Vol. I, IOL.
 53. Banaras Residency Records, U. P. Central Record Office, dated Oct., 31, 1769, cited by Leo E Rose, *Nepal Strategy for Survival*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
 54. B. Hodgson, “An Account on Nepal Trade”, March 18, 1830, *Foreign Consultation*, No. 24, March 26, 1830, pp. 15-16;

correspondence between Hodgson and the Governor General, NAI.

55. The British then did not realize the seriousness and the lasting failure of the Kinloch Mission. Had Kinloch been successful in entering the Nepal Valley with the British troops the modern history of Nepal would have taken a different shape. The presence of a small British force in the Valley would have boosted the physical and moral force of the Mallas. Thus the Gorkha invasion could have been repelled and the flourishing trade between India and Tibet via Nepal again continued. But this again is one of the big "ifs" in history.
56. D. R. Regmi, *Modern Nepal; Rise and Growth in the Eighteenth Century* Vol. 1 (Calcutta: Firma, K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1975), pp. 373-385.
57. The choleric temperament is one of the four temperaments that reflect a medieval humor. A choleric chap is a person who is all violent, fierce and full of fire.
58. Clements Markham (ed.) *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle* *op. cit.*, 200
59. *Ibid.*, p. 202. For more information on the treaty between the Honorable East India Company and the Deba Raja in April 25, 1774, see, C.A.U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Vol. XIV (New Delhi: Central Publishing Branch, 1929), pp. 296--97.
60. Clements Markham (ed.), *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle* *op. cit.*, 205.
61. Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians in India* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 244-255
62. Clements Markham (ed.) *Narratives of* *op. cit.*, 206.
63. D. R. Regmi, "English and the Bhutanese Relations", *New Review*, March, 1942, p. 240; Luciano Petech, "The Missions of Bogle and Turner According to the Tibetan Texts", *T'oung Pao*, XXXIX (1949), 330-46.
64. Clements Markham, *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle* , *op. cit.*, p. 158.
65. *Ibid.*, Letter from Teshu Lama to Gorkha Raja Singha Pratap Shah.
66. *Secret Consultation*, No. 61, Jan. 27, 1849, NAI; Leo E. Rose and Dhana Bazra Vazracharya, basing their source on the

Nepalese chronicles like Buddhiman Singh's Vamsabali, have given a slightly a different version of the treaty, but we feel that the NAI has preserved a better version.

67. *Secret Consultation* No. 39, Feb. 24, 1849, NAI.
68. Leo E. Rose, *Nepal Strategy for Survival. op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.
69. Orfeur Cavenagh, *Rough Notes on the State of Nepal; Its Government, Army, and Resources*, Vol. 1 (Calcutta: W. Palmer, 1851) p. 127.
70. Imperial Edict of the 1st. month, 58th year of Ch'ung-lung, quoted by W. W. Rockhill, "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and Their Relations with Manchu Emperors", 1644-1908, *T'oung Pao* II Ser. 2, (1910), pp. 1-92.
71. The position of the Tibetan refugee Shamer Lama has been depicted by Abdul Kadir Khan, *Political Cons.* No. 15, October, 3, 1792, NAI.
72. Tsepon, W. D., Shakabpa, *Tibet., A Political History, op. cit.*, p. 157,
73. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
74. Three scholarly studies perpetuating this view are Francis Buchanan Hamilton, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal* (New Delhi; Manjushri, 1971 (reprint), pp. 248-249; Orfeur Cavenagh, *Rough Notes on the State of Nepal, op. cit.*, 130-31; Perceval Landon, *Nepal*, Vol. 1 (London: Constable & Co., 1928), pp. 67.
75. Even today, 20 years after the Chinese take-over, a Nepalese proverb on wishful thinking runs: "there is gold in Tibet, but my ears have no ornaments."
76. Som Dhoja Bista. *Shahi Sainik Itihas* (History of the Royal Army) (Kathmandu: C. N. J. Shah and N. M. S. Basnyat V. S. 2026 (1963 A. D.), p. 50; Bikrama Jit Hasrat (ed.) *History of Nepal, as Told by Its Own Chroniclers* (Hoshiapur: B. J. Hasrat, 1970), pp. 153-54; Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History, op. cit.*, p. 158-59.
77. Bikrama Jit Hasrat (ed., *History of Nepal. . . ., op. cit.*, p. Lxiii.
78. Memoirs of Kalon (minister) Tenzin Paldor (Paljor), cited by Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History, op. cit.*, p. 159.
79. *Ibid.*, 80. C. R. Nepali, *Shri Panch Rana Bahadur Shah* (King Rana Bahadur Shah) (Kathmandu: Shri Mati Mary Raj Bhandari, 1964), p. 89.
81. Nepalese version of the treaty is found in *Itihas Prakas*

- Vol. I (Light on History)* (Kathmandu: Nepal Press, 1955-56), p. 20 and is also found as an appendix in Bishnu Prasad Poudel, "Nepal's Relations with Tibet: 1792-1856" (unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Indian school of International Studies, New Delhi, 1963). This version basically consists of monetary questions as well as the mechanics of reparations. But it is clear from the other sources that these two provisions were not the only ones in the treaty. The Tibetan version of the text is best illustrated by W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History, op. cit.*, p. 161, while the Chinese version is seen in *Ching-Ting K'ov-er-ka* (Official Summary Account of Pacification of Gorkhas), Peking 1796, pp. 1a-2-a/7-9, quoted by Leo E. Rose, *Nepal: Strategy for Survival, op. cit.*, p. 43. For a detailed version of this treaty, see, *Secret Consultation* No. 61, January 7, 1849, NAI.
82. However, in spite of this strong legal document commercial relations between the two countries declined. The positions each side took on the exchange rate of the debased currency were poles apart. Tibet refused to put a halt to the old Malla coins in Tibet and, finally, even permitted the opening of a new route for trade in the East, which was an open violation of the treaty, see *Secret Consultation* No. 39, February 24, 1849, NAI.
83. C. R. Nepali, *Shri Panch Ranabhadur Shah, op. cit.*, p. 91.
84. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History, op. cit.*, p. 162.
85. Two senior Tibetan officials sent to negotiate a new settlement were Khenche Thogmel and Tsepon Debugpa.
86. Shakabpa, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
87. C. R. Nepali, "Nepal Chin Yuddha" (Nepal-China War) *Sharada*, XXI, V. E. 2013 (1956), pp. 202-216.
88. *Ibid.*
89. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History, op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.
90. Charles Bell, *Tibet: Past and Present* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 41. An interesting feature of the Nepalese behavior was that an equally wealthy red sect monastery of Digarche was left untouched, the reason being that it belonged to the sect among whom Shamer Lama was popular.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 276
92. A. Cambell, "Sketches of Relations Between the British Govern-

- ment and Nepal from Their Commencement to A. D. 1834", *op. cit.*, Foreign Consultation N. 50.
93. *Foreign Political Consultation* No. 50, June 23, 1835; Herbert B. Edwardes, Herman Merivale, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence* Vol. I (London: Smith Elder & Co., 1873), p. 318.
 94. Perceval Landon, *Nepal*, Vol. 1 (London: Constable & Co., 1928), p. 69.
 95. Particulars relative to the origin of the war between the Emperor of China and the Raja of Nepal. From a paper in Persian communicated by Mr. Duncan to Kirkpatrick, Appendix No. II, see W. Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul*, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
 96. *Foreign Consultation* No. 50, June 23, 1835, NAI.
 97. William Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul*, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
 98. Ambika Prasad Upadhyaya, *Nepal ko Itihas* (History of Nepal) (Banaras: Pandit Devi Prasad Upadhyaya, 1986 V. E. (1929 A. D.), p. 92-93; Clements Markham, *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle*...*op. cit.* 24-129.
 99. Chinese sources interpret the term 'gift' as 'tribute' while Nepal has always interpreted 'gifts' as 'presents' sent by Nepal to the Chinese Emperor and those sent by the Emperor to Nepal, which were far more valuable than the Nepalese counterpart.
 100. The text of the Treaty of 1792 is found either in the National Archives, Nepal or in the archive of the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu. The British records either in India Office Library, London or the National Archives, New Delhi, possessed a copy of this treaty for the Nepalese Government never communicated this treaty, to the British Government. The *Itihas Prakash* of Narahari Nath gives the essence of the treaty of 1792, without quoting its source. It appears to be based upon an undocumented text published by Pudma Jung. No Tibetan text is available for us for scrutiny. See Pudma Jung Bahadur Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur of Nepal* (Kathmandu, Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1974), pp. 7-10; Yogi Narahari Nath, *Itihas Prakash ma Sandhi Patra Sangraha* (A Collection of Treaties in the Illumination of History) (Kathmandu: V. E. 2022 (1966).
 101. Charles Bell, *Tibet Past and Present*, *op. cit.*, p. ix
 102. Bikrama Jit Hasrat, *History of Nepal, as Told by Its Own*

- Chroniclers, op. cit.*, Lxiii-Lv, Landon, *Nepal*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
103. William Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul*, *op. cit.*, p. ix.
104. Charles Bell, *Tibet Past and Present*, *op. cit.*, p. 44
105. A letter from *Maharaja* Rana Bahadur Shah to Governor General Lord Cornwallis, Received at Calcutta, August 22, 1792, *Political Proceedings Cons* No 9, October 3, 1792, NAI.
106. From *Maharaja* of Nepal (Rana Bahadur Shah) to The Governor General, received at Calcutta on Sept. 5, 1792 *Political Proceedings* No. 9, Oct., 3, 1792, NAI.
107. From Dalai Lama to Cornwallis, received at Calcutta August 3, 1792, see English trans. of the Bhote letter in W. Kirpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul op. cit.*, pp. 348-49.
108. *Political Proceedings, Cons.* No. 14, Jan. 14, 1973, NAI.
109. Lord Cornwallis to Dalai Lama, Sept. 25, 1792; Lord Cornwallis to the *Raja* of Nepal, Sept. 30, 1792, see Appendix II, C and E, Kirtkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul, op, cit.*, pp. 352-53.
110. Charles Bell, *Tibet Past and Present*, *op. cit.*, pp. Lxxix-Lxxx.
111. Tsepon, Shakabpa, *Tibet. . . .*, *op. cit*, p. 174
112. C. R. Nepali, *Janaral Bhimsen Thapa ra Tatkalin Nepal* (General Bhimsen Thapa and the Then Nepal) (Kathmandu: Nepal Sanskritik Sangh, 1957), pp. 311-12, Sylvain Levi, *Nepal. . Vol. II, op, cit*, p. 229
113. E. H. Parker, "Nepaul and China", *op, cit.*, p. 78.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 80
115. Chirong can be identified with Kerong; while Niram denotes the Kuti region, an area always covered by the Nepalese.
116. E. H. Parker, "Nepaul and China", *op. cit.*, p. 81.
117. *Ibid.*

PART III
INDEPENDENT POSTURE IN SOUTH ASIAN
POLITICS: NEPAL-TIBET WAR
(1855-1856)

Again to The Battle-field Third Nepal-Tibet War

The second Nepal-Tibet war was followed by sixty years of peace and goodwill between the two countries. But the truce that prevailed in this period was a shaky one, for it was more an outcome of Nepal's economic and political turmoil rather than of her commitment to live in peace with her northern neighbor. Nothing contributed more to this turmoil than the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814 to 1816. The trauma of defeat in this war helped decisively to break down Bhimsen Thapa's hegemony as well as promote peasant unrest. These two factors contributed to the chronic economic and political instability in the period between 1816-1839.¹ However, with the rise of a powerful personality like Jang Bahadur Nepal began to assume an independent posture in South Asian politics. Accordingly, Nepal not only decided to settle her economic grievances with Lhasa but also reassert her political dominance across the Himalayas up to the watershed. Thus by 1852, the differences between Nepal and Tibet that had been shelved for more than half a century began to emerge in a dramatic way. These disputes and grievances took various shades and colors varying from border disputes to violation of Nepalese trading rights in Lhasa as well as the ill-treatment of Nepalese missions enroute to China.

A. Border Dispute

The boundary dispute between Nepal and Tibet near the village of Khasa, that became acute towards the close of 1852, arose in this fashion. The Tibetan government had bought grazing rights over several ranges of hills south of Khasa from Nepal. However, within a

decade the Tibetans began to build villages and collect an annual rent amounting to 2,000 to 4,000 rupees from the occupants. To make matters worse, the Chinese authority in Khasa had built a deep ditch 80 feet in width and running for one mile south of Khasa, thereby putting forth a claim that the area fell well within the Tibetan jurisdiction. Nepal reacted in two ways to this development: first, she quickly alerted the Tibetan government to the illegality of the construction of villages within the Nepalese territory; and secondly, to assert her sovereignty over the area sent her collectors to collect revenues from these new villages.²

Jang Bahadur argued that if the Chinese or the Tibetans could produce a document or a map that could substantiate their claim that the territory had been transferred to the Tibetan government then he was prepared to withdraw his claim and even give back the revenue collected from the disputed villages. However, on the contrary, Jang Bahadur firmly asserted that if the Tibetans did not listen to reason he would forcibly take possession of the disputed lands and expel the Tibetans. Jang Bahadur's tough stand was also dictated by the offensive and insulting letters from the Chinese Amban.³ The Nepalese Prime Minister sought advice, too, from the British resident in Kathmandu on the Khasa dispute. George Ramsay advised the Premier not to open armed hostilities against Tibet, for the disputed land yielded not more than 2,000 to 4,000 rupees annually. He thought it would, be more advisable for him to ask the Tibetan governor in Lhasa to send a commissioner to the border to solve the border dispute peacefully.⁴

B. Ill-treatment of the Nepalese Mission to China

The indignities suffered by the Nepalese mission to China that went to Peking in the month of August 1852 played an important role in determining Nepalese mood in favor of a war against Tibet. This quinquennial mission to China got back only in May 22, 1854, though the whole round trip could have been normally accomplished within 18 months. According to one source, out of a large party of *Sardars* and junior officers only one junior officer Lieutenant Bhimsen Rana returned to tell the ghastly tales of the mission's sufferings

in Tibet and China, specially on its return.⁵ The leader of the mission, Sardar Gamvir Singh, and the deputy leader apparently died in Peking. A Subedar, Kalu Khatri, died after a bitter illness of 22 days.⁶ The rest of the party also perished either due to sickness and hostile environment or due to the unfortunate beating and buffeting of Tibetans and Chinese.⁷ Even the usual courtesy of the provision of food and the means of transport was denied. The result was obvious: a trip that normally would have taken eighteen months was protracted for nearly two years.⁸

George Ramsay once recorded Jang Bahadur telling him that the Chinese Emperor had indignantly refused the presents sent by him on the ground that he had gone to see Queen Victoria with presents. As the record goes the Celestial Emperor not only chastised the Nepalese Premier for his acts but demanded that he should come to Peking or else face the consequences of the Chinese invasion. However, this fancy little episode appears to be a sweet fabrication of Jang Bahadur for the contemporary sources left by his son Pudma Jung and Resident Ramsay speak of a grand reception given by the Chinese Emperor to the delegates of the Nepalese mission.⁹ It is difficult to ascertain what motivated Jang Bahadur to add this little tale. He probably wanted to show the great risk he had taken in going to England and even hoped to gain support of the English for his Tibetan adventure.

The part played by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa to facilitate the Nepalese mission to China was, at best, uncooperative. The Chinese Amban not only refused to supply coolies but even refused the basic courtesy of forwarding letters of compliments to the Court of Peking.¹⁰ When the Nepalese mission was reentering home from Peking, Jang Bahadur felt it necessary to write a letter to the Chinese Amban in Lhasa asking him to see that the life and property of the members of the Nepalese mission were protected. If not, the letter continued, the Premier was fully prepared to break diplomatic ties with both Tibet and China. The letter in part ran

If you will all is well and we shall continue as friends. If you will not our friendship shall be broken. We shall withdraw our merchants and subjects from Tibet and shall never again send embassies to the Court of Peking.¹¹

But this letter had little impact and almost all the members of the mission were annihilated.

C. Maltreatment of the Nepalese in Tibet

The maltreatment of the Nepalese traders in Tibet brought the relations between the two countries to a crisis. For several years the Tibetan government had been responsible for the gross injustices against the Nepalese merchants in Lhasa. The friction often flamed into actual hostility leading to the shedding of innocent blood. The victims of the Tibetan outrages were not only Nepalese domiciled in Tibet but also casual Nepalese tourists who happened to pass through Tibet.¹² The case of a Newari merchant may be taken as illustrative. A Newar merchant of Kathmandu in 1854 had borrowed some money from a Khamba in Lhasa. The Nepalese merchant failed to return the money in time. The Khamba thereupon seized the Newar, bound his hands and feet and placed him in confinement. The Nepalese community in Lhasa reacted to this sad episode in two ways. In the diplomatic front the Nepalese *Vakil* (representative) appealed to the governor of Lhasa¹³; while in the social front several Nepalese merchants went to the Khamba to seek his release. They were, however, insulted and one of them was shot by the servant of the Khamba. Next day 80 Nepalese merchants again went to the house of the Khamba. An affray resulted between the supporters of the Khamba and the Nepalese merchants, which took three Nepalese lives. The Tibetan government was embarrassed and fined the whole group of Khamba supporters 20 rupees. The social reaction was, however, different. The Tibetans in Lhasa followed a policy of economic boycott. Besides boycotting Nepalese goods they also prevented the Nepalese community in Lhasa (about 800 to 900) from buying their necessities in the capital.¹⁴ Two years before (1852) a Nepalese merchant in the border of Tibet was murdered by the Tibetans, for he could not provide them three to four coolies. The number stipulated by the treaty was, however, six men. To make matters worse, the Nepalese *Vakil* was expelled from Lhasa without a proper explanation and Jang Bahadur was asked to send another substitute.¹⁵ The gravity of Nepal-Tibet relations in Kham in

Eastern Tibet is hinted by the letter of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa to Nepal where he points out that several Nepalese have lost their lives and the local governor has not been able to solve the dispute or control the situation.¹⁶

Nepal's War Aims

All the above factors paved the way for the Third Nepal-Tibet War. Nepalese war aims were two in number. First, Nepal hoped to seize the two districts of Kuti and Kerong she had ceded to Tibet during the Second Nepal-Tibet War, and thus extend the Nepalese frontier to the watershed. This would not only place Nepal in a geographically advantageous position but also help heal her wounded pride. Secondly, Nepal thought of redressing her grievances and securing extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Both domestic and foreign situations were favorable for the realization of Nepalese objectives. China was at the peak of a civil war; and the Taiping rebels¹⁷ were about to march into the gates of Peking. England and Russia were busy in the Crimean War in an attempt to settle the Eastern Question in their own terms. The political situation in Tibet was also in a flux. The sixth Panchen Lama had just died while the eleventh Dalai Lama was still a minor: thus Tibet lacked a strong leadership. Moreover, some Tibetan factions hoped to use the Taiping rebellion to eliminate the last vestiges of Chinese authority in Tibet, and was even prepared to seek Nepalese assistance in the process. The acting leader of the Nepalese mission, Lt. Bhimsen Rana, on his return from China in 1854, assured the Tibetan authority that once the new government was installed in China, which was bound to happen, Nepal would help Tibet to expel the Chinese Amban and troops from Tibet.¹⁸ To add to this, many Tibetans had a soft corner for Nepal, for it was their home of Buddhism. In 1854 a delegation representing 20,000 religious divines in one of the provinces in Tibet went to Lhasa and told the administration that in case of Nepal-Tibet war they intended to remain neutral.¹⁹

A strong consolidated Nepal appeared to be a factor that tempted Jang Bahadur to seek an armed confrontation with Tibet. After his return from the highly publicized trip to England, Jang Bahadur

emerged as an “uncrowned king” of Nepal. His position certainly encouraged him to launch the Tibetan adventure. A Nepalese scholar suggests that Jang Bahadur may have hoped that a successful war with Tibet would provide a suitable occasion for the removal of the monarch and his own accession to the serpent-hooded throne.²⁰ However, one can derive little truth from this idle speculation.²¹ Jang Bahadur did not have to go to a war with Tibet to unseat the monarch. He was perfectly capable of overthrowing the monarch any time after 1850, if he really had desired so.²² In spite of this controversy, it was a very opportune moment for Nepal to press forth its claim in Tibet and redress her grievances and, if possible, even assume the Chinese traditional role of the protector of Tibet, receiving even tribute for this favor.²³

Preparation For War

Jang Bahadur was lucky to have inherited a well equipped army from his predecessors. Even in the period of peace that followed the Anglo-Nepalese war the army was not scaled down nor was the production of the materials for war abandoned.²⁴ The military build-up continued. The army was progressively increased and the manufacture of arms pursued with greater intensity.²⁵

To mobilize a country for a semi-modern mountain warfare was not an easy task, for it involved a series of operations like the training of fresh recruits, production and purchase of armaments, collection of food and other commodities and the construction of mountain roads in the national front; while on the diplomatic front British assistance and Chinese neutrality and even positive help had to be desperately sought. The Prime Minister took personal responsibility over war preparations. His son and biographer, Pudma Jung, recalls his father taking little food and sleep and devoting himself for the work for days and nights at a stretch.²⁶ His tireless effort was rewarded with success. Thus within a short period he was able to create a new army corps of 14,000 foot soldiers, 1200 horses, 80 light pounders, 24 pounders, and a large number of motor and howitzers needed for mountain warfare. Thousands of tents and gun carriages, knap sacks, boxes, *bakhus* (warm coats), and *dochas* (warm

shoes), were also manufactured. Besides, the recruitment of the non-fighting men like the physicians, surgeons, carpenters, cobblers, blacksmiths, English writers as well as the Persian, Bhote and Chinese interpreters and *munshis* (language experts) was completed for each of the six columns.²⁷ In short, the whole country was mobilized with only 600 soldiers left in the Kathmandu Valley and the Terai for the purpose of defense.²⁸

As a part of the mobilization process the Premier despatched personal letters to the General Office commanding the Eastern and the Western districts, to furnish contingents of 50,000 soldiers and estimate how many transport animals (yaks, sheep, and ponies) were available for the transport of war materials and *rasads* (food and other commodities) to the Tibetan Front.²⁹ The Maharaja too wrote letters to the different *Rajas* of Nepal to contribute to war against Tibet with men and materials.³⁰

The collection of grains imposed a serious problem both in terms of collection and transportation. The Maharaja tackled this problem in two ways: first, he gave orders to stop the export of grains from the Nepalese Terai to British India, and purchased enormous quantities of food grains;³¹ and secondly, he asked all Nepalese from the King to a commoner and from a civil servant to a householder to contribute some grains to the war fund. This was followed by a proclamation in which he commanded every householder to transport 32 seers of grains to one of the fixed points in the Northern Front. Those who were not able to hire coolies had to transport grains themselves. To make this order more effective, enquiries were to be held after three months to see that every householder contributed his share of grains and had transported the allotted quantity of commodity to one of the depots in the Northern Front.³²

The war-budget fast depleted the national treasury so much so that Jang Bahadur after having collected the land revenue for the year 1854 offered 25% discount for those who would pay next years revenue.³³ In a desperate move to raise more money Jang Bahadur did a few other things. First, the Prime Minister sold the privilege of grain collection to Newar merchants for two lakhs and ninety thousand; and secondly, all government officials were forced to

contribute to the war-fund. For example, from every sepoy one rupee ninety *paisa* was to be collected.³⁴

With war-preparation nearing its completion Jang Bahadur used his diplomatic skills to gain the English cooperation in two areas. First, he sought the British cooperation to take his 270,000 fighting men, 36 guns and 7,000 other followers through the Indian territory to proceed towards Dhankuta to Tibet and secondly, he asked the British permission to purchase materials for war in the military stores of Patna and Calcutta.³⁵ The reply given by the British was diplomatic, "correct" and conditional but at the same time positive enough to fulfil Nepalese needs. A *yaddashat* (official reply) handed over by the British Resident in Kathmandu pointed out that Nepal needed no permission to buy war materials from shops of the Indian merchants. But as Britain had friendly relations with China the Government of India could show no special favor to Nepal in the purchase of armaments and other war materials. It, however, asserted that the Prime Minister could take his troops via Sugauli to Dhankuta, provided that the Nepalese army was accompanied by a British officer, as on previous occasions.³⁶ The Nepalese Premier also made an overture toward Sikkim and asked the Gangtok government to permit the Nepalese forces to invade Tibet via Sikkim. But the Sikkimese *Raja*, who was in close association with Dalai Lama, flatly refused the request.³⁷

An important aspect of war preparation was the attempt to maintain the absolute secrecy of the purchase and production of armaments as well as the movement of troops and goods. The movement of the artillery and troops towards the Tibetan border was not even communicated to the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa. However, total secrecy was difficult to maintain. The Residency Records indicate that several Newar families went through the painful process of mutilations of their limbs for openly talking about the impending war.³⁸

By spring 1855 war preparations were complete. Nepal, then, addressed a letter to Lhasa asking the Tibetan government to be prepared for a summer war if they could not meet the three Nepalese demands which, in summary, were (1) payment of a crore³⁹ of rupees to compensate for the losses incurred by the Nepalese merchants; (2)

restoration of the Kuti and Kerong provinces, which **once belonged** to Nepal; and (3) the cession of the districts of Taklakot (Tagakali) in Western Tibet. The Tibetan government reacted instantly to this letter and sent the treasurer of Ganden monastery, Palden Dondup, to Kathmandu. Tibetan envoy was given a very warm reception by the Prime Minister. Accordingly, Dondup was presented before the Prime Minister's full council and a review of 28,000 Nepalese troops clad in Tibetan costume in the Tundikhel.⁴⁰ Jang Bahadur placed before the Lama the same demands he had carefully listed in his recent letter to the Lhasa authorities. To the disappointment of the Premier the Lama, being neither a military chief nor a political officer (but simply a functionary head of a monastery) was not authorized to make such far reaching concessions. The best he could do was to promise that henceforth the Nepalese would be treated well in Tibet.

However, after two days of negotiations with the envoy Jang Bahadur decided to give up hostilities if the Tibetans would give a crore of rupees as compensation for the losses incurred by the Nepalese merchants in Lhasa. The Tibetan envoy protested saying that the men who looted the Nepalese property were free booters, hordes of marauders, whose whereabouts the government could not even trace. He further asserted that the Nepalese losses had been five *lakhs* which the Lhasa government was willing to pay. A small sum of five *lakh's* could hardly meet the rising expectation of the Nepalese. Dejected and confused, Dondup left Kathmandu saying that if he failed to return within a given time Kathmandu could consider that the demands had been rejected.⁴¹ The Lama did fail to return and Nepal declared war in March 1855. But before declaring the war Nepal sent almost identical letters to the Chinese Emperor, the Chinese Ambans in Lhasa and the four Kazis of Tibet. The object of these letters was not to give a warning or an ultimatum but to notify that Nepal had decided to invade Tibet. The Nepalese strategy was to send some troops via Kuti-Kerong passes in the month of Falgun (Feb-March), and, when the snows had melted, send a larger force under the Prime Minister himself.⁴²

Commencement of War

On March 6, 1855, three regiments each 600 strong, with 12 guns of different sizes under Bam Bahadur assembled before the Thapathali Durbar for the *tika grahan* (ritualistic farewell ceremony). Jang Bahadur decorated the officers with garlands and blessed the soldiers with flowers and vermilion-mixed rice. This auspicious *tika* served as a mandate to the soldiers to march straight towards Kerong and take possession of this vital pass as well as the districts adjoining it. The Prime Minister in his speech narrated the gross injustices, including the loss of lives, met by the Nepalese in Tibet. Then he asked the sepoys to uphold the honor of their motherland. His speech, in part, ran:

Soldiers, the Tibetans slight us because they underrate our power. They have plundered the firms belonging to some of our countrymen and have shed some blood. If we timidly submit to this insult they will be encouraged in their maraudings. I therefore command you to give them a lesson, this will convince them of the superiority of our arms and vindicate the honour of our country.⁴³

These words had the intended effect. The soldiers promised to shed their last drop of blood for their country and set out in their sacred mission. On the same day a newly raised corps called the Himal Dhoj started from Kathmandu to occupy the Wallanchung pass. At Wallanchung alone Nepal concentrated 7,000 soldiers. Some divisions also left for Jumla for a simultaneous attack on Tibet.

The Tibetans counteracted with a vigorous defensive preparation. The Sethia Kazi had mustered 50,000 foot soldiers and 14 to 15 thousand *sawars* (cavalry). It was also reported that they had stationed 8,000 men at Digarche and 40,000 men were assembled at Tingri to join the Sethia Kazi. ⁴⁴ Nepal was alarmed by the extent of Tibetan preparation and reacted in two ways. First, Nepal began to reenforce her positions at the proposed theaters of war, and secondly, the Prime Minister himself decided to take the command of the principal theater of war. The army was divided into three major sectors:

1. *Northern Sector*: The main theater of war was the Northern sector, which included the Jhung and Kerong regions. As it was the principal line of offence, the Prime Minister himself decided to supervise this war-front.
2. *Western Sector*: The western Sector was another major battle-front. It included regions like Kuti and adjoining areas. General Dhir Shumsher and Khadga Bahadur Kuwar were placed in charge of this region.
- 3) *Far Western Sector*: This Far Western Sector comprised Mustang and the Humla regions including the village of Muktinath leading to Tibet. This important front was in charge of General Krishna Dhoj.⁴⁵

Reinforcement too began speedily. The result was that between Falgun 15 and Baishak 23, 1911 Nepal despatched 257,289 sepoy to the Kerong sector, 4,672 toward the Kuti sector, and 2,000 in the Mustang front. All these figures, however, do not include the help rendered by the kings of Mustang, Salyan and other petty chiefs, both in terms of men and resources.⁴⁶

First Tibetan Campaign: Summer 1855

The failure of Palden Dondup to arrive within the given period was taken by Jang Bahadur as a rejection of his proposals. Having received this green signal, the Prime Minister ordered his troops to invade Tibet. Towards the first week of April, the Nepalese troops attacked the two vital border districts of Tibet-Kerong and Kuti. Kuti was captured by Dhir Shumsher with little or no resistance from the Tibetans. His troops advanced as far as Sona Gampa nine miles above Kuti and waited there for the formulation of further strategy.⁴⁷ In the mean time Kerong too fell without opposition. Bam Bahadur advanced his troops up to Kukurghat, two days march from Kerong, and completely routed the enemy. He then pushed forward towards Jhunga (Dzongka), the bastion of Tibetan defense in that region. Here, too, after a battle of nine days the Tibetans were forced to retreat toward Tingri Maidan.⁴⁸

This virtually closed the summer campaign of 1855. In June 1855 a Nepalese officer, Siddhi Man Singh⁴⁹ was sent to obtain a

definitive answer from the Chinese Amban to at least one or all of the three major issues:

1. Are the Chinese going to remain neutral in the Nepal-Tibet conflict, and thus permit the two contenders to settle their differences themselves without assistance or interference ?
- 2) Are the Chinese going to obtain for Nepal the provinces of Kuti and Kerong which comprise the five *zillas* (districts): Kuti, Choosang, Sona Gampa, Kerong, and Joonga, and also the Taklakot or Teglahan in Western Tibet ?
- 3) Is it the intention of the Chinese government to oppose the Nepalese by sending a force if the Nepal-Tibet dispute is not settled without further hostilities.⁵⁰

All these questions taken together indicate that Nepal not only expected the Chinese neutrality in the conflict but also hoped for positive help in the realization of her principal war aim, namely, the acquisition of Kerong and Kuti from the Tibetans. The Chinese Amban in cooperation with the Tibetan government decided to summon the Chinese and Tibetan officers from Kuti and Kerong for a free deliberation which would take between ten to fifteen days. The Chinese Amban told the envoy of *Jang Bahadur* that he would be able to give a reply only after the conference. However, even after two weeks the Chinese Amban was not able to give a definitive reply. He, however, reportedly told the Subba that the Tibetans were aggressors and were in the wrong in at least nine cases of insult against the Nepalese. The Tibetan government thus decided to pay 153,000 *kala mohars*⁵¹ in the form of compensation plus a fine of 80,000 *kala mohars* imposed by the Chinese Amban upon the Tibetans. A sum of 233,000 *kala mohars* was sent by the Amban through the Tali of Digarche to the court of Kathmandu. This Chinese mission was also accompanied by Bhote *sardars* (chiefs) with presents like gold and ponies as a token of submission to the Nepalese, whose forgiveness they were sorely in need of.⁵² The Sethia Kazi sent valuable presents, too, to the Prime Minister through his treasurer. As regards the cession of Kuti and Kerong by the Tibetans the Chinese Amban said that the two provinces belonged to the Emperor and he was powerless to hand them over to the Nepalese without the Emperor's permission. The Amban, however, was careful enough to put the

whole issue under a low key by asserting that the provinces were barren lands that yielded no land revenue except little by trade, which was handed over to support the Lamas of the *Ghyangs* (Lamaseries).⁵³

First Round of Negotiations: Kathmandu

The Tibetan delegation arrived in Kathmandu under the leadership of the Chinese Tali on August 13, 1855 to hold the first round of peace talks.⁵⁴ As the peace talks opened, Nepal, as in the past, insisted on the cession of Kuti and Kerong. But as Tali made an outright rejection of his proposal Jang Bahadur then forwarded two alternative proposals. First, Nepal promised to withdraw from all the conquered Tibetan territory if Tibet promised to pay one crore or raise 20 lakhs for each of the following districts: Tagakali, Kerong, Jhunga, Kuti and Dhakaling. Second, Nepal agreed to restore all the conquered lands to Tibet if the Chinese would give full independence to Tibet placing only their representative in Lhasa to conduct relations between the two states. The first round of negotiations dragged into a stalemate as both sides were unwilling to make any meaningful compromise. The negotiations literally broke down when Jang Bahadur formally rejected the presents brought by the delegation. But as the gifts were too tempting Jang Bahadur decided to keep a few pounies, ornaments, and cochin cloth to himself and his mother.⁵⁵ Frustrated and confused the Tibetan delegation left Kathmandu.

Second Round of Negotiations: Shekar Dzong

The second round of talks was held in the Tibetan territory of Shekar Dzong. The Nepalese side was represented by Col. Tilak Bikram Thapa and the Tibetan side by the Chinese Tali and treasurer of the Grand Lama. During the talks the Nepalese envoy told the Chinese Tali that Nepal was prepared to give up the fort of Jhunga, provided that Nepal could retain all the other territories that she had conquered during the war, or that she would withdraw from all the seized territory if Tibet would make a lump sum payment of 90 lakh

instead of the originally proposed sum of one crore. To this new proposal the Chinese Tali replied that it was not within his power to surrender an inch of territory.^{5 6} The farewell speech made by the Tali to the Nepalese emissary put the whole blame on the failure in negotiations on the adamant Nepalese attitude. Though unhappy the Chinese officer firmly yet seriously pointed out:

We are unable to comply to your demands. It is not within our power to give you a crore of rupees. Where are we to get a crore of rupees from; neither can we give any territory. . . . You will not listen to us. You have rejected everything we have proposed.^{5 7}

In a final move to check further hostilities Tibet sent a letter to the Nepalese Durbar expressing that she was willing to exempt all custom duties on Nepalese traders in Tibet and release all the Sikh prisoners living in captivity in Tibet.^{5 8} This letter showed that this was the furthest limit the Tibetans were willing to go and would fight back if Nepal took the offensive.

The peace negotiations that were initiated by Tilak Bikram Thapa in September 1855 failed to bear any fruit. It only paved the way for the renewal of hostilities. However, on this occasion, under the vigorous leadership of Sethia Kazi, it was Tibet that was on the offensive. By the first week of November the Tibetans launched a simultaneous attack on the Nepalese strongholds-Kuti, Kerong and Jhunga. On Nov. 1, 1855 a force of 50,000 Tibetans suddenly attacked Kuti several hours before day-break. A few hours after they were joined by 12,000 more troops and the new force completely routed the Nepalese. Likewise, 5,000 Tibetans besieged Jhunga which was guarded by 600 Nepalese. In this way they were able to isolate the fort and cut off all supplies and communication with Nepal. The severity of the winter accompanied by a heavy snow fall also served as a boon to Tibet.

Nepalese Reaction

The Third Nepal-Tibet war, in the first place, was never really popular either in the army or among the people at large. The summer

campaign, though short, was enough to convince the Nepalese army that the road to victory was, at best, long and difficult. There was little enthusiasm left in the army that would encourage a second Tibetan campaign. The peasants felt that they had little to gain by the war. On the contrary only suffering and hardship were in store for them, for they had to supply not only food but also conscripts and porters for the army. The demand for *bharias* (coolies) reached the 400,000 mark and the use of domestic animals for transportation had a serious impact on the agriculture of the country. The people thus began to face shortages and the rise in price of grains and other articles of necessity. Jang Bahadur was himself aware of this situation and faced the difficult task of convincing the military that the war could not be ended in disgraceful terms.⁵⁹

Two other factors both external and internal made Jang Bahadur's administration panicky. First, Jang Bahadur faced two conspiracies one from the Pandeys, and the other from the adherents of his own family. The objective of both was to stage a coup d'état against the Premier.⁶⁰ The second factor was the threatening letter sent by the Chinese Amban in Lhasa in September 1855.⁶¹ Jang Bahadur, finding that his position was heading toward insecurity quickly called the *Bharadari Shabha* (Council of Nobility)⁶² to seek a fresh mandate for his Trans-Himalayan adventure. His opening speech was marked by a note of firmness, namely, Nepal should not submit to the Tibeto-Chinese insults and injuries but at the same time he also indicated that he was not absolutely confident of victory and, hence, had decided to bow before the opinion of the council on matters of war and peace. He probably felt that the nation would place the guilt for this war on his head. He asked the Council that neither he nor his family should be held personally responsible for the outcome of the war.⁶³ King Surendra concluded the *Shabha* by asserting that the war should be continued to a victorious conclusion and that, Jang Bahadur and his family would not be held responsible for the war or its outcome.⁶⁴ The ex-king Rajendra even argued during the proceedings of the Council that Nepal should seek British assistance during the war. However, the Prime Minister argued on the futility of seeking British help, for the English would, on no account participate in this conflict.⁶⁵

The Council of Nobility gave Jang Bahadur a strong mandate to continue the war until her war aims were fulfilled. The result was that war preparations were intensified and reinforcement sent to the various sectors of the war. As a part of this new war preparation Nepal purchased huge quantities of grain from British India and enlisted 12 to 14 thousand youths in the army. By Dec. 1855 General Dhir Shumsher, with the help of nine regiments, was able to recapture Kuti by driving the Tibetans across the Bhairab Langar mountains; while the force despatched for the relief of Jhunga under Col. Sanak Singh (Jang Bahadur's brother-in-law) was able to drive away 6,000 Tibetans guarding the area. In the Western front (Taklakot) General Krishna Dhoj was able to create a panicky situation in the Tibetan camp of 3,000. The Tibetans had little choice but to flee, and their arms, stores, and horses were taken by the Nepalese.⁶⁶

The war took a heavy toll on both sides. The exact number of casualties will however, never be determined, for both the sides tended to minimize their losses and exaggerate the losses suffered by the enemy. A strong degree of vengeance was often seen on both sides. Poisonous arrows were used by both parties. Nepalese were tortured and put to death mercilessly. Looting was another aspect of the war. The Tibetans were placed in a precarious position. If on one hand, they were unable to drive away the Nepalese even in winter, while on the other, the revolt in Kham against the Central authority in Lhasa compelled them to sue for peace. The war also had imposed a serious burden on Nepal both in terms of manpower and resources, and Nepal was more than eager to close this expensive campaign, that was increasingly being unpopular both in the army and the people.

The Signing of the Treaty

In January 1856 a Tibetan deputation consisting of Palden Dondup and several officers of Bhutan came to Nepalese border for peace talks. Nepalese side was represented by the brother of the Prime Minister, Jagat Shumsher Kunwar. This meeting was decisive in the sense that it brought a breakthrough in the hostile Nepal-Tibet relations. The concessions made by Nepal were mainly

responsible for the turn of the tide. Nepal decided to give up the highly coveted prize of Kuti and Kerong districts and the demand for ten million rupees for compensation was reduced to an annual tribute of 10,000 rupees. The Tibetans more or less agreed to the Nepalese proposals.⁶⁷ The above concessions paved the way for a second round of negotiations in Kathmandu. Kalon Shatra came to Nepal for further negotiations, which continued throughout February and March. An agreement⁶⁸ that was finally reached by both the parties was, in summary, as follows:

1. *Pratham Kura* (First Clause): The Tibetans promised to give to the Nepalese a *salami* (payment) of rupees 10,000 annually.
2. *Doshro kura* (Second Clause): Nepal agreed to help Tibet as far as possible if she was invaded by a foreign power.
3. *Teshro Kura* (Third Clause): Lhasa decided not to impose *jagat mahasul* (custom duties) on Nepalese traders.
4. *Choutho Kura* (Fourth Clause): Nepal was committed to withdraw her troops from the occupied territories of Kuti, Kerong, and Jhonga, and return to the Tibetans the sepoy and sheep or yaks captured during the war, when the treaty conditions were fulfilled. The Tibetans too promised to return Nepalese cannons and also the Sikh prisoners of war who had been captured in 1841 in the war between Tibet and the Dogra ruler of Kashmir.
5. *Panchoun Kura* (Fifth Clause): Nepal was permitted to station a *Bhardar* (envoy) in Tibet (instead of a representative that had been installed previously).
6. *Chhathoun Kura* (Sixth Clause): Nepal was allowed to establish *kothis* (trade-marts) in Lhasa with the rights to trade in jewels, ornaments, grains and clothes.
7. *Sataoun Kura* (Seventh Clause): The Nepalese *Bhardar* in Tibet was given the authority to settle disputes between the Gorkha subjects and the Gorkha Kashmiris. But the disputes between the Nepalese subject and Tibetans were to be settled by representatives of both governments jointly. The Nepalese *Bhardar* was, however, prohibited to settle disputes between Tibetans.
8. *Athoun Kura* (Eighth Clause): Nepal and Tibet decided to surren-

- der the criminals that escaped into each other's territory
9. *Nawoan Kura* (Ninth Clause): The life and the property of the Nepalese merchant were to be protected by the Tibetan government. If the Tibetan looter could not be made to restore the looted articles the Tibetan government would be made to compensate for the loot. The Nepalese government was expected to act similarly and protect the Tibetans in Nepal.
 10. *Dasaun Kura* (Tenth Clause): Both the governments decided to protect the life and property of those subjects who had helped the enemy during the war.⁶⁹

Treaty Analyzed in Historical Perspective

The principal war aim of Nepal, namely, the annexation of the two important river valleys of Kuti and Kerong up to the watershed was not realized, nor was the violation of Nepalese trading rights or the border disputes completely stopped, though their frequency was definitely on the decrease. Nepal also gave up her jurisdiction over several ranges of hills south of Khasa. The rupees 10,000 that Nepal was able to extract as annual tribute from Tibet hardly compensated for the loss of 2,683, 568 rupees during the war.⁷⁰ However, this treaty, when analyzed in historical perspective was more advantageous than the Treaty of 1792. The annual *salami* of 10,000 rupees Nepal received, as well as Nepal's promise to aid Tibet when she was invaded by a foreign power were significant in Nepal's diplomatic annals in two ways: first, Tibet was reduced to a semi-satellite status, and secondly, Nepal assumed the Chinese traditional role of the protector of Tibet. Apparently, Tibet agreed to this provision, for Kalon Shatra hoped to use Nepal's military assistance to overthrow the Chinese yoke.⁷¹ Once the Chinese Amban was expelled Jang Bahadur probably hoped his envoy in Lhasa to play the role of the Chinese Amban. The fourth clause in the treaty was an attempt made by the Prime Minister to please the British by seeking the release of the Sikh prisoners. The last clause was inserted by Nepal, for she wanted to protect the people of Kuti and Kerong who had cooperated with Nepal during the war. The other clauses secured for Nepal not only extraterritorial rights for her merchants

but also the right to trade in all kinds of merchandise free from custom duties.

The Role of the Chinese During the Truce Negotiations

Once the treaty was signed on March 24, 1856 in Kathmandu, the Nepalese Premier wrote a letter to the Chinese Amban informing him that a new treaty had been signed between Nepal and Tibet with full assurance of the Sethia Kazi and requested for his formal approval. A few days later, he received from the Chinese Amban what he styled as the "most overbearing" and "imperious" letter. The contents of the letter indicated that he would ratify the treaty if it received the consent of the Emperor. He then went on to say that if it contained any improper stipulations he would advise the Emperor to have it cancelled.⁷² Jang Bahadur was disturbed by the Amban's letter and suspected a Chinese-Tibetan conspiracy to undo the treaty. He sincerely felt that the Tibetan *Sirdars* (nobles) had not proposed any terms of the treaty without the prior approval of the Amban; and the Amban's assertion that he came to know about the treaty only through the Premier's letter was in his opinion only an effort to prolong negotiations. The Prime Minister immediately called the Tibetan delegation and threatened an invasion of Tibet if the treaty was not ratified. The Tibetan delegation left Kathmandu, and Jang Bahadur sent Col. Jodh Bikram Thapa to continue negotiations with the Tibetans in the presence of the Chinese Amban.

At Shekar Dzong, the Nepalese Colonel met the envoy of Sethia Kazi and the two Chinese officers (Tales). The Nepalese negotiator was instructed by his Master to resist any alteration in the proposed treaty except in the complimentary and friendly expression to the Emperor. The Chinese Tales were quick to raise objection to the first and third clauses of the treaty. In connection with the first clause the Chinese argument, was convincing: how could Tibet, a Tributary of China be also a Tributary of Nepal? The third clause, they argued was one-sided, and hence Nepal too should not impose any custom duties on the commodities brought by the Tibetans.⁷³ The Prime Minister, however, rejected both these objections

on the ground that the Tibetans had already agreed to them. He further asserted that the treaty should be taken as a package and any rejection of a provision would mean the rejection of the treaty as a whole. The Chinese Tales, finding that the Nepalese Premier was adamant, asked two more questions to the Nepalese Colonel, namely, whether Nepal was fighting with China or Tibet; and whether Nepal respected the Emperor as before? To these questions the Nepalese envoy replied that Nepal was not fighting with China and that Nepal regarded the Emperor with the same respect as before. This explanation satisfied the Chinese Tales; however, they insisted that Nepal should accept the supremacy of China in the treaty. Article two of the treaty was thus amended in this way:

Tibet and Gorkha have both respected the Emperor of China up to the present time. As Tibet is a land of monasteries and shrines (devoted to) penance and worship, if any Raja should invade Tibet, Gorkha would give as much assistance as possible.⁷⁴

China insisted on this ammendment and Nepal readily accepted, for it was flexible enough to have more than one meaning. The Chinese Tales and the Nepalese envoy, having satisfied themselves, proceeded to Digarche to receive the seal of approval of the Amban. The Nepalese Colonel arrived in Kathmandu on July 6, 1856 with a treaty firmly approved by the Chinese Amban.⁷⁵ To celebrate the auspicious occasion of the formal ratification of the treaty Jang Bahadur held a grand Durbar. There he read the letter from the Sethia Kazi, in which Tibet had promised to abide by every clause of the treaty. Jang Bahadur was happy and proud to see his country being successful in the Third Nepal-Tibet War. This mood of the Prime Minister was perhaps nowhere better manifested than in his welcome speech to his soldiers, brothers and officers in the Tundikhel parade ground on April 20, 1856. His speech, in part, ran:

Your indomitable valour has caused the snows to melt and the mountains to bend down their heads before you. The Tibetans who had laughed at us have, by your brave arms, been scattered like a flock of sheep across

the Bhairav Sarpoor. They who condemned us have sued us for peace; and peace has been granted on terms most favourable to your country.⁷⁶

However, even a superficial analysis of the treaty shows that Nepal had little reason to be so jubilant, for her principal war objective, the annexation of Kuti and Kerong was not realized. Neither were the Nepalese trading rights and border disputes permanently settled. In reality, the close of the war brought more a sense of relief than material, territorial, and psychological benefits that follow a triumphant war.

Foot Notes

1. A detailed analysis of the political and economic crisis during 1816-1839 is found in Ludwig F. Stiller, *The Silent Cry The People of Nepal: 1816-39* (Kathmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan, 1970), pp. 25-113., 217-308.
2. *Foreign Secret Consultation* Nos. 61-62, Oct.. 22, 1852. G. Ramsay to GI, Oct. 4, 1852, NAI.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. It is not clear from the records how many returned from this ill-fated mission. Pudma Jung Rana, the son and biographer of Jang Bahdur, asserts that only one survived the long march to and fro from the Peking Court, while Oldfield, another contemporary observer talks about the members of this diplomatic mission going through *Shuddhi* (purification) ceremony in Nuwakot thereby indicating that more than one member of the mission had arrived in Kathmandu. See Pudma Jung Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur*, ed. H. K. Kuloy (Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1974 (reprint), p. 173; H. A. Oldfield *Sketches from Nipal* Vol. 1 (Delhi: Cosmo detailed Publications (reprint), p. 143. For an account on *Suddhi* see Prem Raman Uprety, *Religion and Politics in the Punjab in the 1920's*, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1980), pp. 70-75.
6. FMAN, *Poka* (bundle) No. Ga 57, A Letter from *Maharajadhiraja*, Nepal to Maitri Amban, Lhasa, V. E. Ahad sudi 5, 1910 (July 1853).

7. Bikrama Jit Hasrat (ed.) *History of Nepal as Told by Its Own and Contemporary Chroniclers*(Hoshiapur:B.J. Hasrat,1970),p. 328
8. H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal* Vol. 1. *op. cit.* 412
9. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 50, "Military Preparations and the Despatch of Troops" pp. 2-3,. May, 26, 1854. Major G. Ramsay, to Y. P. Grant, Sec. to GI, May 6, 1854, NAI.
10. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 36, File No. 22/34, p. 25, 1854. Major G. Ramsay, to G. R. Edmonstone, Sec. to GI, NAI. These pages are those from the file. This file consists of a collection of letters written in long hand by the Resident of Nepal and other letters.
11. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 50, *Foreign EA "A"* File No. 249/1854, p. 6. G. Ramsay to G.R. Edmonstone, Sec. GI, August 5, 1854, NAI.
12. Pudma Jung Rana,*Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur op. cit.*, p. 174.
13. The governor of Lhasa told the *vakil* that the laws of Tibet were either applicable to the Gurkhas or the Khambas thus they should settle the differences among themselves in the best way they could. *See Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 32, *Foreign EA "A"* Dec. 29, 1854, p.50; Abstract trans. of letter from *Maharaja* of Nepal to Marquis Dalhousie GG India, V.E. Aswin 18,1911 (Nov. 23, 1854), NAI.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52
15. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 50, *Foreign EA "A"* File No. 249/1854, p. 3. NAI.
16. The contents of this letter are found in the diary of the British Resident, G. Ramsay, June 20-3rd July 1853, *Secret Cons.*No. 51, *Foreign EA, "A"* File No. 249/1854 p. 13, NAI.
17. More on Taiping Rebellion, Vincent Y. C. Shih. *The Taiping Ideology: Its Sources and Influences* (Washington: Washington Univ. Press, 1972); Michael Franz, Chung Li-Chang, *The Taiping Rebellion* (Washington: Univ. Press, 1972). 3 vols.
18. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* Nos. 42-43 *Foreign EA "A"* June 30, 1854, pp. 1-2. George Ramsay to Sec. GI, May 25, 1854, NAI.
19. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 25, *Foreign EA "A"* August 1854, p. 33. George Ramsay to Sec. GI, August 16, 1854, NAI.
20. Babu Ram Acharya, "Rana Shahi ra Shadyantra"(Rana Rule and Conspiracy), *Sharada*, 1:5, Feb-March, 1957, pp. 1-2.

21. In the post-1950 era a new trend developed in Nepalese historiography. Historians and political scientists began to portray the century of Rana rule in Nepal as the darkest period in her history. The result was the Rana prime ministers began to sink in a pool of master villainy with every vice hanging on their necks. While the shoe often fits, this caricature ignores the basic fact that, despite mounting pressures from the Imperial China and the British India, the Rana rulers were able to conduct a relatively independent foreign policy and help begin the process of modernization of the Nepalese society.
22. It is not within the scope of this study to go into why Jang Bahadur preferred not to usurp the Crown and satisfied himself with the titles of the *Maharaja* of Kaski and Lamjung and the premiership of the country. This could be a topic of an independent study by itself. See also Krishna Kant Adhikari, "Nepal Under Jang Bahadur (1846-1877) (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Nagpur University, 1974,) pp. 527-530
23. Conversation between Tibetan Governor, Lhasa and the acting head of the Nepalese mission from Peking. see, *Secret Consultation* Nos. 42-43, *Foreign EA "A"* June 30 1854, File No. 249/1854 p. 2, *Secret Cons.* No. 36, Dec. 29, 1854, File No. 22/1854, NAI.
24. Ludwig Stiller, *The Silent Cry...*, *op. cit.* pp. 109-10, 308-309.
25. For a detailed account of the military buildup in Nepal after the Anglo-Nepal war see T. H. Maddock, "A Report on the General State of Affairs in the Court of Nepal: Nepal's Military Buildup", *Foreign Consultation* No. 60, Feb. 12, 1832, pp. 8-20; Memorandum of the Military Force & Ca (Capacity) of Nepal State as Now Existing, *Foreign Consultation*, No. 392, Dec. 30, 1847, C. Thoresby, Resident Nepal to Sec. GI, August 31, 1847, NAI.
26. Pudma Jung Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur*, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
27. The six columns were Kerong, Kuti, Lamobagar, Wallanchung Mustang and Humla columns.
28. A detailed list of fighting and non-fighting men was prepared by George Ramsay, *Secret Consultation* No. 25, Foreign, Dept., May 25, 1855, pp. 1-2. Major Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, Sec. GI, April 9, 1855; Pudma Jung, Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur*, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-76; H.A. Oldfield, *Sketches of*

Nipal Vol. I *op. cit.*, p. 412.

29. FMAN Poka No. 23, Doc. No. 452. From Jang Bahadur to General Khadga Bahadur, Eastern Sector, Falgun 6 1911, V. E. (Feb. 1855).
30. The *Maharaja* thanked and congratulated the *Raja* of Mustang for having collected 50,000 *bharias* (porters), 2, 606 sheep and mountain-goats, 1960 yaks, 370 ponies and 200 trained fighting men.
31. *Foreign Secret Consultation* No. 4 of 1855. Major Ramsay to G. F. Edmonstone, Sec. GI, Jan. 24, 1855; *Foreign, Secret Consultation*, No. 50, EA "A", August, 1854, File No. 249/1854, p. 2, NAI.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Secret Consultation* No. 29, Dec. 1854, File No. 5349/1854, p. 26. From Campbell to Sec. GI, undated, NAI.
34. *Secret Consultation*, No. 4 of 1854, Feb. 23, 1855. George Ramsay to G. F. Edmonstone, Sec. GI, Jan 24, 1855, NAI.
35. *Foreign Secret Consultation* No. 42, Oct. 27, 1854, p., 1. G. Ramsay to G. F. Edmonstone, Sec. GI. Sept. 23, 1854, NAI. FMAN *New Poka* "China Lhasa saga ko lekhpadi" (correspondence with China and Tibet) (unnumbered). Abstract translation of a *yaddashat* from Ramsay to Jang Bahadur, Sept. 25, 1854 (Aswin sudi 1911). See too a letter from Ramsay to Jang Bahadur Sept. 25, 1854, FMAN, Poka No. 97.
36. Minute of Lord Dalhousie concurred by the Board Oct. 9, 1854, *Secret Consultation* No. 44 of 1854, Oct. 27, 1854, File No. 33/1854, NAI.
37. FMAN, *New Poka* (unnumbered) Chin Lhasa sanga ko lekhpadi". Jang Bahadur to the Chinese Ambans and the Tibetan *Kashag* (cabinet), Feb. 15, 1855.
38. *Foreign Consultation* Nos. 61-62, October 22, 1852. p. 5 From Resident Ramsay to Offi. Sec. Foreign Dept. GI, Oct. 4, 1852.
39. A *crore* is a Nepalese unit denoting ten million rupees.
40. The parade had a diplomatic significance. It was designed to impress or even awe the Lama with the power and resources of the country, see FMAN, Poka No. Ga 57, Letters from Jang Bahadur to the Ambans and to the Tibetan *Kashag*, Feb 15, 1885; Pudma Jung Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur*, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
41. Pudma Jung Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur*, *op.*

cit., p. 177

42. See letters from the *Maharajadhiraja* of Nepal to the Chinese Emperor; *Maharaja* of Nepal to the Chinese Amban in Lhasa and the four Kazis in Tibet, Magh sambat 1911 (Jan-Feb 1855), see *Foreign Secret Consultations* 42-43, Feb. 23, 1855. From Major Ramsay to G. F. Edmonstone, Sec. GI, Jan. 15, 1855, NAI.
43. Pudma Jung Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur, op. cit.*, pp. 177-78.
44. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 39, May 25, 1855. Major G. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon Sec. GI, April 9, 1855, NAI.
45. *Ibid.*
46. FMAN, New Poka (unnumbered), "Chin Lhasa sanga ko Lekhapadhi"; an extract from a conversation between Major Ramsay and Jang Bahadur. This undated document too gives a list of the war materials and the non-fighting men enlisted as physicians, surgeons, carpenters cobblers, and blacksmiths. The list is, however, more suggestive than being comprehensive.
47. The result of this war is not clear. Nepalese sources point out that Listi was captured. But the British Resident in Kathmandu has doubted this claim, see *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 44, May 25, 1855, NAI.
48. *Bhot ko Ladai ko Pustak* (Book on Nepalese War With Tibet), C. No. 131, S. No. 63, NAN.
49. At the time of the deputation the Nepalese envoy held the rank of a *Subba*; but after he returned he was rewarded with the high office of the National Treasurer.
50. Interview of the British Resident in Kathmandu with Jang Bahadur after his return from the First Tibetan Campaign, see *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 654, July 27, 1855. George Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, Sec. GI, June 22, 1855, NAI.
51. *Kala mohars* refer to Tibetan monetary unit. Physically, they were black Tibetan coins. One *kala mohar* was equivalent to half a rupee.
52. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 65. An abstract from the report by Subba Siddhiman Singh to Premier Jang Bahadur. G. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon Sec. GI, June 27, 1855, p. 24, NAI.
53. *Ibid.*
54. While the Tibetan delegation was on its way to Kathmandu, Jang Bahadur dissatisfied by the letter of the Chinese Amban,

informed the Tibetan government that it was useless for the Tibetan government to allow its team to proceed toward Kathmandu unless they were prepared to accept the Nepalese proposals. However, the delegation did make its way to Kathmandu *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 60, Ramsay to GI, August 31, 1855, NAI.

55. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 81, Dec. 22, 1855, pp. 1-4. Major George Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, Sec. GI, August 10, 1855, NAI.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
57. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 40, Nov. 1855, p. 30, George Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, Sec. GI, Oct. 30, 1855, NAI.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 50
59. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 65, July 27, 1855, p. 30. Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, Sec. GI, June 27, 1855; *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No., 82, Nov. 30, 1855, Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, Oct. 12, 1855, NAI.
60. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 82, Dec. 28, 1855, p. 7. A. Campbell, Supdt. Darjeeling to Cecil Beadon, Sec. GI, NAI.
61. The letter ended with a note of fearful challenge which, in short contained that the Tibetans would destroy the capital (Kathmandu) with the help of the Chinese. Together they would capture the *Malik* (King) and would present him to the Emperor of China when he was possessed with extreme anger. Trans. of letter from Chinese Amban to *Maharaja* of Nepal, Sept. 1855, *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 81, Dec. 28, 1855, NAI.
62. The Council of Nobility was attended by King Surendra, ex-*Maharaja*, Rajendra, Jang Bahadur, members of the Rana family, Pandeys, Thapas and Chautarias.
63. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 48, Dec. 28, 1855. George Ramsay to Cecil Beadon, Sec. GI, Nov. 8, 1855, NAI.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Secret Consultation* No 73, Jan. 25, 1856, pp. 3-7. Major Ramsay to G. F. Edmontone, Sec. GI, Dec. 1856 Pudma Jung Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur, op. cit.* pp. 182-83; FMAN, Poka No 23, From Jang Bahadur to Resident Hodgson, Ashadh 13, 1913 (June 1856).
66. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 73, Jan. 25, 1856, pp. 3-7, Major Ramsay to G. F. Edmonstone, Sec. GI, Dec. 18, 1855, NAI.

67. F.M.AN, Poka No. 56 Ga. Jagat Shumsher to Jang Bahadur Mag badi 3, 1912 V. E. (Jan. 25, 1856).
68. The signatories to this treaty from the Nepalese side were: Jang Bahadur, Guru Raj Pandit Bijayaraj, Bam Bahadur, Ranaudip Singh, Jagat Shumsher, Dhir Shumsher, Bhakta Bir Kunwar, Bhakta Jung Chautaria, Rana Sher Shah and Colonel Tilak Bikram Thapa; while the Tibetan side consisted of Neema Dhondoo, the son of Sethia Kazi, Chen tare Sol Wang Dhal Chen, the Lamas of Dhaibung Gamba and others in equal number.
69. A copy of the official Nepalese text is found in the Archives of the Foreign Ministry, see FMAN, New Unnumbered Poka "Chin Lhasa ko Lekhapadhi", Sub-poka No. Vho 5. The English version of the treaty is in NAI, *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 27, May 30, 1856; See, too, the letter from Raja Surendra Bikram Shah to GG. Calcutta, Shravan badi 14, 1913 (July, 1856). This letter contains the ten clauses of the treaty. The original letter is in *Farsi* (Persian script).
70. Buddhiman Singh, *Vamsabali*, Nepali Chronological manuscript (without pagination).
71. The British Resident in Kathmandu came to this conclusion after his conversation with Jang Bahadur. See *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 26, May 30, 1856. Ramsay to GI., April 2, 1856, NAI.
72. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 26, *ibid*.
73. *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 45, August 29, 1856. Major Ramsay to G. F. Edmonstone, Sec. GI, July 15, 1856, NAI.
74. *Itihas Prakash* (Lights on History) (Kathmandu: Nepal Press, 1955-56), Vol. I, pp. 118-21.
75. It appears that the mood of the war-weary Tibetans to sue for peace compelled the Chinese Amban to affix his seal and signature in the Treaty, see *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 45, 47, August, 29, 1856. Ramsay to G. F. Edmonstone, July, 15, 1856 NAI.
76. Pudma Jung Rana, *Life of Maharaja Sir Jung Bahadur*, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

PART IV
THE REEMERGENCE OF OLD PATTERNS IN
TRANS-HIMALAYAN RELATIONS
(1862-1896)

The Post-War Decades (1862-1896) The Test of the Treaty of 1856

Nepal-Tibet relations became highly acute in the post-war decades. The Civil War in Tibet of 1862, the diplomatic crisis of 1872 and the riots in Lhasa in 1883 provided three major occasions for the testing of the treaty of 1856. These decades, among others, reveal how shaky was the latest truce patched by the two countries, or in other words, how little was the utility of the meticulously drawn up provisions of the comprehensive treaty of 1856.

A. Civil War in Tibet (1862-63) and Nepal's Assertive Role

The Third Nepal-Tibet War had served greatly to undermine the political stability in Lhasa. To add to this, the Taiping rebellion had substantially reduced the Chinese influence in Tibet. Both these factors paved the way for the emergence of civil war conditions in Tibet. The immediate cause for the civil war was, however, the feud between the Dalai Lama (or Grand Lama) and the former Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army, the Sethia Kazi (or Kalon Shatra). The riots that broke in Lhasa in the wake of this feud deeply divided the country into two: the Dalai Lama and the Kazis on one side and the Sethia Kazi and all the Lamas on the other. Both these groups supported by large sections of the people as well as the army fought fierce battles at several places. However, as the majority of the army had joined the Lamas, the Sethia Kazi was in a more advantageous position. As the feuding parties fought hilt to hilt, Lhasa plunged into a sea of anarchy so much so that the lives of even foreign nationals in Tibet were not safe. Accordingly, the Chinese Amban, who had

only 500 troops to protect his missions in Lhasa, was compelled to ask the Nepalese *Vakil* to render quick assistance whenever the need was felt. Nepal and China thus agreed to repel jointly in case of a Tibetan attack.¹ Earlier, during the civil war, the Sethia Kazi had been imprisoned by the Potala Lama; but he managed to escape. Once his position was secure, the Sethia Kazi installed himself as the Raj Lama of Tibet by going through the ritualistic ceremony. On the diplomatic front, China was quick to recognize him as the new secular ruler or the Dalai Lama of Tibet, while on the domestic front the former Raj Lama had thrown himself at the protection of the Raja of Kham (Khamba), where he was able to raise troops to oppose the new Raj Lama. The Emperor of China had also issued a mandate which demanded the confiscation of the seal of the former Raj Lama. The mandate further asked for the capture of the former Raj Lama who was to be sent to the Emperor in person if he was captured.²

In the heat of the struggle between the two rival factions in Lhasa, a Tibetan entered the house of a Newar merchant situated in the suburb of the capital and shot him deliberately. Nepal's reaction to this unfortunate incident was sharp and immediate. The Nepalese *Vakil* wrote to the Grand Lama as well as the Sethia Kazi requesting them to inquire into the incident and redress it. At home, *Maharaja* Jang Bahadur called the Council of Nobility to discuss the crisis situation created by the murder of a Gorkhali subject in Lhasa. The Council, after much serious deliberation, decided to despatch three letters to Tibet. Separate, yet identical letters, were despatched to the Grand Lama³ and the Sethia Kazi. Both the letters demanded the surrender of the person who had shot the Nepalese subject, or that the culprit be punished according to the Tibetan law. The third letter was addressed to the Chinese Amban which threatened Tibet with an invasion if justice was not forthcoming.⁴ However, within the background of past experience, Nepal's talk of an invasion of Tibet was only an empty backlash for the sufferings left by the Third Nepal-Tibet War, which had ended without fulfilling the principal war aims, was still fresh in her mind. Even the provisions of the treaty, which were certainly in Nepal's favor, were observed by the Tibetans for only one year and had since, for all

practical purpose, remained a dead letter. The treaty only became perennial source of friction between the two governments for future years. Apparently, the Dalai Lama did not even bother to reply. A reply, however, did come from the Sethia Kazi which asserted that it was the party of the Grand Lama that had committed the murder; but the Kazi did promise to hold an inquiry into the matter and punish the culprit when he was traced. He also asked the government of Nepal to recognize him as the supreme ruler of Tibet, and correspond to him as such. The Sethia Kazi even despatched an emissary to Kathmandu with the object of receiving help and recognition from the Nepalese Court. The *Maharaja*, however, told the envoy that he could not recognize the Kazi in the way he had hoped but that if he could hold on to power for four more months he would be glad to give him a formal recognition.⁵

But, as time rolled on, it was the economic and political considerations that prompted Jang Bahadur to extend his strong arm of assistance to the Sethia Kazi.⁶ His moves were also welcomed by the British, who wanted to use this occasion to open Tibet to the Europeans. The civil war in Tibet had actually an adverse effect on Nepal-Tibet trade. The result was that many Nepalese traders were compelled to return to Kathmandu from Lhasa. Again, owing to the troubled state of Tibet, the Kashmiri merchants who had their trade marts in Kathmandu decided not to send their investments to Lhasa. The profits of the Kashmiri merchants in Lhasa had dwindled so much that for every 20 rupees they formerly made on goods they were getting only two rupees.⁷ Political considerations were also visible in Jang Bahadur's desire to meddle in Tibetan affairs. Once the Kazi was firmly established in Tibet, Nepal hoped to influence the politics of Tibet in a freer and a more direct way.

The *Maharaja* in his reply to the Sethia Kazi pointed out that he had referred the whole matter to the Chinese Amban, and that if he refused to help in the termination of the unfortunate war, he would help the Tibetans, provided they would arrange for food, warm clothes and transportation for his proposed military expedition beyond the Nepalese frontier.⁸ Jang Bahadur immediately put his state on military alert and informed his troops during a grand parade in the Tundikhel of his proposed military expedition to

Tibet.⁹ Six regiments were called to active service, and men were promised not only the continuation of their *jagir*¹⁰ but also a monthly gratuity of ten rupees during their active combat services.¹¹ The *Maharaja* made two more moves to prepare his country for the military expedition. First, he ordered two regiments to proceed towards Jhunga to make roads (pathways) so that four more regiments could follow when the rainy season was over. Secondly, he sought permission from the Government of India to despatch his six regiments along with food and tents via British India through Dhankuta to the Wallanchung pass. By August 1863 the six regiments had already reached the Wallanchung pass.¹²

In September a messenger from Sethia Kazi arrived in Kathmandu who told the *Maharaja* that due to the rainy season, the Kazi was unable to make arrangements for 3,000 troops and 2,000 followers whom the *Maharaja* proposed to send to the country. Thus he asked for eight guns with a supply of ammunition together with artillery men to be delivered via the Kutu pass. The *Maharaja* promised to send the six mountain guns and 800 round of ammunition, but refused the artillery men for security reasons. He also renewed the offer of 3,000 fighting men after the rainy season.¹³

The political objective of Jang Bahadur in extending the influence of Nepalese Court in the Tibetan politics by siding with one of the two contending factions in the Civil War, however, ended in a failure. The untimely death of the Sethia Kazi on August 1864 took the steam out of the Civil War; hence the proposed Nepalese military expedition also crumbled down.

B. Crisis of 1871-73

Nepal-Tibet relations again reached a crisis stage between 1871-73. Paradoxically, there was also a decline of Chinese influence in Tibet,¹⁴ which was partly due to the Taiping rebellion and the Tibetan insurrections in the Western provinces of Tibet. The causes of this crisis were the insult of the Nepalese envoy and the loot and plunder of the Nepalese officials and their property. Jang Bahadur talked of war and ordered partial mobilization of the Nepalese militia in January 1873. He also threatened to withdraw his *Vakil*

from Lhasa and stop all trade between the two countries. The crisis flared to its highest pitch during the annual Durbar held in Lhasa on March 1873. The Nepalese envoy, as usual, was asked to attend, but since he was ill he sent his assistant and the usual attendants. However, the Nepalese team had to remain in the reception room for about four or five hours without any notice. Later they were taken outside the room and beaten with whips and sticks. The Nepalese Assistant Envoy suffered no serious injuries but was insulted and pushed from one corner of the room to another.¹⁵ The Assistant Nepalese Envoy, shocked by such unusual hostile behavior, refused to participate in the conclusion of the ceremony of the Grand Durbar during which presents were exchanged, and reported the whole matter to his Master. Ultimately, the Lhasa establishment realized its mistake and sent an official apology to the Nepalese *Vakil* together with a sum of forty rupees to the attendants and presents to the Assistant Envoy. The Nepalese *Vakil*, accepted the forty rupees but rejected the presents.

This news took Kathmandu by surprise. Jang Bahadur, in a hectic move, wrote strong letters to the Chinese Amban as well as to the Tibetan authorities announcing that he had decided to withdraw his *Vakil* and stop all intercourse between the two countries. The Tibetans, however, suggested the appointment of a joint commission to settle the crisis. The Nepalese Premier rejected the proposal and finally recalled the *Vakil* from Lhasa in the fall of 1873.¹⁶

The withdrawal of the Envoy helped little to improve the worsening Nepal-Tibet relations. The point where Nepal-Tibet friction could always flare up into open hostilities was the high table-land of the Tingri Maidan. Here Nepalese always assembled in fairly large numbers for the purpose of trading in salt, wool and other artifacts. Here the interest of both these groups, namely, of Nepalese and Tibetans often clashed and collided with each other paving the way for perennial hostility. Such encounters were more normal than exceptional during the past fifteen years. In the cold Winter of 1869-70 Nepal expected a major attack and Jang Bahadur made arrangements to proceed in person to the frontier. Distrust between Nepal and Tibet further stemmed from the fact that Tibet sincerely felt that Nepal was drawing closer to China at a time when Tibet was trying

to be free from the Chinese yoke. She naturally feared that Nepal might lend her hand to China in claiming her feudal rights in Tibet.¹⁷ As a part of this comprehensive move the Chinese were training themselves in Lhasa.¹⁸

It is difficult to ascertain how this crisis between Nepal and Tibet eased out. However, by 1875 the situation seemed to have substantially improved and Jang Bahadur decided to send his *Vakil* to Lhasa. Relations between the two countries then became normal for another eight years till 1883.

C. A Catastrophic Point in Nepal Tibet Relations: The Massive Loot of 1883

The plunder of 84 *kothis* (trade-marts) again disrupted the relatively comfortable relations between Nepal and Tibet since 1875, thus placing the treaty of 1856 to the severest test. This dispute took such a serious turn that Nepal as well as Tibet were fully mobilized for war. The timing: a popular festival of a religious character that was participated primarily by the disciples of Bandu Lamas provided the occasion. On Chaitra sudi 1, 1939 (April 1883) the monks of Lhasa and the adjoining areas were holding a religious procession circumambulating the Tokhang temple. While the procession was going on a quarrel broke between two Tibetan women and the Nepalese shop-keeper, Ratna Man. The dispute arose in this fashion. Four strange Tibetan women came to a jewelry shop of Ratna Man,¹⁹ a Nepalese merchant in Lhasa. Two stood to his left and the other two to his right. The two women sitting to his left bought five coral beads for half a rupee; while the two women to his right started to examine three coral necklaces, two of which were valued at twenty four rupees, while the third at ten rupees. It appears that the two customers returned the two necklaces and concealed the third, whereupon Ratna Man demanded the missing one. Both the women in their desperate attempt to prove their innocence unfolded their *patuka* (cloth girdle) and shook their bodies. But, finding Ratna Man still unconvinced, one of the women offered the merchant half a rupee. Ratna Man, however, scorned this offer and began to collect his scattered artifacts. It was

at this moment the two women fled and Ratna Man followed. As the chase began a Bandu Lama, who had been watching this episode attentively, threw a lump of mud to divert the chase. Despite this obstacle, Ratna Man managed to capture the two Tibetan women and kept them in his tent. What happened to the Tibetan women in the custody of the Nepalese merchant one can only conjecture. But Ratna Man himself admitted that he had once beaten the two Tibetan women on their head.

This incident aroused strong anti-Nepalese sentiments and compelled both the monks and the laymen to join in anti-Nepalese riots. In the mean time the news of the seizure of the Tibetan women by Ratna Man swept like fire; and in no time a crowd of Tibetans assembled before the shop. A riotous situation thus prevailed which caused the looting of all the 84 Nepalese shops in Lhasa. The excited mob made fire bands from rolls of cloth to light their way as they pillaged the Nepalese shops. By the morning every Nepalese shop had been plundered.²⁰ The losses of the Nepalese merchants in this riot was 833,709 rupees while the losses of Ratna Man alone amounted to rupees 1,415.²¹

The Tibetan officials, on being informed of this unfortunate incident that had so swiftly and suddenly taken place, went to the Nepalese mission to express their regrets and promised to hold a full inquiry into the matter and give full redress. They also requested the *Vakil* to communicate to the Darbar that the outbreak of the riots was a spontaneous affair and should not be mistakenly associated with a political manoeuvre or a diplomatic intrigue.²² However, the circumstantial evidence tends to indicate that this wide scale riot was something more than the expression of the age old animosities existing between the privileged Nepalese merchants and the non-privileged Tibetan counterpart in the Capital. This riot was not free from political overtones. The rioters did have the support of the powerful section of Tibetan administration which looked upon the increasing nearness of the Sino-Nepalese relation as a threat to the concept of complete Tibetan autonomy. The arrival of the Chinese official, Sanfu Hosai, in Kathmandu with robes of honor to *Maharaja* Ranaudip Singh helped only to confirm the Tibetan suspicion.²³ The worsening relation between Tibet and Bhutan in

Jhung only added to Tibetan complexity (which had cost the latter some blood). Tibet feared that the situation favored Nepal to cement an alliance with Bhutan and invade Tibet.²⁴ Kathmandu, however, sincerely believed the riot to be a premeditated and a planned episode and blamed the Tibetan government for not only remaining aloof from the riot but even secretly encouraging it. Again, the way in which the Tibetan government prolonged the investigation of the riots and delayed its reply to Nepal's official letters for months further confirmed Nepalese hypothesis. The crux of the matter was that Tibet could not displease the monks of the three monasteries of Sera, Drepung and Galden, who had taken part in the loot.

Kathmandu, stunned by this outrage, wrote letters to the Chinese Amban and the Kazis of Kasyal demanding the full restoration or the compensation of the looted property and the punishment of the looters. The immediate response of the Tibetan government was one of silence. But to Nepal's surprise the Chinese Amban for the first time in Sino-Nepalese relations came out in support of Nepal and placed the entire blame for the riot on the Tibetans. He then advised the Tibetan government to settle the whole matter according to the Treaty of 1856.²⁵ This was followed by his donation of a sum of 4,000 *kala mohars* for the relief of riot-stricken Nepalese victims.²⁶

With the cataclysm of Chaitra sudi 1, 1939 Nepal-Tibet relations took such a steady downward trend that Kathmandu had to evacuate her *Vakil* and the merchants from Lhasa to Kerong.²⁷ This exodus of the Nepalese from Lhasa was probably the most disturbing aspect of the riot. Tibet, however, refused to take notice of the sad plight of the Nepalese. Far from restoring the looted property of the Nepalese and punishing the marauders she began to make war preparations. The internal problems in Nepalese politics, in particular the approaching showdown between the sons of Jang Bahadur and his brothers for political supremacy, also helped Tibet to take such an adamant attitude.

These developments placed Kathmandu in a precarious position. On the one hand Nepal could not remain indifferent to Tibet's massive loot, for eventually this would tempt Tibet to stop the annual payment of tribute; while on the other even a successful war with Tibet would not give to Nepal the indemnity she hoped to acquire

which according to one source, would run to 60 *lakhas*.²⁸ Accordingly, the psychology that governed the then Nepalese Court was to pine its faith on vigorous peaceful negotiations, while at the same time keeping the options of war wide open. Nepal thus decided to attack this problem with the "swords" of peace as well as the "daggers" of war.

1. Theater of War Preparation:

Two factors helped to intensify Nepal's war preparation. First the shop of a Newar merchant Ram Narayan Manandhar(Salmi)was also looted during the religious fair of Tetung Gumba situated about two to four day's march from Lhasa.²⁹ Secondly, the continued military buildup in Tibet led Nepal in the direction of intensive war preparation. Preparing a country for a mountain war was a monumental task, which involved the collection of porters, grains and conscripts, and also the manufacture and purchase of armaments and the allied materials of war. Along with this a strategy for war had to be developed and the building of roads and bridges had to be speedily undertaken. Ranaudip had inherited a large well disciplined army from his brother Jang Bahadur, thus the collection of conscripts posed no serious problem. However, orders had to be issued to the commanders of East No. 1 to East No. 4 to conscript soldiers and train them for active combat duties.³⁰ The first thing the *Maharaja* did was to evolve a strategy for war. In order to conduct a meaningful war against Tibet a map of a new route for invasion had to be sketched. The past experience in the three major wars against Tibet (1788, 1799 and 1855-56) had revealed that Kuti and Kerong were too remote from the political and commercial centers of Tibet to make Nepalese invasion fully effective. Thus for the proposed war a new route via Wallanchung Pass in Eastern Nepal was chosen. Having taken this crucial decision the *Maharaja* devoted his energy in two directions: first, the collection of grains and animal carriers, and secondly, the purchase and production of armaments.

Collection of carriers and grains

The arrangement of food and the means of transport was probably the most cumbersome aspect of war preparation. The *Maharaja*

attended to this task personally, once he was convinced that Tibet had little intention to settle the dispute peacefully. He tackled this problem in two ways. First, as early as Marga sudi 4, 1940 (Nov. 1883) 40,000 rupees were sanctioned by the *Kausi Tosakhana* (National Treasury) to purchase grains.³¹ Accordingly, Man Dhoj Gharti and the Royal Treasurer Pandit Mukunda were sent to the Punjab to purchase grains. Four other persons were sent to the city of Ambar (Ambala) to bring 2,000 ponies.³² Additional ponies were also purchased from other parts of India. The aim was to create a pony express of 1,064 to transport war materials across the Himalayas.³³ The *Maharaja* also wrote personal letters to Colonel Bhakta Bahadur Chhetri and Colonel Fatya Bahadur Rana instructing them to see how many yaks, sheep, goats and horses were available and to make sure that they did not find their way to India. Orders were also issued to different offices in the kingdom to collect food for war and prevent its export to India.³⁴ Secondly, he asked all Nepalese from the King to the sepoy and from the office-bearer to the householder to contribute a fixed quantity of a grain to the emergency war fund. To begin with, the Prime-Minister himself contributed, thirty *muris*³⁵ of rice to the war fund and the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding Generals donated half that amount. Even the *bahidar* (the lowest rank in the civil service) gave 13 *pathis of rice*, while a *dhakre*³⁶ sent to the war fund three *pathis*³⁷ of cereals.³⁸

Purchase and Production of Materials for War

For a successful war against Tibet, Nepal had to fill its armory with the latest weapons from British India. To accomplish this objective Dhir Shumsher sent his son Khadga Shumsher to the Indian Capital, Calcutta, to purchase 4,000 breech-loading rifles.³⁹ The aim was to establish the desired strong superiority in fire arms over Tibet. It is to be noted in this connection that the treaty between Nepal and British India permitted Nepal to buy war materials from the Indian dealers anywhere in India. Nepal also threw its armament factory into operation to manufacture light rifles, explosives, bullets and small grenades, engineering goods and water containers. The factories producing utensils, saddles and warm

clothes were also put in full swing. In this way the whole nation was put on a war footing.⁴⁰

B. The Arena of Negotiations

It is true that Nepal though was physically prepared for war yet mentally she was not quite so for the physical and psychological wounds inflicted by the Third Nepal-Tibet war was still fresh in her memory. Thus Nepal decided to tread the track of negotiation as faithfully as possible while keeping the option of war wide open. Both Nepal and Tibet decided to cut the ice on the negotiation table at the border town of Kerong in January 1884. The Nepalese delegation was led by Col. Tez Bahadur Rana and Kazi Laxmi Bhakta Upadhyaya,⁴¹ while the Tibetan side consisted of Kazi Khulhalu Vachalba and Dunkekhabu Saykhaba together with the Chinese Fapoon Dhautalabya. As the discussion proceeded Nepal quickly put forth her claim of 1,447, 807 rupees as compensation for the losses suffered by the Nepalese at Lhasa, as well as to cover the expenses involved during war preparation. The Tibetan government, however, protested that the losses accounted by the Nepalese merchants in Lhasa far exceeded real losses and maintained that the interest demanded by them for the total sum for one year was even more preposterous. The Tibetans argued forcefully that the Nepalese merchants had amassed fortunes by trading in Lhasa for generations and thus they should voluntarily bear a part of the loss. Finally, after a good deal of wailings and dealings the two negotiating teams struck a four point formula that was to close this chapter of dispute. An agreement was signed on Jestha sudi 2,1941 (May 26, 1884) which in summary ran:

1. Tibet agreed to pay in annual instalment of seven years a sum of 942,098 rupees as compensation for the damages in the loot.⁴²
2. Lhasa promised to restore as much plundered property as could be traced, whose value was to be deducted from the compensation figure.
3. Tibet decided to punish the marauders according to the Tibetan law; but if the looters were the Khambas the

case would be referred to the Chinese Emperor for proper punishment.

4. Nepal, too, gave up her claim of 600,000 rupees she had demanded for war preparation.⁴³

While negotiations were still proceeding between the Nepalese and the Tibetan delegates at Kerong, Nepal had already relaxed the state of national military alertness. This change of policy is seen in the lifting of the restrictions in the export of grains to India and also the cancellation of the embargo on the seasonal laborers migrating from Nepal to India. This indicates that Nepal did not anticipate immediate hostility. Moreover, she appeared to be confident of solving the dispute peacefully. However, even after the truce negotiation was completed Nepal did not scale down the army nor showed any slackness in military preparation. Obviously Nepal wanted to keep the war-tuned image until Tibet paid her indemnity.⁴⁴

The Chinese Amban was delighted to hear of the settlement of a serious dispute which could have exploded into a full scale war, thus bringing even China into the vortex of Himalayan conflict. His role in the negotiations was highly significant. He was able to obtain from the Emperor a loan for Tibet so that she could abide by her commitment to Nepal. Accordingly, the Emperor ordered the transfer of 80,000 taels of silver (about 400,000 rupees) as a loan from the Chinese treasury of Szechuan Province so that Tibet could clear her indemnity, and thus settle the dispute once and for all. The Emperor was also kind enough to permit Tibet to pay off the above loan in three easy instalments.⁴⁵ But Tibet was not able to pay the Chinese loan in time. However, in contrast, Tibet paid to Nepal the indemnity in gold dust in a little more than one year, though she had been given a period of seven years to fulfil her obligation. It was probably the burden of 10% interest in cash that tempted Tibet to fulfil her commitment far ahead of time. Whatever may have been the real reason, this behavior on the part of Lhasa was unprecedented in the diplomatic annals of Nepal-Tibet relations.

The four point agreement did seal the thorny dispute between the two countries. The treaty in spite of many positive features was not an unmixed blessing for Nepal. It is true that the terms of the treaty were quite favorable to Nepal. She obtained a fairly reasonable

indemnity without having resorted to war. Again, the Sino-Nepalese relations emerged stronger than ever before or, to put in different words, for the first time in the history of Nepal-Tibet relations China came out openly in favor of Nepal. However, these gains could hardly compensate for the loss of Nepalese foothold in the Trans-Himalayan trade. The Tibetan government increasingly encouraged the introduction of Indian goods via the Phari route (Sikkim-Chumbi route). While Nepal-Tibet dispute was in its highest pitch the Trans-Himalayan trade was taken up by Indian merchants. Nepal could never restore her monopoly of Trans-Himalayan trade. Above all, the psychological wounds of the riot were difficult to heal. The social relation between the Tibetans and the Nepalese in Lhasa never remained the same. Each side condemned the other for rudeness and intrigues.

Further Crisis in Nepal-Tibet Relations (1886-1896)

The Four Point Agreement of 1884 that sealed the horny dispute of the “massive loot” of the year 1883 could little serve as a guarantee of future harmonious relations between the two states. The signatories to this accord, however, rejoiced because it did bring a lull in the disturbed relations between the two countries. Hardly a few years had lapsed since the signing of this agreement, when dark clouds began to envelop the clear peaks of the Himalayas. The maltreatment of the Nepalese, the border disputes, the imposition of a new law on private property and the offensive letter of a Chinese officer brought Nepal almost to the verge of war at the turn of the century.

A. Maltreatment of the Nepalese

Nepal-Tibet relations took a steady downward plunge during the last decades of the nineteenth century. The first symptom of this trend is seen in the prohibition of Nepalese from buying property in Tibet; and the second was heralded by the nationalization of landed property of Nepalese merchants in Tibet, with compensation.⁴⁶ This was a major setback for the Nepalese in Tibet. But this blow was more psychological than real for land was a mirror of social status in both countries, an avenue to prestige and even a sense of power. The immediate result of this law was that the Nepalese who had their own land and houses in Tibet were compelled to live, as tenants in the houses of Tibetans. Harassment of the Nepalese also continued in other forms. As for example, Mambir Gurung and his four companions, who had gone to Tibet via Wallanchung pass to buy horses, were imprisoned by the Tibetans in their office.

One of them, Dadar, a Nepalese Bhote, was stripped naked and tortured with sticks and stones. The *Maharaja*, hearing of such an insolent behavior of the Tibetans directed his *Vakil* in Lhasa to record a strong written protest to the Kasyal office. Again, the Tibetan Dheba of Taklakot had imposed a fine of 335 *kala mohars* on the people of Jumla and three other villages between 1888 to 1896 A. D. without the knowledge of the Nepalese government. He had also confiscated 529 sheep and 138 yaks from those who had refused to pay fines. He argued that the Nepalese had not paid to him the annual dues of 140 rupees. The Nepalese Premier rejected his claim and wrote to the Kazis of Kasyal asking them how they intended to punish the Dheba.⁴⁷

The controversy that surrounded the episode that is often referred to as "Nepal's Export of Tea to Tibet"* is a glaring instance of the further deterioration of Nepal-Tibet relations. The occasion was provided by the despatch of a sizable bulk of tea by the Kathmandu Durbar to the *Vakil* office in Lhasa to be delivered to the Potala Lama and the Kazis as presents. The Tibetan officers in the border prevented the passage of this bulk of tea for they thought that it was being exported to be sold. It is to be noted that China alone had the right to trade in tea in Tibet; and this was done through the *Amban* alone. The Chinese *Amban* upon the receipt of the news about Nepal's illicit tea traffic in Tibet at first decided to confiscate the tea and fine the Nepalese traders, but, upon second thought, decided to give the Nepalese tea traders the benefit of doubt for not knowing the laws of Tibet. The Nepalese were thus asked to return with their tea to their country. A letter containing the above thoughts of the *Amban* was also sent to the Nepalese Monarch. The Nepalese Monarch clarified the nation's stand in the following way. The tea chest was sent by the government of Nepal accompanied by an authorized officer and two interpreters. The tea by no means was intended for export; rather, his Prime Minister was sending the tea grown in his own garden as a mark of respect and goodwill to the Potala Lama and the four Kazis. The letter concluded with the assertion that Nepal was shocked at the rude expressions of the Chinese *Amban*.* Such expressions had never been used by his predecessors and she hoped that he will never use them in future.⁴⁸

To crown this atmosphere of doubt and suspicion a row took place at a frontier outpost situated between Nepal and Tibet. The cause was the attempt made by Tibetans to force their salt into Nepal. Earlier Nepal had banned the import of Tibetan salt on the ground that it was highly adulterated. In this unfortunate incident the casualties on the Nepalese side were six: three killed and three wounded, while on the Tibetan side a few suffered injuries.⁴⁹

B. Border Dispute

The border disputes are a recurring phenomenon in Nepal-Tibet relations from the medieval period to our own times. Towards the close of the nineteenth century Khasa became a hot spot of Nepal-Tibet dialogue. The cause, from the Nepalese perspective, was the encroachment Tibet had made upon Nepal towards Khasa and Lamobagar. Nepalese territory had thus been included within Tibet and a new map had been produced to legitimize the annexation.⁵⁰ As the dispute took a serious turn the Chinese Amban came to be involved. Ultimately it was decided that a top level Tibeto-Chinese team would come to the border to study the problem, by the beginning of 1896. A. D. The Tibeto-Chinese side was represented by Dhaibun, the son of Ito Kazi and the Chinese boundary commissioner, while the Nepalese counterpart were: Naib Subbah Avaya Man Singh, Khardar Puspa Raj Upadhyaya, Khardar Jit Bahadur and Ditha Padma Singh Raj Lawat.⁵¹

As the investigation proceeded the Chinese boundary commissioner came out strongly in favor of Tibet. The report he submitted to the Amban pointed out that no encroachment had been made on either side of the boundary line. The pile of stones that demarcated the two countries was an old one. The report, which blamed Nepal for creating a fuss over nothing, ran in part as follows:

I have thoroughly understood everything in this matter and think that it is necessary to impose fine a on you (Nepalese Monarch); but as both states have respected the Emperor for many years I forgive you this time.....I advise you to maintain friendly relations. It is

not proper for such a poor country to trouble the great Amban on such a trifling matter.⁵²

It appears that Nepal too received a letter from the Chinese commissioner calling Nepal a small "poor country" and threatening to "fine" her.⁵³ This letter served as a catalyst to rouse the Nepalese ego wounded during the row of September 1893. The Nepalese Premier thus decided to take two major decisions. First, he asked the resident to postpone his visit to England,⁵⁴ and secondly, he put the nation on military alert. The nation was fully mobilized for a military campaign across the Himalayas.

Nepal's mobilization for war against Tibet was a matter of concern for the bureaucracy in India, for, as on the previous occasions, Nepal would seek permission to purchase arms in India. The British outlined their strategy to face any serious turn that the dispute might take. The Government of India felt that Nepal's request for a reasonable supply of arms should be met, provided that the British Government had a free hand in the recruitment of the Gurkhas. The Secretary of State thus authorized the Government of India to offer Nepal an immediate supply of 4000 sinders with ammunition and facilities for a future supply of reasonable amount.⁵⁵ In short, the British Government in India looked upon this possible Nepalese Himalayan adventure as an opportunity for British mediation and intervention. However, a little later the British apparently changed their mind.

As a move toward mobilization Bir Shumsher alerted his northern patrol by sending three of his best fighting regiments.* Permissions were also sought from the British to purchase some military provisions. As the month of March unfolded Bir Shumsher made a formal request to the Government of India to purchase 16 *lakh* cartridges either from the government's arsenals or from open market. A Nepalese general was thus sent to Calcutta to purchase armaments and another to Cawnpore to buy leather accouterments.⁵⁶ The British Government, however, turned down the request on the ground that friendly powers are "prevented from selling munitions of war to combatants."⁵⁷

A simultaneous move made by the Nepalese Prime Minister

was the demand of an apology from the Chinese officials for the use of insulting expressions in a letter to the Nepalese Monarch. By the middle of March 1896 an apology was received by the Durbar in which the Chinese Tale, the Boundary Commissioner, asked pardon for his insulting expressions.⁵⁸ This timely apology took the steam out of the Nepal-Tibet border dispute, and the possibility of war between the two states receded. By May 1896 the salt trade and the boundary dispute came to a satisfactory conclusion. The exchange rate of salt was fixed at two manas of salt for one mana of fine rice, and one and a half mana of salt for second quality of rice.* All rates were, however, subject to fluctuation in case of famines or other catastrophes.⁵⁹

The border disputes were also terminated. As regards the Khasa dispute, it was settled amicably according to the *sanad* of Jang Bahadur, and with reference to the second border dispute of Lamo Bagar, Nepal had asserted that the settlement with the Chinese had given to them the hill of Ralung. But the Tibetans had removed the boundary line three miles into Nepal to include the area. The *Maharaja* however, told the Resident that he would not go to war against Tibet on this dispute for the disputed land yielded only the revenue of 26 rupees. He thus had instructed his *Vakil* at Lhasa to settle the matter in a very friendly way.⁶⁰ The storm that could have taken Nepal and Tibet to war toward the end of nineteenth century thus passed away.

The period between 1862 to 1896 was significant in the sense that it provided an anvil on which the treaty of 1856 was tested. An analysis of these crucial decades shows that the provisions of the treaty were too weak to stand the test of time. The treaty far from cementing the traditional friendship between the two countries brought only fear, jealousy and malaise to the surface. The history of Nepal-Tibet relations even up to 1950 was one of persistent violation of the Treaty of 1856 by both of the contracting parties.

Foot Notes

1. *Foreign, Political-A*, No. 26, 1862, P. 1. George Ramsay to H. M. Durand, Sec. to GI, Foreign Dept., July 29, 1862, NAI.

2. A note by the foreign department on Tibetan Affairs, July 1, 1863, see *Foreign, Secret Consultation* No. 69, 1863, File F. G. 1863/ *Political-A*; *Foreign, Political* No. 33, 1862. George Ramsay to H. M. Durand, Dec. 30, 1862, NAI.
3. Grand Lama and the Raj Lama are common expressions that are used to denote the Dalai Lama of Tibet.
4. *Foreign Political-A, Consultation* No. 26 of 1862, NAI.
5. *Foreign Political-A, Consultation* No. 162/164, Sept. 1863, pp. 1-2. Ramsay to H. M. Durand, July 27, 1863; *Foreign Political-A* No. 38, August 1862, pp. 1-2. George Ramsay to H. M. Durand, not dated; *Foreign Political-A*, Sept. 1862, 35/36. Ramsay to H. M. Durand, August 9, 1862, NAI.
6. The period of civil war had brought the Trans-Himalayan trade to a virtual standstill, which was a cause of serious concern to Nepal as well as to India.
7. *Foreign Political-A Consultation* No. 162/164, Sept. 1863, pp. 1-2. George Ramsay to H. M. Durand, July 27, 1863, NAI.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
9. See *Foreign Political-A, Cons.* No. 162/64, Sept. 1863, NAI.
10. A *jagir* is a term used to denote the tenure of a person who is in the payroll of the government.
11. Prior to this, in the month of August, Jang Bahadur called all his army officers and *Uhdads* (down to *havalgars*, corporals), inclusive of the fourteen regiments, and asked them to give up one year's salary as the exigencies of the time had demanded. He further asserted that he and his brothers had done the same. However, several commanders of the troops refused on the ground that if they gave up their *roti* (food) how were they going to live. He, then, met them, a second time and urged them to give up six month's pay but even this proposal was rejected by the troops. See *Foreign Political-A, Cons.* No. 162/64 of 1863. Ramsay to H. M. Durand, July 27, 1863. NAI.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 5, *Foreign Consultation* No. 164 of 1863. From Under Sec. GI, Foreign Dept. to Resident Nepal, August 26, 1863; also *Foreign Consultation* No. 162/64 of Sept. 1863. NAI.
13. *Foreign Consultation* No. 29 of 1862. G. Ramsay to H. M. Durand. Sec. GI, Foreign Dept., Sept. 24, 1863, NAI.
14. China, however, was apparently contemplating the subjugation of Tibet through the cooperation of Nepal and Bhutan. With this aim in the background China sent titles and robes to the

Maharaja of Nepal as well as to the Deba Raja of Bhutan. See *Foreign Political-A* Oct. 1871. R. C. Lawrence, Resident Nepal to Sec. GI. Foreign Dept., August 30, 1871. On the bestowal of the robes and honor to Jang Bahadur, see Patent Tung Chin, 9th. year, 6th. month, 7th. day (July 5, 1870). The Mandate of the Chinese Emperor, FMAN Poka No. 3 (trans. by E. Backhouse), Peking, Feb., 1911.

15. What prompted the Tibetans to behave in such a hostile manner will, probably, never be accurately determined, for the records are silent.
16. *Foreign Political-A*, June 1873, *Cons.* No 464, Offig. Resident, Nepal, to Sec. Foreign Dept., GI, March 3, 1873; *Foreign Political-A*, June 1873, *Cons.*, No. 466, April 24, 1873; *Foreign Political-A-Cons.* No. 471, June 1873, Sikkim *Vakil* in Darjeeling to British Govt., Calcutta, NAI.
17. *Foreign Political-A*, Oct., 1871, *Cons.* No. 471, Offig. Commissioner, Cooch, Behar to Junior Sec. Government of Bengal, 9-13 May 1873. NAI.
18. The Nepalese *Vakil* writes on May 1871 that, once, while the Chinamen were practicing target shooting, he was nearly hit in his house. When the Nepalese Envoy protested the Chinese *Amban* not only apologized and imprisoned the Chinamen but also sent two pieces of silk as presents. See *Foreign Political A*. October, 1871, *Cons.* No. 414, "A Report by the Nepalese Representative Jit Man Singh Lhasa", May 18, 1871. R. C. Lawrence to Sec. GI, Foreign Dept., August 30, 1871. NAI.
19. The practice of writing the family name among the Nepalese is a recent Western innovation. Thus, prior to the 1950's, even the official records did not mention their last names. So we are not in a position to know the last names of many Nepalese in this study. However, attempts have been made to reconstruct the family names of the Nepalese from the Imperial Records of NAI and IOL.
20. This account is based upon the report on the incident presented in writing to the *Vakil* office in Lhasa by Ratna Man. See MAN, Poka No. 85, "The Loot of the Year 1940" (V.E.). However, the Imperial Records, which have preserved the correspondence between *Maharaja* Sir Ranodip and Lord Ripon, gives a slightly different version of the incident. As Ratna Man persistently insisted on the missing coral necklace one of the two women

made a compromise of the case by paying five rupees and went to their respective homes. However, at night the Bandu Lamas assembled in large numbers, assaulted the Nepalese merchants and plundered their property. One of the disturbing aspect of the riot was the plunder of the property of the Nepalese *Vakil* and the inability of the Lhasa Commissioner to offer adequate protection even to the property of Nepalese diplomats. See, *Foreign Secret E*, June 1884, No. 421. Ranodip to Lord Ripon, June 10, 1883. For more on this riot, see also, Tsepon, W. D. Shakabpa. *Tibet: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale Univ., 1967), pp. 193-94; *The Indian Daily News*. May 27, 1887, P. 3.

21. FMAN, Poka No. 85, "A List of Losses suffered in Cash and Property by the Nepalese Merchants", Aswin sudi, 1, 1901 (Sept. 1883) See also *Residency Records* File No. 2041-G of 1883 pt. (a) & (b): "Attack by the Tibetan Mob on Nepalese Quarter in Lhasa and the Plunder of the Property", NAI.
22. *Foreign A, Political E*, May 1883, Cons. No. 302. Girdlestone to C. Grant, Sec. Foreign Dept., May 12, 1883, NAI.
23. FMAN, New Poka (unnumbered). Correspondence between Nepal and Tibet. Sub. Poka No. 22, Chaitra sudi 1, 1939 (April 1883)
24. FMAN, Poka No. 85, A letter from Nepalese *Vakil* Mahavir Singh Khatri to the *Maharaja*, Kartik badi 11, 1940 (Oct., 1883)
25. *Peking Gazette*, June 29, 1883 (*Foreign A. Political E*. No. 240. April 1884), NAI.
26. FMAN, Poka No. 85, Falgun sudi 4, 1940 (April, 1883), Record of Conversation between the Nepalese *Vakil* and the Tibeto-Chinese Officers.
27. FMAN, Poka No. 85, A Letter from Govt. of Nepal to Govt. of Tibetan requesting the provision of the means of transport of the Nepalese diplomats and the merchants from Lhasa to Kerong, Baishakh 7, 1941 (April, 1884); the reply from the Tibetan government that the means of transport had been granted, dated April 1884. The Chinese Amban had, too, recommended the Nepalese *Vakil* to transfer the looted Nepalese merchants from Lhasa to Kerong., Poush badi 4, 1940 (Dec. 1883). See also *The Times of India*, "Nepal and Thibet", Feb. 4, 1884, p. 3.
28. General Dhir Shumsher, in an interview with the British Resident Girdlestone in Kathmandu, pointed out that the war

would cost thirty to forty *lakhs* which together with the damages claimed by Nepal would amount to sixty *lakhs*. Nepal felt that she could not extract this sum of money even after the conclusion of a successful war. *Foreign Secret E.*, June 1884, Cons. No. 434 "A Note on an Interview with Dhir Shumsher", Oct. 20, 1883, NAI.

29. On Shrawn sudi 11, 1941 (July 1884) six/seven Nepalese merchants had set up temporary shops during the festival of Tetung Gumba. The dispute arose when a Tibetan stole a mirror from the shop of Ram Narayan Salmi. The Nepalese merchant, however, was successful in capturing the culprit. The Tibetans then began to crowd the *bazaar* (market) and, in the process, looted the shop of the Salmi as well as the Thakali Chidi Tamat. But the local population did help the Nepalese merchant to capture the plunderers and restore all the looted property. For more information see FMAN, Poka No. 85, "The Loot of the Year 40". Correspondence between the *Vakil*, Mahabir Singh Khatri and the *Maharaja*, Aswin badi 1, 1941 (Sept. 1884)
30. MAN, Book No. 22, 1883 "Possibility of War Between Nepal and Tibet. . . .", *Roka Purjai* (Order from the Central Government) Shrawn 10, 1940 (July 1883), p. 2.
31. MAN, Book No. 23, "Purchase of *Khachchars* (ponies) and grains from India", Marga sudi 4, 1940 (Nov. 1883), p. 4.
32. The cost of 2000 ponies was estimated to be 40,000 rupees. See MAN, Book No 23, p. 5.
33. MAN, Book No. 23. "Purchase of *Khachchars* (ponies) and Grains from India", *Purji* (Order) to Man Dhoj Khatri, Bhadra sudi 14, 1940 (August 1883). Other *Purjis* of Kartik sudi 2, and Kartik sudi 10, 1940 (Oct. 1883), p. 7, p. 10; *Foreign Secret E.* June 1884 Cons. No. 434, "A Note on Interview by the Resident Girdlestone with Dhir Shumsher, Oct. 20, 1883. NAI.
34. MAN, Book No. 32, "Collection of Food and Grains for the Possible Nepal-Tibet War", Order of Marga sudi 3, 1951 (Nov. 1883), pp. 75-76, Book No. 22, "Possibility of a War with Tibet. . . ." *Roka Purji*, Shrawn sudi 10, 1940 (July 1883), p. 2, 21-29; Book No. 23, "Purchase of Animals for Transport from India for Nepal-Tibet War", Letters dated Bhadra bai 6, 1940 (August 1883).
35. A *muri* is a Nepalese measuring unit to measure cereals and powder. It is equivalent to 71 kilograms.

36. A *dhakre* is an expression that signifies a person who is not in the payroll of the government.
37. A *pathi* is a Nepalese measuring unit to measure cereals and powder. One kilograms is equivalent to $2\frac{1}{4}$ manas.
38. MAN, Book No. 32, 1884, "The Collection of Food and Grains During the War with Tibet. . . .", Order of Marga badi 3, 1941 (Nov. 1884), pp. 75-100.
39. *Foreign Secret E*, Cons. No. 445, June 1884. Memorandum of the Conversation Between Khadga Shumsher and Governor General Lord Ripon, Jan 23, 1884, NAI.
40. MAN, Book No. 28, p. 13; Book No. 27, pp. 1-47; Book No. 32, pp. 75-76.
41. The other members of the Nepalese delegation included the then Nepalese *Vakil* of Lhasa Mahabir Singh Chhetri, Subba Bijaya Ram Uprety, Kharidar Riddi Narsingh Rajbhandari, the interpreter Dilli Man Singh Silwal and the 84 merchants whose trade-marts had been looted in Lhasa. For a more detailed information see FMAN, Poka No. 85, "Conversation between the Nepalese and Tibetan Negotiation teams at Kerong", Chaitra badi 4, 1941 (March, 1884).
42. The compensation figure differs in different sources. The records in the FMAN Poka No. 85 give the figure as 942, 098 rupees as well as 1025, 477 rupees, while those in NAI give the amount of compensation paid by Tibet to Nepal in gold dust valued as 20 lakh Tibetan rupees. See, *Foreign Secret E*, Sept. 1886, Cons. No. 544. Girdlestone to Durand, Aug. 28, 1886, NAI.
43. MAN, Book No. 25, 1883, "The Plunder of the Nepalese Merchants in Tibet. . . ." Nepal-Tibet agreement signed on Jestha sudi 2, 1941 (May 26, 1884), pp. 7-24; FMAN, Poka No. 85, Nepal-Tibet agreement signed Jestha sudi 2, 1941 (May 26, 1884); FMAN, New Poka (unnumbered) "Correspondence with Lhasa and China", Sub-Poka No. 22, 25 titled "Settlement of Dispute between Nepal and Tibet, *Foreign Secret E. Consultation* No. 544, "Payment by Tibetan Government of Compensation on the Account of Outrages on Nepalese merchants at Lhasa in 1883", Girdlestone, British Resident, Kathmandu, to H. M. Durand sec. GI, Foreign dept., August 28, 1886, NAI.
44. *The Indian Daily News*, February 28, 1884, p. 12.
45. *Foreign Secret E Consultation* No. 544, Girdlestone to H. M.

- Durand, August 28, 1886, NAI.
46. FMAN, Poka No. Pa 36 "Correspondence in the Time of Bir Shumsher." A *purji* (notification) from Commander-in-Chief, Deba Shumsher to Hakim, *Sadar Mulukikhana* (National Treasury) Poush badi 2, 1947 (December 1890). This notification gives the figure of the compensation paid by the Tibetan government to the Nepalese merchants in the year 1890 as 80,000 *kala mohars*; see also the civil dispute between the forty Nepalese merchants in Tibet and the Tibetans, Kartik sudi 3, 1948 (November 1891).
 47. FMAN, Poka No. Pa 36, "Correspondence in the Time of Bir Shumsher". The "Tea Trade Dispute". A letter from Spaintarin Amban to *Maharajadhiraja*, received by the Nepalese Monarch on Falgun 13, 1947 (February 1891). Reply to the letter by the *Maharajadhiraja*, Chaitra 9, 1947 (March 1891).
*This bulk of tea consisted of 20 bundles packed in a beautiful wooden *sandus* (chest) to be delivered to the Dalai Lama and the Kazis of Kasyal.
*The expressions used by Spaintarin Amban in his letter was "as she (Nepal) was a distant country I have decided not to fine her for the conduct." Poka Pa No 36, *ibid*.
 48. Reply of the above letter from *Maharajadhiraja* to the Amban Chaitra badi 9 1947 (March 1891). *ibid*.
 49. *Foreign Secret E, Consultation* No. 39 of 1893. "Quarrel Between Nepal and Tibet in Regards Salt Trade." Col. H. Wylie, Resident Kathmandu to Captain H. Daly, Asst. Sec. GI, Sept. 18, 1893. NAI.
 50. FMAN, Poka Pa No. 36, "Correspondence in the Time of Bir Shumsher". Ditha Padma Singh to *Maharaja* Chaitra sudi 3, 1952 (April 1896).
 51. FMAN, Poka Pa No. 36, Vakil Ambar Bahadur Dhoj Gharti Chhetri, to *Maharaja* Shrawan sudi 10, 1950 (August 1893); *Maharaja* to Ambar Bahadur, Bhadra sudi 2, 1952 (August 1895).
 52. FMAN, New Poka, "Correspondence with Chin and Lhasa". Report of the Boundary Commission Deputed by the Chinese Government in Lhasa, Magh sudi 9, 1952 (February 1895).
 53. *Foreign Secret E, Consultation* No. 74 of 1896 K. W. No. 2. A rough trans. of the letter was shown by *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher to H. Wylie, British Resident, Kathmandu to W. J. Cunningham, March 31, 1896, p. 3, NAI.
 54. *Foreign Secret E, Consultation* No. 74 of 1896, K. W. No. 2,

“Trade and Boundary Dispute Between Nepal and Tibet”, A copy of letter from Bir Shumsher on postponement of his visit to England, H. Wylie to Sec. State, Foreign Affairs, GI, Feb. 15, 1896. From the conversation between the British Resident, Manners Smith, and the Nepalese officer attached to the Residency, Marich Man Singh, one finds that the troubles with Tibet were not the only reason that prompted the Nepalese Premier to postpone his proposed visit to England. Though this was the official reason given yet factors such as the internal problems of the Rana family, the economic burden of the trip as well as the orthodox views of the *Maharaja* on the crossing of the “Black Waters” seemed to have dissuaded him from the proposed venture. Resident Wylie, commenting upon the postponement of the *Maharaja's* visit to England, points out that the long delay in settling his mission to England and the fear that it might not come through was certainly a major factor that helped to shape his decision. In order to retire with honor from what appeared “to be a false position”, the *Maharaja* opened up the vexed border dispute with Tibet. Wylie, however, admits that this was only his hypothesis for “it was difficult to arrive at the real bottom of anything with such people as Nepalese.” For more information, see *Foreign Secret Consultation E. K. W.* 2 Cons. No. 74 of July 1886. Resident Wylie to W. J. Cunningham Feb. 15, 1896, *Foreign Secret E. K. W.* 1, Cons., No. 74 of July 1896, “Dispute Between Nepal and Tibet”, H. Wylie to W. J. Cunningham, May 27, 1888, p. 3, NAI. Also Register Book containing letters and correspondences and conversations regarding the *Maharaja's* proposed visit to England, FMAN, St. James Gazettee, April 9, 1896, p. 4.

55. A Note by Deputy Secretary and an order issued by the Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs, GI. See *Foreign Secret E. K. W.* 1, Cons, No. 74 of July 1896; also “The Dispute Between Nepal and Tibet”, Col H. Wylie to Captain H. Daly, Sept. 18, 1893, *Foreign Secret E. Consultation* No. 39 of Sept. 1893, NAI.

*The three regiments despatched by Bir Shumsher were: Ram dul, Ganesh Bahadur and Bijaya Bahadur. See *Foreign Secret E.* Cons. No. 39 of Dec. 1893, H. Wylie to H. Daly, October 18, 1893, NAI.

56. See Confidential Diary of District Superintendent for the week ending in 7th March 1896, The information contained in the

diary is based upon the information supplied by the Nepalese Governor of Ilam Col. Harka Jung Thapa. *Foreign Secret E. K. W. 2 Cons. No. 74-129* of July 1896, NAI.

57. Nepal's Request for Arms and the British Attitude. See *Foreign Secret E.K.W. 2, Cons. No. 74-129* of 1896; also *Foreign Secret E*, of July, 1899, H. Wylie to W. J. Cunnungham, March 10, 1896, NAI.
58. For an apology demanded by Nepal and the actual apology that followed see *Foreign Secret, E., K. W. 1, Cons. No. 74*, of July 1896, A Telegram from GI to Secretary of State For India. London, April 24, 1896, NAI.
*The exchange for the above Nepalese units in modern concepts would be: nine *manas* of fine rice would be four kilograms while seven *manas* of salt would be four kilograms.
59. *Foreign Secret E. K. W. 2, Cons, No. 74. 129*, of July 1896, Bir Shumsher to H. Wylie, May 15, 1896, NAI.
60. *Foreign Secret E., K. W. 2, Cons. No. 74-129* of 1896, H. Wylie to Sec. GI. Foreign Dept., June 2, 1896, NAI.

PART V
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
NEPAL AND TIBET, 1900-1930
THE PERIOD OF CHALLENGES, HOPES
AND FRUSTRATIONS

Diplomatic Relations between Nepal and Tibet 1900–1930

The dawn of the twentieth century caught Nepal by surprise. She quickly discovered that Tibet was no longer a sleepy neighbor that could be manoeuvred to serve her national interest. In fact, the Tibetan plateau had become a theater of Anglo-Russian rivalry by the opening of this century. It is within this framework that the two European giants competed for their political and commercial foothold. The overall result of this rivalry had its impact on Nepal. Her commercial privileges in Tibet crumbled down and her political influence in that country was significantly eroded. Nepal was ill-prepared to meet such a situation both physically and psychologically. However, she learned to adjust and remained a strong element in Tibetan affairs. Three factors served to disturb the statusquo in the Trans-Himalayan region. First, the opening of the Phari route, which besides providing a direct link between India and Tibet also made obsolete the existing trade routes via Nepal. Secondly, the sweeping erosion of Chinese influence in Tibet had turned her traditional suzerainty over Tibet into a constitutional myth; and finally, Russia due to her geographical proximity was tempted to fill this political vacuum. Two other factors marred the Tibetan political horizon during the first quarter of this century, namely, Sino-Tibetan conflict, and the crisis in Nepal-Tibet relations.

A. Russian Involvement in Tibet, and the Anglo-Nepalese Reaction in the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century.

Russia came into the Tibetan scene by the turn of this century. The first breakthrough in Russo-Tibetan relations was the announ-

cement in the Foreign Office Column of *Journal de Saint Petersburg* of October 2 (15) 1900, which announced the schedule of reception of Declaimer Dorjieff,* the first Trans-Himalaya to the Dalai Lama of Tibet. Then again, an excerpt from *Odessa Novosti* stated that Odessa would welcome that day (June 25, 1901) an extraordinary mission from the Dalai Lama of Tibet proceeding towards St. Petersburg with diplomatic instructions of high importance. The Tibetan envoy was styled an Envoy Extraordinary and received in the Grand Palace of Peterhof. However, the *Messenger Official* of June 8, 1901 pointed out in a few carefully worded sentences that the Tibetan mission was not political or diplomatic in nature, but rather was to be placed at the same level as the one sent by the Holy Pope to the faithful in the foreign land. The Czar sincerely believed that a friendly and controlled Tibet was necessary to protect the Russian paramountcy in Singkiang and the Pamirs.¹ In 1902 Khedechhega, an attendant of the Dalai Lama, was sent to St. Petersburg. A secret treaty seemed to have been concluded between Tibet and Russia in which the Czar promised to prevent the English from entering Tibet. This rumor is also corroborated by the British Minister in Peking on August 2, 1902. He quotes a rumor in China and concludes that China was making a secret arrangement with Russia which would uphold the integrity of China in return for the establishment of Russian offices in Lhasa to control Tibetan affairs.² This message from China is also confirmed by the circumstantial evidence which points to a similar arrangement between Russia and Tibet.³ It is within this framework that Russo-Chinese collaboration in Tibetan affairs began to take shape.

The British Resident in Kathmandu, Colonel T. C. Pears, quoting a conversation between the Tibetan Lama Chhyalosung Chhyodoen* and the *Maharaja* of Nepal, reports on a much wider alliance between China, Bhutan, Ladkha and Tibet to form a defensive alliance and even seek Russian support in case of a British attack.⁴ As a gesture of moral support the Russian Government had sent three engineers to Tibet to construct an armament factory.⁵ The principal objective of the Lama's mission was to bring Nepal within the defensive pact; and thus negate the British thirst of expansion across the Himalayas. As a reward for joining the Trans-Himalayan Defensive

Pact the Lama promised the *Maharaja* his help in extending his kingdom up to the Bay of Bengal. The Nepalese Premier, far from being allured by this bait, posed a sincere question, namely, "can the four country (sic) crush a power like the British ?"⁶ Though the Lama argued positively, Chandra Shumsher the then *Maharaja* found it difficult to swallow his arguments.

The Tibetan mission to St. Petersburg was also followed by the mission of a high Russian official, Pan Po or Popu. His arrival in Lhasa was, however, kept a top secrecy even in Lhasa known only to the inner circle of nobles.⁷ The Tibetan mission to Russia and vice versa was a matter of grave concern for both Nepal and British India. This concern becomes more real in view of the fact that Russia was at the crest of imperialistic expansion in 1902. She had not yet been checked by Japan. Thus, she had spread over Manchuria and Western Turkestan, annexed Pamirs and was likely to absorb Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia.⁸ Though the Nepalese and the British never dreamed of a full-scale Russian invasion of India yet they were fully aware of the fact that the presence of the Russian army in Tibet would complicate matters in South Asia. As Britain was not represented in Tibet, the British felt that the presence of the Russians in the Himalayas would be a definite setback to her prestige in the orient. Further, the British, haunted by the memories of the 1857 Indian revolt, looked upon the presence of the Russians in the Himalayas as a potential and constant source of provocation for the Indians to revolt.

Two methods were available to the British to deal with the Tibetan problem. One was the indirect method known as the "Lee Warner Plan". Its principal objective was to use Nepal, whose relation with Tibet was not a happy one, as a "cat's paw". Accordingly, Nepal would be encouraged to attack Tibet. But Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India, was opposed to such a plan. The second was the "Curzon Scheme". Curzon was convinced that the presence of Russia in Tibet demanded a new approach to the problem. Thus, he was in favor of keeping Russia outside Tibet by exercising a direct pressure on Tibet. This direct pressure appeared as the only alternative in view of the fact that the Dalai Lama refused even to open a dialogue with the British. Curzon therefore decided to enter

into an agreement with China as early as 1903 according to which a permanent British mission with a military escort would be stationed in Lhasa.⁹ Trade would be discussed with Tibet but it would take a secondary place. The main problem was to eliminate the Russian presence in Lhasa. The British Prime Minister took the Viceroy's views with a large grain of salt for he felt that the British mission to Lhasa would be viewed by the rest of the world as a "blatant infringement" of the integrity of China. Curzon, however, proposed that the negotiation with China and Tibet was to be held in khamba Dzong, close to the border of Sikkim. London consented to this proposal but at the same time forbade the British advance beyond the point. The Governor General chose Francis Younghusband for this delicate task.

The Tibetans and the Chinese dragged these talks to a stalemate for about six months by sending officials of low rank. Francis Younghusband then came to the conclusion that the talks could take place only in Lhasa. To end the stalemate Young husband wanted the Viceroy to encourage Nepal to exert a direct pressure upon Tibet. He believed that the evidence that Nepal was on the side of the British would have a great impact on the Tibetans. He proposed that the Nepalese government should be specially requested to furnish the Mission with yaks and its drivers. This, he presumed, would be taken by the Tibetan government as an indication of Nepal's alliance with the British.¹⁰ Younghusband was correct in his anticipation of Nepalese assistance, for Nepal was no less apprehensive of the Russian intrigues in Tibet than the British.

It is true that Nepal was bound by treaty rights to assist Tibet if she was invaded; but the times were such that Nepal had to weigh this in relation to her national well-being. National interest and national security were the two overriding factors that compelled *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher to assure Curzon of his country's support of India's Tibetan Mission.¹¹ The *Maharaja* sincerely felt that the Russian presence in Lhasa besides adversely affecting Nepal's extra-territorial rights in Tibet, would also help perpetuate insecurity in the border regions. The persistent help rendered by Nepal to Younghusband's mission to Tibet during 1903-1904 has to be explained within this broad framework. The Nepalese assistance was

both on the physical and diplomatic front. On the physical side *Maharaja* Chandra promised to give to the British 500 *yaks* immediately and 8,000 within one year ¹² and was willing to go ahead with the British plan of helping Colonel Younghusband to occupy Khamba Jong. ¹³ By the end of October 1903 Nepal had handed over 3,500 yaks to the British at Falte. The collection of yaks was, however, not an easy task, for, yaks had to be collected from Solu-Khumbu to Wallanchung Gola. ¹⁴ The other problems included were the search for strong and sturdy animals and furnishing them with saddles and *gothalaas* (drivers). ¹⁵ As early as September 1903 Nepal had made ready 500 of her best troops armed with Martin Henry rifles to help Younghusband to occupy the Tibetan region of Khamba Jong or even occupy Khamba Jong when the British Colonel moved with his 300 men to the area. Harka Jang Thapa had even instructions from Kathmandu authorizing him to take his 500 men via Darjeeling to Khamba Jong. ¹⁶ The records of the Military Archives, Kathmandu, indicate that plans for a major offensive against Tibet were also made by Nepal in 1903. An instruction manual was prepared for the army for this expedition, which covered a wide range of subjects like the geographical terrain between Kathmandu and Lhasa, the nature of the fighting units, the construction of roads and bridges and the description of other aides for the army. However, this offensive was never launched. ¹⁷ On the other hand the British records also indicate that the Government of India did not avail itself of the Nepalese military assistance.

On the diplomatic front, Nepal rather bluntly told Tibet that as the political crisis was Tibet's own creation, Nepal was in no position to come to her aid in case of the British invasion. Her best bet would thus be to make peace with the British. The Nepalese views were contained in a long eight-paragraphed letter of the Nepalese Premier to the Kazis of Kasyal. This letter, in short, was a defense of British actions and blamed Tibet for her violation of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1890 and 1893. This letter also assured Tibet that the British did not have evil designs over their country for the British were not only tolerant in their religious beliefs but also democratic in their diplomatic policies. Thus, if the Nepalese experience since 1816 is taken as the measuring rod, Tibet would

immensely benefit by the signing of a treaty with the British. The letter concluded with a characteristic remark, which in the form of an advice and a warning cautioned the Tibetans that to run into an unnecessary complication with the British Government "is like producing a headache by twisting a rope round one's head when it is not aching." He further asserted that "if you disregard my advice a serious calamity is likely to overtake you."¹⁸ Tibet then asked Nepal to follow a strict neutrality in Indo-Tibetan dispute, or to be more specific, Nepal was asked not to assist the British with troops and transport carriers. The reply of the *Maharaja* was that he would remain neutral in the sense that he would not supply soldiers to the British but he could not prevent the British from buying animals and hiring their drivers in Nepal.¹⁹ Nepal's diplomatic initiative to solve the Indo-Tibetan dispute continued during the crucial years of 1903 to 1905. As early as August 1904 Nepal warned Tibet of the approaching British troops, which could ruin their capital. Nepal's advice to Tibet in such an eventuality was total surrender to the British. The advice, in part, ran

The safety of your capital depends only upon your peacefully and submissively approaching the British with an open heart upon the settlement of the pending question. Move at once on the matter otherwise any negligence on your part would cost you your capital.²⁰

The whole Tibetan question assumed a new dimension with the entry of the British troops in Lhasa in the month of August 1904. Nepal's role as a mediator between the Tibetans and the British became more important than ever. The *Vakil* Jit Bahadur K. C. in Lhasa and *Maharaja* Chandra in Kathmandu played a crucial role in Lhasa negotiations and helped shape the British attitude towards Tibet specially on the indemnity issue. A convention was finally concluded between Tibet and Great Britain on September 7, 1904. The object of the convention was to remove the difficulties that had crept up as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1870 and the Indo-Tibetan trade regulations of 1893. However, its indirect effects were more significant for both Britain and Nepal. Above all, the Russian presence was sealed in

Tibet once and forever. Tibet promised not to station any foreign representatives in Lhasa nor to cede, sell or mortgage its land or give concessions to build roads, railways, telegraphs or mining rights to a foreign power. Tibet was a loser in the domestic front too. She not only had to pay a war indemnity of Rs.500,000 but also had to permit the British to build trade-marts in Gyantse, Gartok and Yalung.¹

The signing of the Convention brought a sigh of relief to both Nepalese and the British bureaucracy. The *Maharaja* of Nepal took this occasion to express his happiness to the Kasyal Office in Lhasa at the peaceful and amicable solution of the crisis in Indo-Tibet relations. The *Maharaja's* communication, in part, ran

I congratulate you for the successful conclusion of the difficult business...The national honour and your prosperity are involved at the faithful observance of the terms of the treaty...Let me tell you here again what I have told you in the past that a friendly understanding and the maintenance of amicable relations with the British Government be nothing but beneficial to you.²

A friend in peace Nepal was an ally in the British semi-military mission to Tibet in 1903. The *Maharaja* of Nepal offered substantial help in the matter of transport, while his *Vakil* Captatin Jit Bahadur placed his valuable services during the negotiations at the disposal of the British in areas like collecting information and supplies.³ The letter of appreciation of the Viceroy to the *Maharaja* speaks highly of the timely help rendered by the Nepal Durbar throughout the Tibetan negotiations both on the diplomatic and physical fronts. Above all the Governor General's attribution of the peaceful settlement of the Anglo-Tibetan crisis to the sound advice and exhortations of the *Maharaja* to the Lhasa Kazis is indicative of the crucial role Nepal played in the peace efforts.⁴

The signing of the Convention, however, left Tibet sad and dismayed, for the Tibetan leaders looked upon it as being forced upon them. Above all they resented the Article II of the Convention, which permitted the British to establish trade-marts and station

British officers there. The Tibetans sincerely felt that this would be a source of serious friction in future. The *Maharaja* was thus asked by the Kazis to seek, on behalf of the government of Tibet, modification of the terms of the Convention for there was on it "not a single item" to which they had agreed.²⁵ The Nepalese Premier, who had been so instrumental in the signing of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904, regretted very much at the Tibetan mood which was prevalent even after two months since the signing of the Convention. His letter to the Kasyal Office thus played a warning note whose tone may be best illustrated in these words

I must impress upon you that a treaty is a solemn and sacred business which one should try to religiously carry out when once it has been made and should on no account be thought of being evaded or nullified on the pain of serious consequences.²⁶

His warning was, however, diluted by his statement that he had forwarded the Tibetan letter to the Viceroy of India and that he was confident that the British Government would find out means to redress Tibetan grievances for they had no intention to deal harshly. He, too, promised to put the Tibetan case before the Government of India.

The efforts of the *Maharaja* were rewarded with some success, for, by January 1905, the Government of India decided to reduce the Tibetan indemnity from 75 lakhs to 25 lakhs and the period of occupation of the Chumbi Valley to three years only. This alteration in the Convention was, however, contingent on the punctual payment of three instalments of indemnity. He then advised the Tibetan government that the provisions of the Convention, far from being a liability, would serve as an asset to them in the long run. An excerpt from the letter made this point vividly clear.

If you act upon your promise, scrupulously carry out the provisions of the Convention, have a proper regard for the power and resources of the British Government, help them in a friendly and neighbourly way, and generally try to promote mutual well-being, I

am sure that you will prosper greatly and the present struggle instead of being a curse will be a blessing in disguise.²⁷

Nepal thus played a dual role during the Younghusband Mission of 1903. If on the one hand she placed her transport carriers (yaks and drivers) and even 500 of her best troops at the disposal of the British; while on the other hand she also carefully represented the Tibetan case before Fort William, Calcutta, and helped soften the terms of the Convention. Her mixed role has to be explained within the broad geo-political framework.

B. Tibet-China Conflict and Nepal's Mediatory Efforts

The Convention between Russia and Britain on Tibet in 1907 together with the earlier Convention between Tibet and Great Britain of 1904 did help to seal the Russian presence on Tibet. However, the Russian influence on Tibetan manners and customs was to remain a more lasting feature. The Russian impact was distinctly visible in the Tibetan Court life as well as in the caps and uniform of the Tibetan army.²⁸ Above all, it was amply manifested in the moral support Russia extended to Tibet in her attempt to assume total independence from China, during the first decades of the twentieth century. This new Tibetan mood emerged above the surface in two ways. First, private orders were given to replace the issuing of coins bearing Chinese dates and names of the Emperor. The coins were henceforth to bear Tibetan dates and name. Secondly, Tibet sent an emissary to Russia for further consultation.

The result was that the relations between the Chinese Amban in Lhasa and the Kasyal Office became increasingly strained. The feeling of insecurity that took possession of the Chinese mind in Tibet compelled the Amban to ask the Nepalese government to permit 300 Nepalese *Khachcharas* (Nepalese of mixed parentage) to be enlisted in the Chinese troops. The government of Nepal, however, directed the *Vakil* to reject the request, and even discourage the voluntary enlistment of the Nepalese *Khachcharas* into the Chinese service. Accordingly, the *Vakil* told the Chinese Amban

that the *Khachcharas* were very unsuited for military services. He, however, suggested that the Durbar might be willing to send to Lhasa 5,000 to 6,000 of her trained troops to maintain law and order in the capital city. The Nepalese Premier in the beginning welcomed the suggestion of his *Vakil* but later on under the influence of the British resident in Kathmandu asked his representative to drop the idea.²⁰ The Chinese then asked the Nepalese government to sell to them 500 magazine of rifles to arm the new Chinese soldiers raised by the command of the Emperor³⁰, but Nepal rejected this move too. China had thus no option except of bringing troops from China itself.

It was, however, not till 1908 that China began to follow a policy of effective control of Tibet. The physical indication of this move is seen in the display of military action of the Chinese garrison and the addition made to the Tibetan army of those trained by the Chinese instructors.³¹ It was at this point that the Tibetans began to feel that the Chinese intended to deprive them of their power. The Tibetan government next sought the help of Nepal in reforming civil and military services and ultimately in the training of Tibetans by the Gurkha officers. But Nepal politely rejected all these moves. China, to counteract the Tibetan moves, despatched a thousand Chinese soldiers for the purpose of protecting the Chinese trade-marts and the frontier posts.

The Tibetan government naturally panicked and sought Nepalese good-office to prevent the arrival of the thousand Chinese troops into Lhasa. For a little over two weeks from January 22 to February 9, 1910 Nepal played a hectic role in trying to dissuade the Chinese from bringing the 1000 troops to Lhasa. On January 22, 1910 the Nepalese *Vakil* met Utarin Amban and asked the Chinese to adopt a conciliatory line of actions with the Tibetans, for they, as a race, were very ignorant. He also suggested that it might be wiser for them to bring 200 to 300 soldiers in Lhasa while keeping the option of increasing the strength whenever it was necessary. The Amban, however, laid stress on the absolute necessity of 1,000 troops for the purpose of protection as well as partrolling of the frontier. However, he assured the *Vakil* that the Chinese soldiers would never injure the Tibetans.³²

The next day the Nepalese *Vakil* had an interview with the Kazis of Kasyal and argued on the urgent necessity of arriving at an immediate amicable settlement with the Chinese. The *Vakil*, successfully brought both the Chinese and the Tibetans to a conference table at Labrang Office on January 24, 1910. Jit Bahadur K. C., the Nepalese representative, was highly delighted for he was specially invited by both the Chinese and the Tibetans to attend the conference. The Chinese side in the conference was represented by two officers Jhiakunchhe and Qualin and the Tibetan side by Chipon Kusio of Lhasa and a few others. The conference, in spite of good gestures shown by both the parties, ended in a stalemate for both sides found no room for a compromise. If on the one hand, Lhasa looked upon the arrival of the 1,000 Chinese troops in their capital city as an infringement upon their authority in their country; the Chinese, on the other hand, saw the absolute necessity of the 1,000 troops in Lhasa for security reasons.

Jit Bahadur, however, still continued his diplomatic efforts and hoped that the Ambans would only bring a small body of soldiers into the city of Lhasa. But the six point memorandum he received from the two Chinese Ambans on January 26, 1910 showed how futile his efforts had become. The memorandum, in summary, is as follows:

1. The troops were ordered to come to Lhasa by the Emperor, hence they could not be stopped on the way by the Ambans.
2. The troops had already passed Chhamdo and were at 13 marches distance from Lhasa.
3. The Ambans have given very strict orders to the commanders of the troops not to fight the Tibetans. But if the Tibetans attacked first they could strike back.
4. Chow Ta-Yen was now with the main forces in Chhamdo. If the Tibetans attacked and beat the Chinese then he would come to Tibet for their assistance.
5. When the Chinese troops come to Lhasa they would not be allowed to create any disturbances.
6. If the Tibetan troops opposed and fought against the Chinese troops they would be doing a great harm to themselves for it would only invite more Chinese troops.

It would thus be wise for the Tibetans not to oppose the Chinese troops.³³

The Chinese troops, having arrived at Lharingo and Nakehewkha at a distance of 13 to 8 days journey from Lhasa respectively, divided into two routes. The Tibetans, on the other hand, could think of no better plan than to send Kazi Chharong to oppose the advancing Chinese army. In the meantime on February 3 a report came to Lhasa that some Tibetan soldiers had taken possession of a Chinese storehouse and killed four Chinese. The Chinese action too, left much to be desired. The Tibetan action was apparently in retaliation to desecration and destruction of Tibetan monasteries and the Lamas.³⁴ The Nepalese *Vakil* then sent for Kusco of Lhasa and warned the Tibetan government of the serious consequences of the event. He thus suggested a meeting of the Potala Lama and Lyang Tarin Amban, to avert the impending crisis between Tibet and China. The conference never took place but the tireless effort of the Nepalese *Vakil* did bring about a compromise. Both the parties agreed to stop fighting. The crux of the compromise was that Lhasa agreed to permit the Chinese troops into Lhasa and send orders to the Tibetan troops in Chhamdo to stop fighting. The Chinese, on the other hand promised to inform the Lhasa authorities of the day on which the Chinese troops were to enter. In the meantime, 200 Chinese soldiers and 50 cavalry men entered Lhasa without even the knowledge of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. A clash between the Chinese and Tibetan troops took place in the holy city of Lhasa itself. The casualties of this conflict were 17 Tibetans, who were wounded and taken prisoners by the Chinese. While this brief episode had intensified the hostile political atmosphere of the capital the 1,000 Chinese troops entered Lhasa and sent orders to capture the Tibetan ministers. The Dalai Lama, finding himself virtually nailed to the wall, fled to India with some of his trusted aids.³⁵ By the third week of February 1910 the Tibetan Spiritual Leader and his ministers were already in Darjeeling, India.

The arrival of the Chinese troops in Lhasa coupled with the flight of the Dalai Lama from Tibet threw Lhasa into panic. The Kalons of Lhasa, however, did ask Nepal to help Tibet fight the Chinese aggressor with men and materials as well as by sending a

high-level diplomat to take part in Sino-Tibetan negotiations. The Nepalese Premier, however, pointed out that the best thing Nepal could do under the then circumstances was only to render sincere advice, the reason being simply that Tibet herself was largely responsible for the crisis. But as regards the sending of a Nepalese envoy well versed in the art of negotiations the *Maharaja* pointed out that the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa, Jit Bahadur K. C., coming from a good and ancient lineage and conversant with the issues and the spirit of the times, was competent for the task.³⁶ The Dalai Lama also being unable to muster any British support for his cause during his six month stay in India, wrote to the *Maharaja* of Nepal for help either peaceful or armed. He too proposed to send a diplomatic envoy who enjoyed his full confidence to negotiate with the *Maharaja*.³⁷ Earlier, one may recall that Nepal had turned down the Tibetan request of the training of the Tibetan soldiers by Nepalese officers in Tibet as well as in Nepal.³⁸

The position of Nepal was very precarious. If on the one hand Tibet wanted Nepalese help to hold her own against China; China also wanted her help to subjugate the "recalcitrant state" so as to bring her under her direct administration. Though both Nepal and British India could not militarily intervene in Tibetan affairs, they could not remain indifferent to the Tibetan situation after the flight of the Dalai Lama. Nepal knew that the supremacy of China in Lhasa would also lead to the decline of her extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Moreover Britain wanted Tibet to be a buffer between China and India, and was committed in not allowing the rights and interests of Nepal to be prejudiced by the administrative changes in Tibet.³⁹

By April 1910 Lhasa was under the full control of the Chinese. A Chinese Police Department was created to mark this change fully and complete. The Chief Commissioner of Police in Lhasa, Tin, and his associate Yui-Chen issued a ten point proclamation, which, above all, were related to the Tibetan violation of the Chinese laws on sanitation, safety of children and noise pollution. Another proclamation issued by Len Amban, the Great Resident Minister of China, regulated arms in the country.⁴⁰ The establishment of the Police Department by the order of the Emperor of China for the general security and the maintenance of peace and justice in Tibet,

however, paradoxically came into conflict with the Nepalese extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Instances, thus, began to multiply which symbolized the direct violation of Nepalese rights and privileges. A Nepalese *bande* (gold-smith), Ratna Man, was arrested by the Chinese for having sold opium, kept in confinement and released only after a strong protest by the Nepalese *Vakil*, Jit Bahadur. One Mongrel Khekya, a Nepalese subject, was beaten and released for having passed urine near a latrine. Again, the quarrel between Foofoo Keba, the daughter of Pemba Bhotini of Wallanchung and Puna Khambini was decided by the Chinese police without informing the Nepalese representative. Finally, two other Nepalese subjects Mimi Mongrel and Kesang Bhote were also arrested by the Chinese for stealing sheep. Both were given twenty bamboo lashes and kept in custody. To add to this, the Chinese were also trying to impose a tax on Nepalese liquor shops; and lastly Nepalese were also required to take license from the Chinese to carry guns in different parts of the country.⁴¹

The Nepalese *Vakil* protested on each of the occasions reminding the Chinese Resident Minister of the violation of the rights and privileges of the Nepalese provided by the Nepal-Tibet treaty of 1856. The Amban, however, refuted the Nepalese arguments in two ways: first, he argued that the treaties between Nepal and Tibet were not binding upon China and secondly, the Nepalese rights should not be mixed up with the imperial police arrangements.⁴² He also told the *Vakil* Captain, Jit Bahadur, that the whole problem would be solved if he would only tell the Nepalese subjects in Tibet that they should refrain from doing anything for which they could be arrested by the Chinese police.⁴³ Mindful of the futility of the efforts of this representative the Nepalese Monarch wrote a personal letter to the Chinese Amban expressing satisfaction over the establishment of the police department by the Chinese in Tibet, but at the same time also pointed out that the new arrangement should not interfere with the treaty rights of Nepal in Tibet which too were "inviolable" and "sacred".⁴⁴ The Chinese reacted to Nepalese "obstinacy" in two ways. First, Len Tarin Amban in his reply to the *Maharaja* pointed out that the Nepalese and the Tibetans being the children of the Emperor should stop making 'vexatious represen-

tations according to their sweet will" and should rather submit to His justice by observing His rules and customs.⁴⁵ Secondly, the Chinese officer, Lau Dharin went to the *Vakil's* office and took ample pains to convince the Nepalese *Vakil* that it was an internationally accepted convention that all foreign nationals were subject to the rules of the countries they reside in. The Nepalese also should observe the rules of Tibet while living there.⁴⁶

The troubled state of Tibet brought serious consequences to Nepal, for she not only had a contiguous border with Tibet but her trade relations were fortified by the extra-territorial rights. As the twentieth century unfolded Nepal's privileged position was questioned not only by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906 but also by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. However, Nepal's peace efforts to bring a compromise between the Chinese and the Tibetans continued. On March 23, 1912, the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa went to the Potala palace amidst volleys of fire between the Chinese and the Tibetans. The Tibetan officials at the Potala palace, while appreciating Nepalese efforts in bringing about a peaceful end to China-Tibet conflict, did persistently point out that Tibet was not going to listen to any new peace proposal unless the Chinese soldiers were sent back to their home country. A precondition set by Tibet for the next round of talks between Tibet and China was the exit of 1,000 Chinese troops from Tibet within a fortnight. But Nepal insisted that the first prerequisite was to stop fighting, which would then pave the way for talks and compromise. Finally, it was agreed that on March 24, 1912 fighting would be stopped for two days in Lhasa and three other monasteries of Tibet. Captain Jit Bahadur and Kazi Guva of Ladakh were to act as intermediaries to bring about a meeting of the Chinese and the Tibetans. However, the cease fire was too fragile, and on March 27, 1912 fighting again broke out between the two.⁴⁷

Two years had passed since the Chinese occupation of Lhasa. The Dalai Lama in India had failed to muster up the British support for the Tibetan cause. All this while in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet the Tibetan resistance to the Chinese occupation continued. Fighting was also reported from Digarche where the Tibetan Khambas armed with Russian rifles were offering a stiff resistance to

the Chinese. The actual turning of the tide was seen on March 29, 1912, when Tibet successfully recaptured Thong from the Chinese and placed their flag there. This was a significant victory of the Tibetans and it did have far reaching consequences. On April 19, 1912, both the Chinese and the Tibetans sought mediation from the Nepalese and the British officers for a peaceful solution of Tibet-China crisis. The meeting was held in the British Trading Agency at Gyantse. Those present were: Chitung Lopsu and Hisi Gnawing from Tibet, D. Macdonell, Captain Jit Bahadur K. C. as well as the Chinese officials. The negotiation was finally concluded with an agreement between Tibet and China on April 2, 1912. This important agreement had five features:

1. First, the Chinese soldiers promised to give up all their rifles to the Tibetans.
2. Secondly, the Chinese soldiers agreed to leave Tibet unarmed.
3. Thirdly, Tibet decided to pay for the Chinese rifles.
4. Fourthly, Tibet decided to offer necessary convenience, transport and safe passage of the Chinese soldiers en route to China via India.
5. Fifthly, the Tibetans agreed not to punish the Tibetans who had cooperated with the Chinese during the Chinese occupation.⁴⁸

On April 1, 1912, the Chinese handed over 144 rifles, and 11,600 round of ammunitions in return for the payment of 9,250 Chinese currency.⁴⁹ The arms according to the understanding was kept under the custody of the Nepalese officers. Although the agreement worked as a safety-valve to remove the steam out of the China-Tibet hostilities, disputes and even exchange of fire continued for some time. A strong difference arose between the Chinese and Tibetans when the Kasyal Office refused to accept the accredited envoy of the Chinese Emperor as the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. The Chinese Amban Tung Thong Lin, however, decided to stick to his post until recalled by his Master. In a telegraphic message to the Nepalese *Maharaja* Chandra he also asked him to communicate his stand to the Dalai Lama. The Nepalese Premier took this occasion to write to the Tibetan Spiritual Leader. Two delicate themes were conveyed by his letter. First, the *Maharaja* advised the Dalai Lama to fully

recognize the duly accredited envoy of the Chinese Emperor; and secondly, the *Maharaja* advised the Tibetans to fulfil the provisions of the Tibet-China Agreement of April 2, 1912.⁵⁰

Nepal's extra-cautious and sincere effort in bringing about a peaceful accord between China and Tibet was dictated more by self-interest than other reasons. Two factors specially motivated her peace efforts. First, Nepal knew fully well that if Tibet would be absorbed into the Chinese dominion then her extra-territorial rights in Tibet would pale into insignificance. Secondly, the further escalation of Tibet-China armed conflict would also lead to the destruction of Nepalese life and property. Already 38 Nepalese *kothis* had been looted and burnt and five Nepalese had lost their lives, which included a Muslim, a *Banda*, a *Thakali* and two *Khachcharas*. The saddest part was that some of them were killed when they were sound asleep.⁵¹ Nepal thus had been compelled to move her property and her subjects to safer zones. At one time Nepal even prepared a contingency plan to move the Nepalese Legation as well as her subjects from the occupied Chinese sector to some safer region outside Lhasa. The Tibetan government also insisted that Nepal should remove her Legation from the Chinese occupied section. By May 30, 1912, the Nepalese *Vakil* Lal Bahadur Basnyat had taken up his residence in the house of Lhahul Kazi, that was provided by the Tibetan government.⁵² The Nepalese *Vakil* waited every day hoping that the tensions between the Tibetans and the Chinese in Lhasa would subside. But apparently no end was in sight. As conflict soared up the Tibetans did not even hesitate to open fire at the Chinese quarter when the Nepalese *Vakil* was conferring with the Chinese *Amban* at the request of the Kasyal Office.⁵³

The Nepalese premier, very much disturbed by the escalated hostilities between the Chinese and Tibetans, instructed his *Vakil* in Lhasa to remove the Nepalese Legation to safer quarters and tell the Tibeto-Chinese officials very candidly that Nepal would not take any part in future negotiations between the two countries. The *Maharaja* in an earlier letter, while replying to the *Vakil's* telegram of September 1912, told the Nepalese representative to issue private orders to the Nepalese soldiers guarding the Chinese arms that they were not to offer any resistance, should any party disregard their

advice, and in case of disturbances they should withdraw and keep aloof.⁵⁴ The *Maharaja*, in an effort to make the Tibetans realize the graveness of the situation, wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama, which in part ran

It will be seen how useless it is any longer for our representative to persist in his endeavour to settle differences between the two parties so self-opinionated and I have instructed him rather to turn his attention to what can best be done to safeguard the life and property of our people there and keep aloof from the insensate quarrel between the Tibetan and the Chinese.⁵⁵

On October 1912 the Chinese did attack the place where the Chinese arms had been kept under the protection of the Gurkha soldiers. The situation was saved only by the protest of the Nepalese guards.⁵⁶

As the year 1912 came to a close two factors appeared to have helped a further escalation of Sino-Tibetan hostilities. The first was the withdrawal of Nepal from the theater of peace negotiations, and the second was the adamant attitude of the Chinese Amban Tung Thong Lin, who decided to stick to his post in Lhasa even at the cost of his life. In the first week of October 1912 (Aswin 9, 1969) the Tibetan soldiers in an effort to kill the Chinese Amban Tung opened fire at the Chinese mission. The object was, however, not fulfilled though it did result in a few casualties on the Chinese side.⁵⁷ In another dual the Tibetans managed to capture the Chinese General Ching. The Tibetans were about to kill him but the timely intervention of the Dalai Lama succeeded in saving his life. The stories of Tibetan success also came from other parts of Tibet. The Chinese troops in Sigatse were routed by the Tibetans in November 1912. The Chinese, having lost a few lives, surrendered 130 rifles and 10,300 rounds of ammunition, and left Sigatse via India to China.⁵⁸

As fighting intensified in Lhasa and the border regions of Nepal, Nepal as early as July 1912 put the whole nation on military alert and called for a mobilization of national resources for the protection of the lives and property of Nepalese in Tibet. As a part of the mobilization process the Nepalese government took a series

of hectic measures, which began in the middle of 1912 and continued till 1917. First, letters were addressed to the *Bada Hakims* (Governors) of the different districts for voluntary contributions of grains from the land owners to meet the emergency that had arisen due to the armed conflict between the Chinese and the Tibetans.⁶⁰ The amount of grain contribution, however, as in the Third Nepal-Tibet War, varied according to the fertility of the soil. Orders were also given for the purchase of grains from the Terai regions. As an illustration, a letter to the revenue office of Birganj had instructed the officer to purchase, 35,000 *maunds* of rice, 6,000 *maunds* of *chana* (gram,) and 200 *maunds* of tobacco. ⁶⁰The orders for the purchase of 35,000 *maunds* of rice were also made to the revenue office of Jaleshwar.⁶¹ Orders were despatched to the Terai for the prohibition of the export of new rice crop. A similar order for the collection of grains was also given to the officers of East No. 1 and 2. Associated with this move was the construction of storehouses, in places like Mahottari, Dhulikhel and Rasuwa.⁶² Secondly, the cost-estimate for the troops moving towards Kuti, Kerong and Walanchung was also *prepared*. This came to approximately 14 *lakhs* rupees.⁶³ Thirdly, the Nepalese armament factories in Sundarijal and Chhauwni were put into full operation to manufacture gunpowder, muskets and other materials of war, like leather boxes, horse's hoof, saddles and carpenter's tools.⁶⁴ Finally, orders were also given for the manufacture of warm clothes for the soldiers and the porters.⁶⁵

While Nepal was fully mobilized to face the potential war-situation in the Trans-Himalayan regions, on the diplomatic front Nepal continued her good-office for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Tibetan crisis. The Nepalese *Vakil* was successful in arranging a meeting between the Tibetans and the Chinese in the house of the Nepalese representative. This negotiation between the Chinese and the Tibetans was rewarded with success. Accordingly, an agreement in triplicate was signed by the Tibetans and the Chinese with the Nepalese *Vakil* as the witness.⁶⁶ The agreement which was a breakthrough in the Sino-Tibetan crisis, had the following eight features:

1. First, both sides (Chinese and Tibetans) agreed to check the number of arms kept under Nepalese custody.

2. Secondly, the store-room was to be sealed by the Tibetans, the Chinese and the Nepalese and was to be guarded by the Nepalese until the Chinese had crossed the frontier of Tibet. The list of arms was to be kept under three keys and until the three parties were present neither the door was to be opened nor arms were to be used.
3. Thirdly, once the Chinese troops had crossed the Tibetan border the Nepalese guards were to hand over the keys of the store-room to the Tibetans.
4. Fourthly, the Tibetans promised to send the Tibetan traders to sell supplies sufficient for each day for the period they (Chinese troops) remained in Lhasa; but the Chinese who wished to go to the Tibetan quarter in Lhasa could do so only with a pass.
5. Fifthly, the Tibetans also agreed to arrange supplies and riding animals for the road upon full payment.
6. Sixthly, The Chinese troops promised not to loot or molest the Tibetans on their return home.
7. Seventhly, the Chinese agreed to the confiscation of the arms in their possession by the Tibetans.
8. Finally, the Tibetans promised to protect the lives and property of the Chinese civil and military officials.⁶⁷

This treaty was highly significant for it did provide the framework for a peaceful exist of the Chinese soldiers from Tibet. However, the withdrawal of the Chinese garrison from Tibet was not easy for it ran into a snag a little before the withdrawl began. The cause for the snag was that the Chinese claimed their right to retain General Chung Yi, while the Tibetans maintained that his retention was contrary to the agreement. But the position of the Chinese was getting desperate as they were ill-clothed and ill-fed. Their last show of strength was seen in September 1913, when they attacked the guards of the monastery of Tenj-Yelin. However, in the end they had no alternative but to appeal to Nepal or the Viceroy of India for their good-office to act as mediators, so that they could gracefully carry out the total evacuation of their garrison from Lhasa. The British Government refused to intervene. But Nepal was induced to act as a mediator. Nepal successfully fulfilled her role as an inter-

mediary and affected the transfer of arms and ammunition from Chung Yi. These arms were placed again under the Nepalese custody and the Chinese General Chung Yi left for China via India with 800 of his men on December 19, 1913.⁶⁸

The peaceful exit of Chung Yi closed the last chapter of the Chinese-Tibetan adventure. The possibility of the total absorption of Tibet within the Chinese dominion a year ago was brought to a sudden end. The Chinese by their rash move lost their moral authority in Tibet which they were able to exercise prior to Chao Ehrfeng's Campaign. The withdrawal of the Chinese in 1913 also helped to give Tibet a definite independence from the Chinese. The Dalai Lama took an official move on February 13, 1913 when he issued a proclamation that terminated all ties with China. Tibet's craving for complete freedom from the Chinese had already been expressed in a treaty concluded between Tibet and Mongolia in January 1913. This treaty was significant in the sense that both the states being free and independent were declared outside the pale of influence of the Manchu dynasty.⁶⁹ The Republic of China, however, refused to recognize the independent status of Tibet.

This new development in Trans-Himalayan politics led to the tripartite Simla Conference in October 1913. As expected, the bone of contention in this Convention was Tibet's assertive role in the proclamation of her independence from China. A compromise was finally evolved, as the Simla Convention took its final shape. Accordingly, Tibet was divided into two zones: inner and outer Tibet, namely, Central Tibet would enjoy complete autonomy, while the Inner Tibet, that is, the areas east of Upper Yangtze would be under continued Chinese administration, and recognize Chinese suzerainty.⁷⁰ The Simla Convention, being a compromise, satisfied neither party. Tibet was highly dissatisfied with the new proposal but went along, for it was the best deal she could strike. But China refused to accept it. The provisions dealing with India and Tibet, however, went into effect immediately. The Simla Convention of 1913 even without the Chinese ratification served its purpose. Tibet became an accepted buffer between India, Russia and China. Another major outcome was that the Russian designs over Tibet were permanently checked. Above all, a period of relatively unprecedented peace and tranquility

reigned over Sino-Tibetan relations from 1913 to 1950.

With the exit of the Chinese soldiers from Tibet and the beginning of the Simla Convention Nepal breathed a sigh of relief, and turned her attention to the economic aspect of the China-Tibet conflict. On October 1913 *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher wrote a letter to the Dalai Lama demanding a compensation of 134,894 Tibetan *kala mohars* for the Nepalese losses of property during the Sino-Tibet conflict.⁷¹ The Tibetan Spiritual Leader, besides placing the blame for the Nepalese losses entirely on the Chinese, advised the *Maharaja* to send a representative at the Simla Convention with a list of property lost in the conflict for the true and fair judgement of the British. He further asserted that he was sending to the Convention his own Prime Minister, Sethia Kazi, with the list of the losses of Tibetan property due to Chinese intrusion in Lhasa, Digarche and the Khasa regions.⁷² The *Maharaja*, however, pointed out that Tibet, which had failed to give protection, was really responsible for the loss of Nepalese lives and property. Thus it was her obligation to compensate for the Nepalese losses. He also totally rejected Dalai Lama's idea of sending a Nepalese representative to the Simla Convention to claim compensation for the Nepalese losses in a few emotionally worded sentences.

I wonder how you could have made such a strange proposal as that of sending a begging-mission to the Conference at Simla to press our claims on a body which has nothing to do with the matter which concerns us two only. . . . which has been convened under the wise guidance of the fair-minded British Government for deliberating over the question of differences between China and Tibet. A little common sense would show the impropriety nay the loss of self respect, involved in in the acceptance of your absurd suggestion.⁷³

C. Crisis in Nepal-Tibet Relations, 1912-1930

The period between 1912 and 1930, though marked by peace and tranquility as far as Sino-Tibet relations were concerned, was

yet distinguished by another crisis in Nepal-Tibet relations, which could have blown into a full-scale armed hostility during the second and third decades of this century. Three major disputes plagued Nepal-Tibet relations in this period, namely, the Gyalpo Affair, the *Khachchara* Problem, and the Border Disputes.⁷⁴

1. The Gyalpo Affair*

The Gyalpo Affair proved to be the most serious crisis between Nepal and Tibet in this century. It became the subject of endless correspondence between Nepal and Tibet for three years. As the gravity of the situation multiplied Nepal found herself at the brink of war. The possibility of a wide-scale turmoil in the Trans-Himalayan region dragged even the British Government of India into the picture. This episode was centered over the arrest of Gyalpo, an alleged Nepalese subject, by the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa in January 1928. As the Gyalpo Affair dominated Nepal-Tibet diplomatic relations in the third decade of this century it would be profitable to go into the origins and consequences of this historic episode.

i. **Origins:** The highly publicized Gyalpo Affair was set in motion by the arrest of Gyalpo Sherpa by the Tibetan establishment, whom Nepal considered to be her subject. The Tibetan administration charged him for a series of alleged offences ranging from illicit trade in cigarette and tobacco, minting counterfeit Tibetan copper coins, along with his Nepalese counterparts, and above all furnishing secret information to the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa.⁷⁵ Surprisingly enough, this controversy was kept within reasonable limits during the period of the first arrest of Gyalpo by the Tibetans; but exploded with full intensity after his rearrest from the Nepalese Legation, where the alleged criminal had sought asylum. This controversy brought into the forefront two major issues: one the nationality of Gyalpo, and two the infringement of international law by Tibet when her troops marched into the Nepalese Legation and arrested Gyalpo, who had sought an asylum. The varied and chequered career of Gyalpo became a fertile ground for both Nepal and Tibet to assert their respective claims over Gyalpo. Sherpa Gyalpo was born in Pher-rank in Tibet. But at the age five of he came to live with his

uncle Sherpa Laho-pe of Lava Shar-Kom-pu in Nepal. While living with his uncle he also married a Nepalese Sherpa girl Ang-Mu-Wa-Lung. After his wedding he lived for a decade as a *ryat* (tenant) in Shar-Kham-pu in Nepal. During the turn of this century he came to Darjeeling(India)where he worked as a porter and then became a curio dealer. He also was successful in cultivating friendship with the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa, who was no other than Lal Bahadur Basnyat, from whom he was apparently successful in borrowing money for his prosperous trade.^{7*}

It is true that a list of nine witnesses was brought by Sherpa D'hakitar in an attempt to prove conclusively the Tibetan origin of Gyalpo but the Imperial records as well as the Nepalese records present a different picture. The certificate issued by the British Trading Agent, Macdonell, and the Curator of an Indian museum to Gyalpo indicates Nepalese citizenship of Gyalpo. Further, a list prepared by the *Kumari Chowak* (Office of Internal Audit) lists Gyalpo as a Nepalese subject paying taxes to the government of Nepal. To add to this, the Nepalese *Vakil* Lal Bahadur Basnyat had given Gyalpo a license to keep a gun on behalf of the Nepalese government.⁷⁷

The Tibetan Government, however, took Gyalpo to be a Tibetan citizen on the sole ground that he was born in Tibet, and thus had him arrested, handcuffed and imprisoned in January 1928.^{7*} The Tibetan government sincerely felt that Gyalpo's claim of Nepalese citizenship was only a device to doze the Tibetan government of taxes and be independent of Tibetan officialdom. Nepal, however, insisted that a joint-court be held to settle the nationality issue of Gyalpo. But after a lapse of nineteen months Gyalpo escaped from Tibetan custody and sought refuge at the Nepalese Legation on August 10, 1929. Gyalpo was granted asylum by the Nepalese *Vakil*. This gave a fresh impetus to the whole episode that had been kept under a low key by both the governments for almost two years. On August 16 and 17, 1929 the Nepalese *Vakil* was summoned to *Gorship* (Tibetan Foreign Office) and was asked to surrender Gyalpo under the threat of unpleasant consequences. The Nepalese representative, however, refused to surrender Gyalpo until the nationality of Gyalpo was decided. For the next two days rumors were widely afloat in Lhasa that the Tibetans would forcibly seize Gyalpo from the Nepalese

Legation. However, the Kasyal Office as well as Prime Minister Lochen assured the Nepalese *Vakil* that such an event would not take place.⁷⁹

However, the sixth sense had assured the Nepalese *Vakil* that there was something in the air. He therefore kept the Nepalese guards under his personal control and told his soldiers not to resist in case of an invasion of the Nepalese Legation. As expected, the Tibetan assurances proved to be futile. On August 25, 1929, at about 3 P. M., eighty Tibetan policemen armed with revolvers, bayonets and batons, entered the Nepalese Legation court yard. Besides, 300 regular Tibetan soldiers in uniform, armed with rifles and ball ammunitions, managed to climb the roof of the Legation, while another group of 1200 armed regulars surrounded the outer periphery of the Nepalese Legation. Gyalpo during the seize was in an "outhouse" within the Legation. However, at the sight of the Tibetan soldiers inside the Legation, Gyalpo was terror-stricken and he ran into the residence of the *Vakil* and hid himself on the flat roof. The Tibetan police officers marched into the Legation and when remonstrated by the *Vakil* threatened him of his life, seized Gyalpo and took him out of the Legation. The news reaching the *Vakil's* Office in Lhasa after this event shows that Gyalpo was then taken before the Dalai Lama and given 150 lashes and fettered with a heavy weight on his neck. After the beating, a thick steel *lathi* (rod) was placed on his feet⁸⁰

ii. **Consequences:** The forcible entry of the Tibetans into the Nepalese Legation and the seizure of Sherpa Gyalpo, who had taken asylum there, gave this episode an international flavor. The result was that the question of the nationality of Gyalpo faded into the background or at best took secondary character. An English "Aide Memoire" hinted at this new development very clearly when it asserted that the forcible entry of the Tibetans into the Nepalese Legation was an international offense of the first magnitude, an offence against the laws of nations. The Government of India felt that Tibet had a greater share of responsibility, though rights and wrongs were committed by both the parties.⁸¹ A letter was also written by the Government of India to the Dalai Lama asking the Tibetan Spiritual Leader to take the whole matter into his own hand and acknow-

ledge mistakes where they had been committed in the sacred interests of peace.⁸² The government of Nepal reacted in two ways. First, the Nepalese Prime Minister, Chandra Shumsher, mobilized his country for war and allocated a sum of 2,500,000 for the war-fund. Other steps were also quickly taken. About three thousand soldiers were despatched toward Kerong side to repair roads. Other troops were also mobilized for the Tibetan offensive in the next spring. Orders were issued from Kathmandu to different districts prohibiting the export of grains, sheep, goats, butter, and *ghee*.⁸³ Secondly, on the diplomatic front, Nepal demanded from Tibet an unqualified apology and even dictated the words of the apology, which in part ran:

The Government of Tibet do hereby express their sincere regret for the reprehensible behaviour of some of their officials who very foolishly and rashly violated the sanctity of the Nepalese Legation and forcibly arrested the one Gyalpo who had since died in custody. For these outrages which are abhorrent to every known law, human and divine, His Holiness, the Dalai Lama while disowning the acts of guilty officials offers an unqualified apology for the outrages done and tender this written expression of regret to the Government of Nepal.⁸⁴

In an effort to defuse the crisis, the Government of India also suggested an apology to the Tibetan government which was milder in tone. However, the crisis persisted because the Tibetan government, far from tendering an apology to the Nepalese government began to make war preparation. But time proved to be the best healer of wounds. Two unforeseen factors helped to take the steam out of the crisis. First, on November 19, 1929 the strong man in Nepal, *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher, who ruled Nepal with his iron fist for almost three decades, passed away. Secondly, the Sherpa Gyalpo also breathed his last within the walls of the Tibetan prison. With the death of Gyalpo the question of his nationality became more a question of academic interest for historians and the students

of International Law. Both these events paved the way for the easing of the crisis and took both the countries nearer a peaceful settlement.⁸⁵ The crisis, however, did linger on for a few more months. Those few months were a period of much soul-searching for the Tibetan leaders. The Tibetan government finally decided to tender an apology to the government of Nepal. The apology in part ran as follows:

In compliance with your telegram this apology is submitted for the reason that Gyalpo and his wife were arrested and removed from Nepalese Legation by the Tibetan police officers and men. They have acted foolishly, such acts are abhorrently disgraceful. Tibetans and Nepalese have long lived in brotherly union and Tibetan government therefore express their sincere regret and submit this apology.⁸⁶

Nepal was more than happy to accept the apology. *Maharaja Bhim Shumsher* despatched an express telegram to the Dalai Lama as well as the Kazis of Kasyal on March 21, 1930 expressing happiness over the termination of such an unfortunate dispute between the two countries and the restoration of the traditional paternal relations.⁸⁷ The Nepalese Premier was so over-joyous over the settlement of the thorny dispute that he asked his *Vakil* in Lhasa to celebrate the happy occasion by inviting the Kazis for a feast in the Nepalese Legation.⁸⁸ Thus ended the historic Gyalpo Affair, an affair that virtually brought Nepal and Tibet to the brink of war.

2. The *Khachchara* Problem (Problems of Half-breeds)

It is true that the *Khachchara* issue had disturbed Nepal-Tibet diplomatic relations ever since the days of *Maharaja Jang Bahadur* but it assumed a serious proportion during the twenties of this century. The crux of the *Khachchara* problem was that Nepal had claimed jurisdiction over all Nepalese *Khachchras* (half breeds) born from Nepalese father and Tibetan mothers. The Tibetan government had also accepted the *Khachcharas* to be Nepalese subjects. However, during the 1920's a new element entered into the *Khachchara* issue.

The Tibetan government had complained that the Nepalese *Khachcharas* were getting out of control and were impeding the course of Tibetan justice. The *Khachchara* problem took such a serious turn that in 1924 the Tibetan Cabinet thought it necessary to write to the Nepalese *Maharaja* expressing how the *Khachcharas* had behaved in a high-handed manner and oppressed the poor Tibetans. Even before this the Tibetan Prime Minister had written to the Nepalese counterpart stating that the *Khachcharas* in the U and Tsang provinces were not observing the laws of Tibet. The letters further noted that each instance had been reported to the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa but the *Khachcharas* under the protection of their *Vakli* and *dithas* (junior officer) had continued to defy the Tibetan law and the orders of the district magistrates in different parts of Tibet. To make matters worse, the *Khachcharas* of different parts of Tibet behaved collectively as one unit and forced the *Vakil* and *dithas* to punish the Tibetan subject for no fault and proclaim themselves innocent even when guilty. The letters besides asking the *Maharaja* to make the *Khachcharas* observe the laws of Tibet, made two specific requests. First, the *Maharaja* was asked to make arrangements for the remittance of the poll-tax on the *Khachcharas* through the Tibetan government to Nepal government. Secondly, Nepal government was also asked to maintain a register of birth and death of the *Khachcharas*. And finally, the letters also complained that the Nepalese *Vakil* had not carried out the *Maharaja's* order of surrendering thirty three people related to the *Khachcharas* through their mother.⁸⁰

The root of the *Khachchara* problem was that whenever there was a discussion of the half-breeds between the Nepal and the Tibetan officials the Nepalese officials, including the *Vakil*, backed the *Khachcharas* while the Tibetan officials sided with their own subjects irrespective of the relative merits or demerits of the case. The Tibetans sincerely felt that the *Khachcharas* were of not much benefit to Nepal but were a source of constant annoyance and friction between the two governments. They too felt that the source of the *Khachchara* problem could be avoided by limiting the number of the *Khachcharas*. Two kind of suggestions came from the Tibetan government. First, all the half-breeds should be registered. Secondly, some limit be placed to the number of generations of marriage after which the

descendants of the Nepalese subjects could be considered pure Tibetans.⁹⁰

The Nepalese government, however, did not want to lose its jurisdiction over the *Khachcharas* for they were a source of revenue, as each *Khachchara* paid to Nepal a poll-tax of two *tankas* (six *anas*) annually. The Tibetan government, realizing this fact, even promised to pay five *tankas* per *Khachchara* each year in return for the control over the Nepalese *Khachcharas*.⁹¹ But Nepal was unwilling to go along with the liberal proposition of the Tibetan government, for it meant the loss of control over the *Khachcharas*, which Nepal had been enjoying for the last eighty years. Having seen that the correspondence between the two governments on the *Khachchara* issue was deadlocked, the Tibetan government decided to send her Commander-in-Chief Tsarong Shape, to Kathmandu on January 30, 1925. His visit, although made under the cover of a Buddhist pilgrimage, was, in fact, political. The sole thrust of this one-man mission was to discuss the affairs between Nepal and Tibet, in particular, the *Khachchara* problem. During the discussions the Tibetan army leader proposed to limit the number of *Khachcharas* by stating that after two generations the *Khachcharas* should be declared as Tibetan subjects. However, nothing concrete came out of this visit. The *Khachchara* problem remained the same as before. The Nepalese Premier also rejected the Tibetan proposal of excusing the Tibetans from paying the annual sum of 10,000 to Nepal. At the end *Mharaja* Chandra agreed to take a lump sum of five *lakhs* rupees for the exemption. But the Tibetan Commander-in-Chief did not agree to it.⁹²

The *Khachchara* problem managed to dominate the decade of 1920's. It had been a source of periodic friction between the two countries in the past. It is thus difficult to evaluate the intrinsic merit of this particular source of friction. Yet a considerable responsibility over the *Khachchara* dispute lay on the shoulders of Nepal. The protection given by the Nepalese officials to the *Khachcharas* as well as the growing tendency among the *Khachcharas* to flout Tibetan laws compelled the Tibetan government to take the *Khachchara* issue seriously. To make matters worse, many Tibetans who wanted to doze the Tibetan government of taxes and punishment took the cover of Nepalese *Khachchara*. By 1925 the public opinion in Tibet was geared to the

fact that since the *Khachcharas* were born in Tibet they were Tibetan subjects and thus fell within the jurisdiction of the Tibetans laws or, in other words, their cases need not be referred to the Nepalese agents.⁹³ As the 1920's drew to a close the Tibetan government began to punish the *Khachcharas* as well as the Sherpa subjects of Nepal without consulting the Nepalese officials. In June, 1929 a Nepalese *Khachchara* was kept in confinement for three days and given 200 lashes by the Tibetan government for not carrying the sacred book while circumambulating the holy land.⁹⁴ The arbitrary behavior of the Tibetan government reached its climax with the flogging and torturing of a Sherpa, a Nepalese national of Dhundui, in the course of extracting confession from him. The Tibetan, however, claimed the person to be a Tibetan subject and suspected him to be an accomplice in a murder case.⁹⁵ The Sherpa of Dhundui case did open up another incident like the Gyalpo Affair. But both the governments discussed this case more calmly than they did the Gyalpo Affair. Thus it was settled amicably.

C. Border Disputes

The border disputes had always been a recurrent phenomenon in Nepal-Tibet relations from time immemorial. The border disputes always remained a constant source of irritation in Nepal-Tibet relations but it was only on rare occasions that they paved the way for armed hostilities. The Thutam border dispute is a perfect illustration of how leisurely Nepal and Tibet took up their border disputes. Though this dispute arose in 1895, it lingered on for more than three decades till 1928. The Thutam border dispute across the border of Dhankuta was registered for the first time in 1895 when Dabal Gurung reported to the Governor of Dhankuta, Bam Bikrum, that the Tibetans were keeping their herds of yaks in the Nepalese territory of Thutam. In 1904 another report came to the Governor of Dhankuta which mentioned that the Tibetans had encroached upon the Nepalese territory of Thutam. It took more than a decade, in fact, thirteen years, for the Nepalese *Vakil* to refer this matter to the Kasyal Office in Lhasa. It was, however, only in 1915 that Nepal was able to secure legal documents that could prove

Thutam to be within the Nepalese dominion. As a part of this process the Nepalese Governor in Dhankuta, Lt. Colonel Bhuvan Bikrum Rana, was able to collect signatures of the subjects in Thutam, who, invoking their Gods pointed out that Thutam belonged to Nepal. The Kasyal Office of Lhasa, however, maintained that the Nepalese had collected the signatures in Thutam through coercion.⁶⁶ In May 1914 a joint court (*Kachari*) was held in Deomaya Tar to decide the border problem of Thutam as well the case that involved the looting of the Nepalese property. The six-membered Nepalese team was led by the Governor of Dhankuta while Tibetan delegation with the same number of delegates was led by Khemjum Nawam Loksa Lama, the officer of Gyantse *kothi*. As the discussion proceeded the Tibetan team produced a list of signatures of the people of Thutam, who while admitting that Thutam had been a part of Nepal, had, however, opted to be within the dominion of Tibet. Nepal was happy with the Tibetan document, for she interpreted the documents as a further indication of the fact that Thutam had been a part of Nepal and the people there had been paying taxes to the Nepalese government from ancient times. The Tibetan leader Loksa Lama was also persuaded by the Nepalese logic. He not only accepted that Thutam was a part of Nepalese dominion but also promised to restore the Nepalese property looted by the Tibetans.⁶⁷ The Tibetan government, however, not only refused to accept the conclusions of the joint-court of Deomaya Tar but the Tibetan officer at Digarche went to the extent of writing a letter to the Nepalese counterpart in Wallanchung asserting that the Tibetan boundary in Thutam was not Dhonya Dhang Dohara as had been earlier accepted but was really Amborralog Dada.⁶⁸ The Thutam border dispute irritated Nepal-Tibet relations till 1928. It is not clear from the Nepalese and the Tibetan records how the dispute was finally settled. But apparently, by 1928 it was settled to the satisfaction of both the parties. Other minor disputes, however, continued to be the subject of many letters between Nepal and Tibet up to 1931⁶⁹, but they never assumed a serious character.

In summary, the Gyalpo Affair, the *Khachchara* problem and the border disputes were three principal elements that heightened the crisis in Nepal-Tibet relations during the second and third decades of

this century. However, after 1930 the volatile elements in Nepal-Tibet relations became relatively dormant, and both the countries were happy to maintain their traditional friendly posture. Two factors helped to bring this changed atmosphere. First, Tibet was plagued with increasing Chinese influence in Lhasa. Secondly, the Rana administration in Nepal had to divert its attention to the domestic problem of increasing political awakening among the Nepalese both at home and abroad.

Foot Notes

* Dorjjeff (Dorzhiemy) was formerly a Russian subject of Eastern Siberia, but had settled in Tibet for the last 20 years. His Russian origin had tempted the Dalai Lama to use him in His diplomatic mission to Russia. It is to be noted that he also had, for a long time, enjoyed a post of confidence in the office of the Dalai Lama. For more on the Tibetan Envoy, see the article on *Novae Vremya*, June 18 (July 1), 1901, quoted by Francis Younghusband in *India and Tibet* (London: John Murry, 1910), p. 68.

1 Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 68-70

2 An information supplied by a gardener of the garden attached to Norpulinka Palace and a *vaidya* (physician) of Chharong Palace, to the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa. This is contained in the correspondence between *Maharaja Chandra* and C. W. Ravenshaw. See the *Proceedings of the Foreign Dept.*, No. 115-125, April 12, 1902. The original letter sent by the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa is dated Baishak 3, 1949 (April 2, 1902).

3 Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet, op. cit.* 223.

* The Tibetan Lama Chhyalosung of Chara Ghyang (monastery) arrived in Kathmandu in January 1902 through India to repair three principal Buddhist monasteries in Nepal at Budha, Simboo and Namaboodha. According to the Tibetan sacred canon a great merit was in store for a person who repaired or whitewashed the Buddhist monuments in Nepal.

4. *Proceedings* No. 115-125 of March 1902. A detailed record of the conversation between the *Maharaja* and the Lama is found in the correspondence between the Nepalese Premier and Resident T. C. Pears, Jan. 3, 1902, pp. 3-5, NAI.

5. *Foreign Office* , 17-1745. Col. Pears to India, Jan. 13, 1902. India Office to Foreign Office Feb. 24,1902. IOL.
6. See the conversation between the *Maharaja* and the Lama, *op. cit.* pp. 4-5.
7. *Proceedings of the Foreign Department* on Tibetan Affairs No. 115-125 of 1902. Chandra Shumsher to Offg. Resident, Kathmandu, April 12,1902, NAI.
8. For more on Russian expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries see Sergei Pushkarev, *The Emergence of Modern Russia, 1801-1917*, trans. R. H. McNeal, Tova Yedlin (London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 337-365; Basil Dmytryshyn (ed.) *Imperial Russia: A Source Book, 1700-1917* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 402-408.
9. *Indian Foreign Letter*, Fo. 171743, Jan. 8,1903, IOL.
10. Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 309-317.
11. When the *Maharaja* introduced his proposal of helping the British during the Younghusband's Mission before his Council of Nobility many nobles did pass adverse comments. In summary, they pointed out that such a step would besides jeopardizing Nepal's traditional political and commercial rights in Tibet, would also pave the way for another war with Tibet. But the proposal of the *Maharaja* carried the day. In retrospect, the Nepalese Premier, in a letter to the British resident, is seen labeling his nobles who had opposed his plans "Little Nepalanders" as compared to the "Little Englanders" of Britain whose ideas were narrow and limited to the personal affairs of their country. See, *Secret Foreign External B, Pro.* No. 188 of Feb. 1904. *Maharaja* Chandra to C. W. Ravenshaw, Jan. 25,1905, NAI.
12. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 197 of 1903, "Nepal-Tibet Negotiations". Undersecretary GI, Foreign Affairs, to the Military Department, Sept. 26,1903, p. 25; *Proceedings* No. 130 of 1903 Resident, Nepal, to Foreign Secretary Simla, GI, August 31, 1903, p. 59, NAI.
13. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 186 of 1903. W. C. Macpherson, Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal to Secretary of State GI., Foreign Dept., Sept. 18,1903, NAI.
14. FMAN, Cha Poka No. 104. *Maharaja* Chandra to Colonel. Harka Jang Thapa, *Bada Hakim* (Governor), Ilam, Kartik 14, 1960 (Oct. 1903)
15. FMAN, Cha Poka No. 104. A conversation between Col.

Harka Jang Thapa and Col. Younghusband at Ghoom, three miles from Darjeeling, undated; Major Tek Bahadur Khatri to *Maharaja Chandra*, Kartik 4, 1961 (Oct. 1904); Harka Jung Thapa to *Maharaja Chandra* Kartik 1, 6, 8, 9, 1960 (Oct., 1903); Telegram from Harka Thapa to *Maharaja Chandra*, Oct. 26, 1903.

16. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 186 of 1903, W. C. Macpherson, Chief Sec. to the Government of Bengal to Sec. of State GI, Foreign Dept., Sept., 18, 1903, NAI.
17. MAN, Book No. 82, 1960 V. E. (1903 A. D.) pp. 1-23.
18. *Foreign Secret E., Proceeding* No. 147 of 1903, "Tibet Negotiations". *Maharaja Chandra* to the Four Kazis of Kasyal, 1960 V. E. (day and month ?) . The English trans. is contained in a despatch from C. W. Ravensaw, to Sec. of State of GI, Foreign Dept., Sept. 4, 1903; NAI. See too *Pioneer*, December 10, 1903 pp. 4-5.
19. *Ibid., Foreign Secret E.*
20. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 470 of August 1904, Trans. of a letter containing the conversation between the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa and the Four Kazis of Kasyal, Shrawan 18, 1961 (August 1904), See also *Englishman*, "The Thibetian Question", Nov. 18, 1903, p. 4, *Englishman*, Nepal's Advice to Tibet", November 19, 1903, p. 3.
21. More information on the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904 see the Appendix E.
22. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 490 of 1905, "Tibet Negotiations", pp. 31-32; enclosed in a despatch of C. W. Ravenshaw to Sec. of State GI, Foreign Dept., 26, 1904, NAI.
23. Thanks by the Government of India to Native States of Bhutan and Nepal, *Foreign External A., Proceedings* No. 57 of 1905. Brigadier General, J. R. MacDonald, Commander Tibetan Mission Force, to Adjutant General, India, undated, p. 8, NAI.
24. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 999 of Feb. 1905 Asst. Sec. GI, Foreign Dept., to Lt. Colonel C. W. Ravenshaw Oct., 20, 1904, p. 35, NAI.
25. Trans. of a letter from the Kazis of Kasyal to *Maharaja Chandra Shumsher*, Sept. 30, 1904, *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 474 of March 1905. See despatch from Resident of Nepal to Sec. GI, Foreign Dept., Nov. 4, 1904, p. 18, NAI.

26. Trans. of a letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to the Kazis of Kasyal, Marga 6, 1961 (Nov. 28, 1904) *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 475 of March 1905, NAI.
27. Trans. of a letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to the Four Kazis of Kasyal, Magha 15, 1961 (Jan. 27, 1905), *Foreign Secret E. Proceedings* No. 350 of 1905, p. 1, NAI.
28. For more information on the Russian influence in Tibet, see the conversation between the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa and Pochha Thirring Lama of Tibet, contained in a letter from Nepalese representative in Lhasa to the *Maharaja*, Marga 21, 1966 (Dec. 6, 1904), forwarded to British Resident Col. Manners Smith, June 2, 1910, FMAN, E 10, Poka No. 3, p. 7.
29. Memorandum of papers forwarded to India Office with *Foreign Secret Weekly Letters. Letter* No. 43 M. Oct. 21, 1904. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 83 of Jan. 1910, p. 4, NAI.
30. A letter from Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa, *Foreign Secret E. Proceedings* No. 83 of Jan 1910, see Correspondence between J. Manners Smith and S. H. Butler, Sec. GI, Foreign Dept., August 22, 1909, p. 2. Contents of the letter found also in Foreign Dept. Notes on Chinese Action in Tibet., by C. Laitmer. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No. 72 of Jan 1910, NAI.
31. *Foreign Secret E. Consultations* No. 114 of Sept. 1908, NAI.
32. FMAN E,10, Poka No. 3, see purport of a letter from Nepalese Representative in Lhasa before the flight of the Dalai Lama, not dated.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-10; see also *Foreign Secret Consultations* No. 354 of June 1910. J. Manners Smith to S. H. Butlet, Sec. GI., Foreign Dept., March 4, 1910, NAI.
34. *London Times*, 'Serious Chinese-Tibetan Differences', January 14, 1910, p. 8.
35. Report from Darjeeling on the Flight of Dalai Lama. *Foreign Secret E., Proceedings* No 277 of June 1910. F. W. Duke Chief Sec. to Government of Bengal to Sec. GI, Foreign Dept. Feb. 28, 1910. NAI.
36. *Foreign Secret E. Proceedings* No. 160 of August 1910. An undated letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Sarba-Pama-Joge Swraswartha Sri the 4 Kalons of Lhasa, NAI.
37. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No 566 of Dec. 1910. Dalai Lama to *Maharaja Chandra* 6th. day of the 7th. month of the Iron Dog Year (August 1910). pp. 65-66, NAI.

38. Conversation between Kazi Bhairab Bahadur and Chharong Kazi, Lhasa, *Foreign Secret E. Proceedings* No. 412 of March 1910, Trans. of a letter from Nepalese *Vakil* Lhasa, Kartik 30, 1909, (Nov. 15, 1909), NAI.
39. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 216 of July 1910. Governor General and His Council to Viscount Morley to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, July 21, 1910, NAI.
40. For Proclamation issued by Tin., Commissioner of Police, Lhasa and of Len Amban, see FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3; see also Appendix H
41. FMAN, E. 10 Poka No.3 A Letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Lt. Colonel, J. Manners Smith, Nov. 8, 1911; Trans. of a letter from Lyang Tarin Amban, Lhasa, to *Vakil* Jit Bahadur, 29th. day of the 9th. month of Syathong year; a copy of the statement made by Nepalese Mongrel before the *Vakil*, Lhasa, Ashad 9, 1909 (June 22, 1910): "Arrest of Nepalese Subject", *Vakil* to *Maharaja*. Jestha 28, 1909 (June 10, 1910).
42. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. Trans. of a letter from Lyang Tarin Amban to Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa, 14th. day of the 7th. month of the 3rd year of Syanthong.
43. FMAN, E. 10. Poka No. 3, letter from Nepalese representative, Lhasa to *Maharaja* Chandra Ashad 9, 1909 (June 1910).
44. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. An undated letter from *Maharajadhiraja* of Nepal to the Chinese Amban. Received in Tibet on 17th day of the 7th. month of the Third Swynthan Year.
45. *Ibid.*
46. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3 . See Conversation between the Nepalese *Vakil* and the Chinese Officer Lau Dharin in the Nepalese Legation on Ashad 4, 1909 V. E. (June 17, 1910).
47. FMAN, E. 10 Poka No. 3. Trans. of a letter from Assiastant Ditha, Kula Prasad and Rana Gamvir Singh, Baishak 3, 1909 (April 1912) pp. 7-14.
48. FMAN, E. 10 Poka No. 3. The terms of the China-Tibet Agreement of April 2, 1912, received by the *Maharaja* of Nepal from his *Vakil* in Lhasa, Lal Bahadur Basnyat.
49. *Ibid.* See, also, Confidential No. 1389. H. L. Showers to *Maharaja* Chandra, August 12, 1912 in E. 10. Poka No. 3.
50. FMAN, Poka No. 3. A Telegram Letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to Dalai Lama, undated. See too letter from Chandra to Resident H. L. Showers, Oct. 5, 1912.

51. FMAN, E. 10. Poka No. 3. Trans. of a letter from Ast Ditha Kula Prasad to *Vakil Jit Bahadur K. C.*, Lhasa, Baishak 3, 1969 (April 1912); Trans. of a letter from Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa Chaitra 21, 1968 (April 2, 1912).
52. FMAN, E. 10, poka No. 3, Jit Bahadur to *Maharaja Chandra*, Jestha 18 (May 30, 1912); *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident Col. H., Showers, June 27, 1912; Telegram from *Vakil Jit Bahadur* to *Maharaja Chandra*, June 9 (1912.).
53. FMAN, E. 10 Poka No. 3. *Maharaja* of Nepal to Dalai Lama's Camp, June 10, 1912; see too purport of a telegram, Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja Chandra*, Sept. 25, 1912.
54. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. An undated rough draft of a telegram from *Maharaja Chandra* to *Vakil Lal Bahadur Basnyat*
55. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. Telegram from *Maharaja Chandra* to Dalai Lama, October 6, 1912.
56. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. *Maharaja Chandra* to Resident Showers, Nov. 1, 1912.
57. FMAN, E. 10 (Poka No. 3, Telegram from Lal Bhadur Basnyat to *Maharaja Chandra*, Aswin 12, 1969 V. E. (Oct. 1912); See, also, a letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to Col. H. L. Showers, Oct. 13, 1912, and of October 8, 1912.
58. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. Telegram P. British Trading Agent Gyantse to Sec. GI. Foreign Department, Simla, Nov. 4, 1912.
59. MAN, Book No. 159, 1968 V. E. or 1912 A. D. Letters from Kathmandu to the Bada *Hakim/Karindas* of Kot Khanas, Ashad 18, 1969 (July 1912)
60. MAN, Book No 159, 1969 V. E. or 1912 A. D. Letter from Kathmandu to *Hakim* (officer) Birganj Mal (revenue office), Ashad 11, 1969 (July 1912), p. 4.
61. MAN, Book No. 159, 1969 V. E. or 1912 A. D. Letter from Kathmandu to *Hakim/Karinda Mahottari-Sarlahi Goshwara*, Ashad 18, 1969 (July 1912) p. 7. For more on the collection of grains see Appendix K; also Book No. 170, 1970 V. E. (1913 A. D.)
62. MAN, Book No. 158, 1969 V. E. or 1912 A. D. Files Related to the Collection of Grains, Construction of Store-Houses and Armaments. See also request letters to the different officers in the districts and merchants. These letters do not have specific dates, pp.1-2; For more information on the collection of grains, see also Book No. 193, V. E. 1973 or 1916 A. D. (MAN).

63. MAN, Book No. 160, 1969 V. E. or 1912 A. D. An Estimated Expenditure of the Army Moving Toward Kuti, Kerong and Wallanchung, p. 2, See too Appendix M.
64. MAN, Book No. 156, 1969 V. E. or 1912 A. D. Manufacture of artifacts of 7,9, and 12 pounder cannons, pp. 1-5; See too Book No. 162, 1969 V. E. or 1912 A. D. and Book No. 155, 1969 V. E. or 1912 A. D.
65. MAN, Book No. 191, 1973 V. E. or 1916 A. D.
66. The signatories to this agreement from the Tibetan side were: Teji Timan, Ken Trung, Professor and Chief Secretary, Ken-Chung, the interpreter and the representatives of Sera, Drepung and Gan-den monasteries. The Chinese side was represented by Jara-Chi, Su Yon, Tekhun, Li-si-kwna-Li-Cha-del, Desi-Kawn, and Haro-Khun. The Nepalese who signed as witness to the agreement were: Lal Bahadur Basnyat, Offg. Representative Lhasa (30-8-69), Ditha Kul Prasad Upadhyaya and Rana Gamvir Singh Gharti Chhetri.
67. A Copy of the Tibetan-Chinese Agreement dated 6th. Day of the 11th. Month of the Water Mouse Year (December 14, 1912). See, FMAN, E. 10. Poka No. 3, The treaty is enclosed in the Trans. of Tibetan Papers received from the Nepalese Vakil, Lhasa, with a covering letter dated March 22, 1913.
68. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. A Letter from Charge'd Affaires of His Majesty's Government in Peking, Sept. 9, 1913 to Deputy Sec. GI. Confidential *R. No. 69-C.*
28-X-12, No. 2450, E. B.
69. H. E. Richardson, *A Short History of Tibet* (New York; E. P. Dutton & Co., 1962) pp. 265-66.
70. See Simla Convention of October 1913, *Ibid.*, p. 265.
71. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. A letter from *Maharaja* to Dalai Lama, Aswin Sudi 5, 1970 (October 1913) p. 23.
72. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. A letter from Dalai Lama the 2nd. Day of the 7th Month, p. 2.
73. FMAN, E. 10, Poka No. 3. An undated letter from *Maharaja* Chandra, which was a reply to the letter of Dalai Lama dated 30th. Day of the 7th. Month. p. 3.
74. Leo E. Rose miserably fails to perceive the gravity of this period in the Trans-Himalayan politics when he asserts that after the Simla Convention of October 1913 Nepal-Tibet relations take a turn for the better and even those disputes that had existed

before take a mild character. This study, however, proves just the contrary. Leo Rose further blames *Maharaja Chandra* for having revived the Gyalpo dispute, which had long since (1922) been dormant in 1928 as a part of general complaint over the treatment of his subjects in Tibet. However, the American scholar fails to observe the serious national and international implication of the rearrest of Gyalpo by the Tibetan authorities from the Nepalese Legation in August 1928. For Leo Rose's views see *Nepal: Strategy for Survival* (Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 169-70.

* The word Gyalpo is sometimes spelled as a Gyalbu or Gyalbo in the Nepalese records.

75. "Gyalpo Affairs: Nepal-Tibet Friction" *Foreign and Secret* No. 75, Political Officer, Sikkim to GI, November 1, 1929, pp. 30-31, NAI.
76. See information supplied by Sherpa Tenzing Pasang who was the nephew of Gyalpo's mother-in-law. Demi-Official letter from Sardar Bahadur S. W. Laden Lal Supdt. of Police, Darjeeling to Lt. Col. J. L. R. Weir, Political Officer in Sikkim, October 7, 1929. *Foreign Political File* No. 228-X of 1929. Serial No. 75, p. 32. NAI.
77. FMAN, *Avilekhalaya New Poka* No. 3. A Note Prepared by the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu, on Gyalpo Affairs", undated.
78. Leo Rose suggests that the first arrest of Gyalpo by the Tibetan government occurred in 1922 (*Nepal: Strategy for Survival*, p. 169). But this date is erroneous as suggested by the Imperial Records housed in National Archives, New Delhi, and the Nepalese Records of the Foreign Ministry, Kathmandu. The American scholar apparently has taken the date blindly from Tsepon, W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale Univ., 1967), p. 265.
79. *Foreign No. 228-X, 1929, Encloser to Se. No. 36* "Nepal-Tibet Friction: Gyalpo Affairs", A Note Handed to the British Envoy, Kathmandu, by the Prime Minister of Nepal September 25, 1929, pp. 17-18, NAI.
80. Memorandum from the Prime Minister of Nepal, handed to the British Envoy by the Nepalese Officer attached to the Legation, Kathmandu. *Foreign and Political* No. 29 of Sept. 129, File No. 228-X 1929 pp. 12-13; see also *Foreign & Political Consultation* No. 46-48, Sept. 1929, File No. 228-X, NAI.

81. *Aide Memoire*, Encloser to Serial No. 129, *Foreign and Political*, File No. 228-X, 1929, NAI; See, also , Telegram P(Very Secret). H. M. Secretary of State for India, London to GI, October 19, 1929, *Foreign Political*, File No 228-X, 1929, p. 25; also letter from Foreign Secretary GI, to Dalai Lama, undated, *Foreign Political*, Encloser to Serial No. 125, File No. 228-X, 1929, p. 61, NAI.
82. *Foreign Political*, Encloser to Serial No. 61. Government of India to Dalai Lama, October 19, 1929, p. 29, NAI.
83. For more on war preparation by Nepal, see *Foreign Political*, File No. 228-X, 1929, p. 45; also Book No. 237, 238 and 271 dated 1986 V. E. or 1929 A. D. in MAN.
84. Apology prescribed by the *Maharaja* of Nepal in his telegram to the Dalai Lama Octoer, 3, 1929, *Foreign Political*, File No. 228-X, 1929. Appendix 1 to Notes, p. 55; See too the Register *Bha* 67, 1986 (1929 A. D.) FMAN.
85. FMAN, Register *Bha* 67, 1986 V. E. (1929 A. D.)
86. Apology despatched by the Tibetan government to the *Maharaja* of Nepal, March 6, 1930 or 6th. Day of the 1st. Month of the Iron Horse Year, See Appendix to Notes, *Foreign Political* File No. 228-X, 1929, p. 55, NAI.
87. FMAN, *Avilekhalaya* Poka No. 3, see copies of express telegrams to the Dalai Lama and the Kazis of Kasyal (Kshag)
88. FMAN, *Avilekhalaya* Poka No. 3, Vakil Ranagamvir Singh to *Maharaja* Bhim Shumsher, Baishak 24, 1887 (May 1930).
89. Trans. of letters from Tibetan *Kashag* (Tibetan Cabinet) and of the Prime Minister of Tibet to the Nepalese *Maharaja* Nov. 16, 1924 or 20th. Day of the 9th. Month of the Wood Mouse Year, *Enclose* 1, *Foreign Political*, *Secret External*, File No. 328-X, 1926, NAI.
90. Agenda to be discussed by Tsarong Shape during his visit to Nepal on Jan. 30, 1925, *Foreign Political*, *Secret External*, Se. Nos. 1-9, File No. 328-X, 1926.
91. Trans. of a letter from Premier of Tibet Lonchen Shokang to F. M. Bailey, Political Officer in Sikkim, July 1, 1923, *Foreign and Poltical*, *Secret External*, File No. 328-X, 1926, NAI.
92. MAN, Book No. 219, 1981 V. E. or 1925 A. D. "A Bock Relating to the visit of Tibetan Commander-in Chief of Lhasa", pp. 1-48. *Foreign and Political*, *Secret External*. Demi-Official letter, W. H. Wilkinson, British Envoy, Nepal, to GI, June 6, 1925;

Statesman July 8, 1925, p. 5.

93. See conversation between the British Political Officer, Sikkim and Tibetans in Lhasa, March, 14, 1925, *Foreign and Political, Secret External*, File No. 328-X, 1926, NAI.
94. FMAN, Poka No. 104, Vakil Captain Ranagamvir Singh Gharti Chhetri to *Maharaja Chandra Ashad* 4, 1986 (June 1929), *Shrawan* 9, 1896 (July 1929).
95. Arrest and Flogging of Sherpa Subject of Dhundui, Nepal, by the Tibetan establishment, Lhasa. A Note Prepared by S. D. Howel, January 12, 1930, *Foreign and Political External*; File No. 279-X (Secret), 1930 pp. 12-13; Extracts from the letter of an Officer, Sikkim, November 18, 1930, *Foreign and Political*, File No. 279-X 1930 (Original File No. 4-X of 1929), NAI.
96. FMAN, Poka No. 156, File "Thutam Border Dispute" or "Papers Relating to Dhankuta Border": See, too, "An Abstract Note Prepared by the *Jaisi Kotha*," Kathmandu.
97. FMAN, Poka No. 156, "Papers Relating to Dhankuta Border Dispute". A report submitted by Lt. Colonel Bhuvan Bikrum on joint-court between Nepal and Tibet, *Jestha* 16, 1971 (May 1914).
98. FMAN, Poka No. 156, File Thutam, "Papers Relating to Dhankuta Border". Nepalese Trans. of a letter in Tibetan character. From a Tibetan Officer in Digarche to Nepalese Officer in Wallanchung, *Koldo Spa Thok* 9th Year, 8th. Month (1971 V. E. or 1914 A. D.)
99. For more information on the minor boundary disputes see despatch from C. T. Daukes, British Envoy, Kathmandu to Howel, Jan. 14, 1931, *Foreign and External*, File No. 279-X (Secret), 1931, p. 17.

PART VI
TRANS-HIMALAYAN TRADE: THE NEPALESE
EXPERIENCE

Trans-Himalayan Trade (1850–1930): The Eclipse of Nepal's Monopolistic Trade Structure

Nepal had enjoyed the unique position of premiership in Trans-Himalayan trade in the later medieval and the early modern periods. Kathmandu as an entrepot had served as the center of this highly lucrative trade. The war years between 1770 and 1793 had brought a new political context in Nepal, which led to further expansion and consolidation of Trans-Himalayan trade. To add to this complex milieu, the emergence of the British as a political power in South Asia in the second half of the eighteenth century, offered a new focus to this trade. Two factors, determined by the law of supply and demand, helped greatly to politicize this trade structure: the first was the increasing search for a market by the East India Company to dispose its surplus industrial products in Tibet, and the second was the ability of Tibet to pay its export bill in gold.

The allurement of gold across the Himalayas instigated the Company Government in India to explore the possible trade routes leading towards the Tibetan Plateau. Since the two principal trade routes to Tibet lay in the Central Himalayas across the border of Nepal the Anglo-Nepalese relations went through a period of waxing and waning between 1760 and the 1880's. It is true that the British effort to be a partner in Trans-Himalayan trade was rewarded with little success yet the effort was always continuous and persistent. The British interest in the Tibetan trade was further accentuated by the views of her residents in Kathmandu. B. H. Hodgson in his official memorandum to Calcutta in 1830 painted a very rosy prospect of the market for British goods in Tibet and Southern China.¹ However, by the 1870's the British interest in the Trans-Himalayan trade

received a definite setback. This was primarily due to two factors. First, the report of John Ware Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, in 1874 had convincingly presented a very dismal picture of the Tibetan trade², and secondly, the then British resident in Kathmandu, G. R. E. Girdlestone, viewed, the Tibetan trade as too insignificant to be of any positive value.³ Accordingly, the British interest in Trans-Himalayan trade was shelved at least for some time. But her interest in Tibet was aroused for political reasons as Russophobia began to extend a firmer grip on the British mind.

This brief introduction sets the framework for the scrutiny of Nepal-Tibet trade structure between 1850 and 1930. This can be divided into two phases: the last days of Nepal's hegemony in Trans-Himalayan Trade (1850-1880) and the breakdown of the hegemony (1880-1930)

Last Days of Hegemony in the Trans-Himalayan Trade (1850-1880)

Nepal was able to maintain her monopoly in the Trans-Himalayan trade structure up to 1880's for two reasons. First, the Nepalese merchants, whether the Newars or the Thakalis, were able to sell their goods cheaper in Tibet than any other foreigners, partly due to Nepal's privileged position in Tibet, but primarily due to the fact that they were satisfied with the retail trade and were content with less profit. In addition to this, the Nepalese merchants could arrange the transport of their goods at a cheaper rate than their foreign counterparts. Secondly, the Nepalese trade was very well protected by the Kathmandu Court, for the ruling elites were actually interwoven into this lucrative trade by their large private investments.⁴ A strong semi-official element in the Nepalese Trans-Himalayan trade was the opium trade carried by Nepal during her quinquennial missions to China via Tibet. This opium trade assumed a significant dimension during the premiership of Maharaja Jang Bahadur. The Nepalese Premier managed every five years to land a considerable amount of opium in a western province of China without paying the ordinary heavy maritime duty and "Lenkin" taxes.⁵ The opium for this trade came from the Nepalese Terai,

where the cultivation was regulated by the government. The farmers of the Nepalese plains were forced to grow opium and sell at a fixed price to the Darbar agents, which at best was very unremunerative.⁶ This precious commodity was taken by the head of the Nepalese mission to be sold in China under diplomatic immunity. This opium trade continued during the quinquennial missions to China from 1852 to 1900.

It is true that there was always a high demand for opium in China yet there were at least three occasions when the Nepalese mission could not dispose of this narcotic product. The first occasion that registered this kind of frustration was in 1875, when 400 cooly loads of opium had to be brought back to Lhasa for the Nepalese diplomatic mission could not even reach China. It was so difficult to sell this huge amount of opium in Tibet that half of it had to be brought back to Kathmandu. The year 1888 provided the second occasion. This time the opium taken by the Nepalese mission to Peking proved to be of an inferior quality. No Chinese were willing to buy it for it had lost its flavor as well as its sticky property. A similar problem of disposal was faced by the Nepalese mission in the year 1900.⁷

The short period between 1850 and 1880 proved to be the last days of Nepal's premiership in the Trans-Himalayan trade. Kuti and Kerong, being the principal venues of Trans-Himalayan trade, Nepal's premiership in this trade was unquestioned. The principal exports from Nepal were: rice, wheat and other cereals, cotton, tobacco) *ghee* (unclarified butter) and opium in exchange for which she received salt, wool, musk, and gold dust. The treaty of 1856 had given to Nepal extraterritorial rights. The enjoyment of such a highly favored status together with the control of the two major trade routes to Tibet proved to be an unprecedented boon to the Nepalese traders.

Breakup of Nepal's Hegemony in Trans-Himalayan Trade (1880-1930)

As the second half of the nineteenth century unfolded, Nepal's monopolistic position in the Trans-Himalayan trade was eclipsed

to such an extent that it could never be revived. This catastrophic decline took place in two stages. The first was the construction of a new trade route in 1888 from the Kalimpong district in Darjeeling through the southern corner of Sikkim to Tibet. This was the immediate result of the British military campaign in the Sikkim-Tibet border. The second stage was the extension of this route through the length of Chumbi Valley to Phari and Gyantse. This was followed by the signing of the Convention between Great Britain and China on March 17, 1890 under which Peking recognized the British supremacy over Sikkim and her rights to establish trade-marts in Yatung, Tibet.⁸ The British soon painfully came to realize the fragile nature of the Convention because Tibet, being not a party to the contract, refused to abide by it and China was too weak to impose the terms of agreement upon Tibet. However, by 1900 the new Phari route succeeded in capturing the trade across the two twin routes of Kerong and Kuti, that branched off the central range of Himalayas and came down the valley of Tsangpo. By the turn of the century Kalimpong had replaced Kathmandu as the entrepot of Trans-Himalayan trade. In short, Nepal's monopolistic position in the Trans-Himalayan trade was lost.

The opening of the new trade route between Phari in the Chumbi Valley and Kalimpong across the Jelep Pass showed a steady decline in the Trans-Himalayan trade via Nepal. At the same time the flow of the Indo-Tibetan trade via Kalimpong registered a spectacular rise. Accordingly, in 1894 the gross value of export by Tibet to British India was Rs. 191,000, while in 1895 it jumped to Rs. 416,000. The values of import by Tibet from India for the years, 1894 and 1895 were 398,000 and 634,000, rupees respectively.⁹ The major exports from Tibet were wool, musk, and butter while imports consisted of cotton fabrics, umbrellas, clocks, kerosene, and oil products.¹⁰

The construction of the Phari route, besides providing the direct contact of Tibet with British India also helped in making obsolete the existing trade routes that linked Tibet and South Asia via Nepal. The impact of such a changed situation is seen in the behavior of both the Nepalese and the Tibetans. For instance, by the turn of this century the Nepalese traders in Tibet, having been

deprived of the margin of profit, stopped sending wool and yak tails via Nepal to India. The actions of the Tibetan government also helped to paralyze Nepalese commercial activities in Tibet. The Nepalese *Vakil* writing in 1903 pointed out that an order had been lately issued by the Tibetan government prohibiting Nepalese from using the new route as an artery of commerce. Nepalese merchants were thus compelled to divert the traffic of 3,000 to 4,000 bales of wool on bound towards Darjeeling to Kathmandu. The report goes on to point out that as the yak caravan moved toward Kuti the merchants were intercepted again and again and the *Vakil* had to intervene to secure the safe passage of the commodity to Nepal¹¹ Once Nepal was pushed to the periphery in the Trans-Himalayan trade the Tibetans began to raise objections against the traditional Nepalese trade of salt and wool. To be illustrative, in the year 1899 the *Dhebas* (Tibetan officers) of Kerong blocked hundreds of *muris* of salt that was being despatched by Doppa Bholes of Chya Tam via Kerong to Nepal. It is to be noted that the Doppa Bholes had been carrying this trade for more than a quarter of a century. Along with this, the looting of the Nepalese goods in Tibet became more a normal affair than an exception as Nepal-Tibet relations stood on the threshold of twentieth century.¹² The flow of goods and traffic across the Phari route also, naturally, led to the closure of many Checkpoints and the opening of new ones in Nepal. A perfect example of this is the inauguration of the custom post at Sitapul and the closing of the one at Darchula.¹³

It is true that with the opening of the Phari route Nepal lost control of the structural apparatus of the Trans-Himalayan trade yet she continued to remain strong, partly due to her extra-territorial rights, and partly due to the fact that many Nepalese merchants shifted their South Asian center of operation from Kathmandu to Kalimpong. However, despite such a pragmatic adjustment Nepal's role in this trade was never the same. A rapid decline was inevitable, and Nepal's commercial relations with her northern neighbor definitely fell into the rainshadow area. The manifestation of this phenomenon is seen in the decline in the number of Nepalese merchants in Lhasa from the previous number of 2,000 to 500 in 1907¹⁴ and to only 42 in 1923.¹⁵

The study of Nepal-Tibet economic relations after the opening of the new route really consists of the persistent effort made by Nepal on two fronts: first, the continuation of the smooth flow of rice and salt through the traditional trade routes of Kuti and Kerong and secondly, the free and unrestricted use of the Phari route to trade with Tibet and British India.

Trade through the Traditional Routes: 1896-1930

Once the Phari route had established a direct link between Tibet and India, Tibet began to adopt a more independent role in her trade relations with Nepal. As early as 1896 the controversies on the exchange of rice and salt had reached an epidemic stage. Nepal, thus, desired to set up an office of a *ditha* in Kuti to look after the welfare of the Nepalese merchants there. The Tibetans in the beginning argued that this was going against the treaty of 1856; but finally consented after the explanation from the Nepalese government that the terms *thakali* and *ditha* were interchangeable.¹⁶ Henceforth, the Nepalese officer in Kuti, irrespective of his caste, came to be known as the *Thakali Ditha*.

As the dispute over the exchange of salt and rice became acute Nepal and Tibet decided to fix the rates of exchange of these commodities. Accordingly, rice was divided into three categories. Superior quality rice fetched double the amount of salt. Good rice was to be traded at par, while the exchange rate of the other qualities of rice, would be established according to spot values. These rates could, however, be revised in case of famines or in the event of other unforeseen circumstances,¹⁷

Salt Trade Crisis in Mustang

Mustang was an important outlet for Tibetan Salt for the Far Western Region. The Tibetan salt mine of Naithapaila, was close to Thakdan in Mustang. It had thus been the convention* among the Tibetan traders to bring the salt to Mustang and then channel it to the different parts of Nepal. The salt brought by the Khampas of Naithapaila passed through Thakdan custom office

where Nepalese used to trade with money and grains. However, since 1894 the Khampas of Naithapaila broke the tradition and began to take salt to different parts of Nepal as they pleased. The result was a disaster for the economy of the petty feudatory kingdom of Mustang. The King of Mustang, Gyamparabal, naturally panicked and rushed to call a joint meeting of Nepalese and Tibetans in the border in the year 1895. The King himself led the Nepalese team consisting of the contractor, Harkaman Thakali, and twelve other merchants, while the Tibetan side was represented by the Tibetan head of the salt mine, Chikyathak Bir, and the other Khampas of Naithapaila. The outcome of the conference was fruitful for the Tibetans promised to send the salt of their mine to Mustang only. Further, both sides decided not to adulterate the two commodities of exchange—rice and salt. The new agreement that was signed in the year 1895, thus, restored the flow of salt trade between Nepal and Tibet via Mustang.¹⁸

However, trouble again rose after a decade. To be precise, the year was 1905. The reemergence of the trouble can be traced to the death of Chikyathak Bir, the chief of the salt mine, in the year 1903. Hardly a few years had lapsed since the passing of the Tibetan chieftan, when the Khampas of Naithapaila resorted to the previous practice of taking the salt to any part of Nepal as they pleased. To make matters worse the Tibetans also looted the yaks and mules of the Nepalese traders. As situation worsened, the Nepalese *Vakil* Jit Bahadur wrote to the *Maharaja* imploring him to issue a protest letter to the Tibetan government with the object of restoring the looted yaks and mules and preventing the Khampas from taking salt to places other than Thakdan customs check-post.¹⁹ The *Maharaja* acted accordingly and sent letters to the King of Mustang, the *Dhebas* of Naithapaila, and Subba Mani Lal Gurung asking them to prevent the Tibetans from selling salt in areas other than Mustang.²⁰ The *Maharaja* also asked his *vakil* in Lhasa to write to the *Dhebas* of Jhung to restore the looted yaks and mules as well as help reestablish the former practice of taking the salt to the Thakdan customs check-post.²¹ Such a hectic diplomatic move apparently settled the dispute at least for the time being.

Salt Trade Crisis in Kuti

Kuti, an important salt trading region on Nepal-Tibet border, became a center of disputes and counter-disputes in the second decade of the twentieth century. The cause for this dispute was the interpretation of the treaty of 1856 pertaining to the right of the Newar merchant to trade in Kuti. Article 6 of the treaty of 1856 had permitted the Nepalese merchants to establish *kothis* in Lhasa, with the right to trade in jewels, ornaments, grains and clothes. The Nepalese sincerely believed that this article served also as a mandate for them to establish trade-marts and trade freely in any part of Tibet.* Accordingly, the Newars and the Thakalis living in Kuti commenced trading in salt. The Tibetans, however, after a lapse of more than half a century, protested against the violation of the treaty of 1856 by the Nepalese. The Tibetans argued that the trade in Kuti was not covered by the treaty of 1856. The Tibetans were also very much unhappy at the ammendment of another provision of the treaty²² that had prohibited the Nepalese from trading in grains and the Tibetans in salt, in the year 1920 V. E. (1863 A. D.). This ammendment, accordingly, permitted the Nepalese to trade in grains while, it also kept intact the clauses that related to the prohibition of the Tibetans from trading in salt. The Nepalese had pressed for this provision in the ammendment for their merchants had to face horrors of starvation when grains could not be brought from their own country.²³ The Tibetans, however, wanted the trade in Kuti to be regulated by the Treaty of 1894 V. E. (1838 A. D.) which permitted five Tibetan merchants and Nepalese traders stationed in Tibet to freely trade there. Nepal on the other hand, maintained that the Treaty of 1856 had made null and void the provisions of the earlier Treaty of 1838. But Tibet not only thought on the contrary but also sincerely believed that since the Treaty of 1856 was forced upon Tibet it was deprived of its moral validity.²⁴

Nepal was further annoyed by the dealings of the Tibetan *Dhebas*, who always sided with the Tibetans in their dispute with the Nepalese. As the salt trade dispute in Kuti picked up its momentum, the Nepalese *Vakil* Jit Bahadur K. C. rushed to the Kazis in Lhasa and asked them to intervene in the dispute. The Kazis of

Kasyal Office promised to look into the case and send a strong directive to the *Dhebas* of Kuti instructing them on the ways to solve the problem.²⁵ However, this assurance proved only to be a lip service. Nepal, however, waited for three years for the Tibetan government to intervene in the Kuti affairs and restore the normal salt trade as guaranteed by the Treaty of 1856. In the mean time Nepal repeatedly requested the *Dhebas* of Kuti to prevent the Naibus from trading in salt and return the illegal profit made by them to the Nepalese merchants. It appears that the Kasyal Office in Lhasa had also issued a directive, which asked the *Dhebas* of Kuti to compensate the losses and restore the normal trade relations between Nepal and Tibet.²⁶ But the adamant attachment of the *Dhebas* of Kuti to the Treaty of 1894 V. E. had greatly hindered the restoration of normalcy.

To make matters worse, in December 1915 the Tibetan Office in Kuti issued an *urdi* (circular), which fixed the price of salt as eight *manas* for one rupee. An indirect effect of this rule was that salt was not available for the Nepalese to trade. The result was that Nepalese grains began to accumulate in the *Ditha's* office.²⁷ On one occasion *Ditha Dil Bahadur* even caught red-handed a Naibu descending from the hills and engaging himself in salt trade. But the *Dheba* of Kuti using the Treaty of 1894 as a shield dismissed the case with the greatest ease and swiftness.²⁸ With the approach of the year 1917 the Nepalese Court demanded a sum of 15,091 *kala mohars* as compensation for the loss of salt trade in Kuti, as the trade had been captured by the Tibetans of Naibu. The Kasyal Office of Lhasa had also reacted favorably and asked the *Dhebas* of Kuti to abide by the Treaty of 1856 and compensate for the losses suffered by the Nepalese merchants. But the *Dhebas* of Kuti had refused to act and preferred to continue their usual course of action.²⁹ At this stage the Nepalese Commander-in-Chief, Bhim Shumsher, thought it prudent to write personal letters to the two *Dhebas* of Kuti. The letters, above all, contradicted the assertion of the *Dhebas* that the Treaty of 1894 V.E. pertaining to the right of Tibetans to trade in salt was valid. They were also careful to point out that the Treaty of 1920 V. E. had permitted the Nepalese to trade in grains. The letters, finally, concluded with a note of warning namely, that the Tibetans were bound to suffer if the flow of Nepalese grains was

stopped. The Tibetan prohibition of salt would, however, have no impact on Nepal for sufficient salt for domestic consumption came from India.³⁰

The *Dhebas*, far from heeding to the warning of Nepalese Court, permitted the Tibetans of Kuti to raise the price of salt to such an extent that it made salt trade a very unprofitable business to the Nepalese. The *Thakali* Indra Bahadur Shrestha, speaking on behalf of the forty Nepalese merchants in Kuti, laments in a petition to *Maharaja* over the status of salt trade in Kuti. His petition, in part, stated:

We are losing 120 pice per every *mohar* (half a rupee) instead of getting one *mohar* of profit for trading two *manas* of salt at the current rate of exchange. If the present situation continues we will soon be losing our houses and land.³¹

This petition, though a little exaggerated, does bring the point home, namely, the Tibetans were going against the treaty by engaging themselves in salt trade, and if this went on unchecked, the future of Nepalese trade in Tibet was doomed.

The year 1918 proved to be very significant in Nepale-Tibet relations for there arose a serious dispute between the Nepalese merchants in Kuti and the Tibetans. The occasion was the buying of salt by Pema Dhorje in October 1918 from the Lowenchen merchants of Tibet and selling it to the Nepalese. The Nepalese traders caught Pema Dhorje red-handed and handed him over to the *Dhebas* for punishment for he had violated the treaty between the two countries. Kathmandu also wrote a strong letter to the *Dhebas* of Kuti asking them to punish Pema Dhorje on two counts: first, buying salt from the Tibetan subjects and, secondly, reducing the rate of exchange of salt; or be prepared for its unhappy consequences.³² The immediate reaction of the *Dhebas* of Kuti was the promise to punish Pema Dhorje if the case was true. However, after a lapse of a little more than a week, they shelved the issue for the time being with the assertion that they had to wait for instructions from Lhasa to determine their future course of action. The reason was that the treaty of

1894 V. E. had permitted the Naibus to exchange salt for rice.³³

Finally, on the twenty-fourth day of the fifth month of the year (?) (1918 A. D. ?) the *Dhebas* decided to call the conference of the Forty Maharajans and the *Thakali Ditha*. Here too, the Nepalese. *Ditha* pressed the Tibetan side for the punishment of Pema Dhorje. But the two *Dhebas* evaded the whole issue by pointing out that a Tibetan envoy Chitung was being sent to Kathmandu to settle the salt trade issue. They then asserted that it would be wiser for both the sides to wait for the outcome of this crucial mission. Thus the conference ended in a failure and all future talks to hold a joint-court to settle the salt dispute were postponed indefinitely.³⁴

The salt disputes between Nepal and Tibet took such an alarming character in Kuti and other parts of Tibet like Kerong and Naithapaila, that the court of Lhasa decided to send Chitung Sekha³⁵ to Kathmandu to discuss the prickly salt problem. However, his visit was postponed, for he was sick with fever. As Chitung was ailing two other issues intensified the already complicated salt trade controversy. First, the Tibetans objected to the expansion of *kothis* (trade-marts) in Kuti by the Newar merchants as it was against the treaty. Secondly, closely associated with this was another thorny question of the *khachcharas* (sons of Nepalese-Tibetan wives) in Kuti. The whole question hinged on the issue whether these *khachcharas* could run trade-marts and engage themselves in salt trade. The Tibetans also complained about the arrogant behavior of the Nepalese *Ditha* Amrit Lal under whose protection the Newar merchants had engaged in illegal practices.³⁶

Chitung finally arrived in Kathmandu after recovering from his protracted illness in June, 1922. He discussed with *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher the complexities of the salt trade crisis in Kuti. Both sides agreed in principle that the salt brought by Lowenchen merchants could not be bought by the Tibetans. The issue was again dead-locked when Chitung asserted that the Tibetans should be permitted to conduct salt trade in Kuti, for they had been placed under great stress by this prohibition. The mission of Chitung ended without solving the crux of the problem. Thus leaving the salt trade exactly where it stood before.³⁷ The Tibetan envoy, however, left Kathmandu promising to come back for a second round of talks in Winter.

Salt Trade Problem in Kerong

As the conversation was going on between *Maharaja* Chandra and Chitung in Kathmandu another salt trade controversy had risen over the flow of salt in Kerong. The cause of the crisis was connected with a whole range of issues like adulteration of salt, reduction of salt price as well as the prevention of the Dokpas from salt trade in Kerong. To complicate the matter further the Tibetan officer in Kerong, Jhang Jhong, had himself violated the treaty by carrying the salt trade himself. The Tibetans at Kerong had been consistently rejecting the salt brought by Dokpas of Dhaba because they had been traditionally trading with the Nepalese. Nepal referred this case to a joint-court of the Nepalese *Ditha*, merchants and the *Dhaibun* of Tingri. However, the *Dhaibun* left the court on the pretext that he had to refer the case to Lhasa for further instruction.³⁸

The result was that the condition and well-being of the Nepalese merchants in Kerong deteriorated day by day. In June 1923 the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa went to the Kasyal office and requested the Kazis to issue a strongly worded letter to Kerong for lifting the ban on the Dopas from trading in salt and prohibiting Jhang Jhong from engaging himself in private salt trade. But the kazis decided that they could not send any fresh instructions until they had examined the case. The *Vakil* returned dismayed and disheartened, for the Kazis even refused to send him a copy of the letter to Kerong even if it was ever sent.³⁹

The salt trade disputes in kuti and kerong continued to plague Nepal-Tibet relations during the second and third decades of this century. Finally by 1925 the two governments succeeded in fixing the rate of exchange of salt and grains for three years (till 1928). However, even this meticulously drawn arrangement proved to be only superficial. The differences between the two countries were too great to be bridged by a sheet of paper. The Nepalese *Vakil* reports from Lhasa that the Tibetans, according to the agreement, started to take grains from the Nepalese traders but refused to give salt in return. In 1928 the *Vakil* goes on to state that the Tibetans had already taken grains worth 200 muris of salt* but the salt had not been provided.⁴⁰ The salt trade dispute continued even as late as

1937. In this connection the Tatopani *vansar* (custom office) makes mention of adulterated salt coming to Nepal from Tibet.

Nepalese Adjustment to the New Trans-Himalayan Trade Structure

With the opening of the Phari route the existing Trans-Himalayan trade structure was radically altered by the turn of this century. The new trade route served to provide a direct link between Tibet and British India thus reducing Nepal's intermediary role in this trade to a nonentity. Nepal's absolute control of the traditional trade routes of Kuti and Kerong as well as her imposition of heavy customs on goods passing to and from Tibet compelled the British to seek an alternative trade route to Tibet. The changed economic context took not only Nepal by surprise but exposed her to serious problems of economic and political nature.

The Anglo-Tibet convention of 1904 permitted Tibet to impose custom duties on twelve articles like wool, yak tails and *pasminas* (shawls) that went via Phari route.⁴¹ Accordingly, the Tibetan government began to impose five *kala mohars* per bundle of wool and yak tails that passed across Phari.⁴² The Nepalese found this to be a bitter pill to swallow for there was a time when she was imposing custom duties on goods passing via Kuti and Kerong into Tibet; however, the situation was not only reversed but now the Nepalese even faced the risk of not being permitted to trade through this route. Even if permission to trade via this route could be obtained through diplomatic manoeuvre Nepal would definitely have to pay custom duties to the Tibetan government. However, this realization came only later. Initially, Nepal did not take up the opening of the Phari route with such seriousness. As early as January 1906, the Nepalese *Vakil* in Lhasa called a meeting of the 32 Nepalese merchants in the Legation and asked them to use the shortest route to India. The Phari route being shorter, would add to their profit and he continued that it was the wish of the *Maharaja* that they should contribute five per cent of their profit to their mother country. The merchants were delighted to hear the news that they could go to Calcutta, bring goods via Phari; and promised to help their home

government in the best way they knew.⁴³ But this happiness was short-lived.

The opening of the Phari route proved to be a fertile ground for the emergence of conflicting interpretations about the provision of extra-territorial rights of Nepal in Tibet as laid down by the Treaty of 1856. Two areas of conflict naturally emerged. First, Nepal contended that the allotment of the contract of wool to the Tibetans was a violation of the treaty and so was the imposition of custom duties over the Nepalese traders in Tibet. Tibet, however, quickly replied that she had always taken the utmost care in preserving the sanctity of the treaty in the way one "would guard the pupil of the eye" and then she went on to state politely, yet firmly, that Nepal's extra-territorial rights had no jurisdiction over the new Phari route.⁴⁴ To Nepal the message was clear. Her extraterritorial rights had remained a dead letter and if her merchants wanted to trade in Tibet they had to pay custom duties. Tibetan actions that followed further supported this hypothesis. A Nepalese merchant Rin Jin Topke,* who tried to take 700 bundles of wool via Phari route to India without paying custom duties had his 100 bundles looted and the remaining 600 bundles seized.⁴⁵

While the case of Rin Jin Topke had brought a fresh wave of uneasiness in the Nepalese mind, Nepal-Tibet relations were further complicated by two ordinances issued by the Lhasa administration. Accordingly, the Nepalese sellers of flour in the Solo Khumbu region were compelled not only to sell their products to certain Tibetan shops⁴⁶ but also to pay a tax ranging from 40 to 200 *kala mohar* to the government.⁴⁷ Nepal, very much irritated by the attitude of Tibetan government on trade matters, instructed her *Vakil* in Lhasa to tell the Kazis of Kasyal that if they were determined to close the Phari route to Nepalese traders then Nepal would be left with no other option except to go to war against Tibet.⁴⁸ This warning of the *Vakil* was followed by letters from the Maharaja of Nepal to Potala Lama. In summary, the letters pointed out that if Tibet continued to violate the treaty rights between the two countries Nepal would have to defend her rights.⁴⁹ The Maharaja's letter to the Kazis of Kasyal was more direct. Among other things it pointed out that if treaty rights between the two countries were further violated then:

Tibet shall be responsible for the war that might follow. It concluded with a note that Nepal would be compelled to take appropriate actions to defend her rights.⁵⁰

The strongly worded letters which the Nepalese Premier wrote to the Potala Lama as well as the Kazis of Kasyal did have the intended effect. A *Karkay* (official instruction) issued by Lhasa to the Tibetan officers at Gyantse and Digarcha did permit the Nepalese merchants to conduct wool and musk trade via Phari to India.⁵¹ This extremely significant legal document, while opening the Phari route to the Nepalese traders, did impose certain limitations. In summary these were as follows:

1. First, the Nepalese officers were to count the bundles of Nepalese artifacts and communicate to the Tibetan officers about their export to India ten days in advance.
2. Secondly, the merchants of Nepal were to refrain from carrying wool and yak tails of people other than Nepalese. The penalty for doing so was the confiscation of such goods and surrendering them to the respective governments.
3. Thirdly, the Nepalese merchants taking wool and yak tails via Phari needed a passport from the Tibetan government and each bundle had to receive a Nepalese official stamp.
4. Fourthly, if the Nepalese bundles of wool and yak tails were not examined by the Tibetan officers within ten days then the Nepalese officer should write to the kazis of Kasyal and the bundles could be transported without the approval.
5. Nepalese merchants had to pay customs to Tibetan authorities before taking the goods to India.⁵²

The *Karkay* was not the one Nepal desired or even expected. But it was the maximum concession the Tibetan government was willing to make; and Nepal had no choice but to go along with it. On the positive side, the Phari route was opened for the Nepalese merchants. However, it was not unconditional, for the Nepalese merchants not only had to observe the slow and cumbersome rules and regulations of the Tibetan government but also had to pay custom duties. Nepal was not happy with this sort of arrangement but it was the best bargain she could make and had to be content with. Gone were the days when Nepal could dictate her own terms

of Trans-Himalayan trade on Tibet. She no longer made rules but only followed them if she wanted to remain in business in the frame work of the new economic context. Despite such consequences, the *Maharaja* thought it prudent to congratulate the Dalai Lama for permitting the Nepalese merchants to trade via Phari route to India.⁵³

Nepal, however, consistently raised objections on the question of the legality of the Tibetan government in imposing customs on Nepalese goods passing via Phari. The dispute over the custom duties and the Nepalese monopoly over salt and wool trade in Tibet continued to disturb Nepal-Tibet relations for years. As the Nepalese government disputed the right of Tibet to impose custom duties on Nepalese goods passing via the Phari route the losses suffered by the Nepalese merchants began to increase in a geometric ratio. In order to reverse such a situation the Nepalese merchants began to trade via the new route by paying cutstom duties privately to the Tibetan officials.⁵⁴

It cannot be denied that the *Karkay* did open the new route to India for the Nepalese traders, yet, as it contained so many sub-clauses, their interpretation became a source of fundamental differences between the two governments from 1913 to 1930. The government consistently prevented the Nepalese from trading in salt, wool, and grains in other parts of Tibet like Kuti, Kerong, Wallan-chung and the Solo Khumbu area. To make matters worse the Tibetans continued to harass the Nepalese traders in every possible way they could think of. The methods of harassment ranged from the granting of the monopoly of trade in wool and yak tails to Tibetans only, and confiscation of Nepalese goods to imprisoning the Nepalese on flimsy pretexts. To add to this, the Nepalese were compelled to give the names of Tibetans who sold them wool, who, in turn, were severely punished for trading with Nepalese.⁵⁵ The aim was always the same: to throw Nepal out of business in the Trans-Himalayan trade.

The policy of the Tibetan government between the second and third decade of this century was not only to limit the Nepalese merchants from the Phari route but also to discourage and even prevent the flow of the usual traditional trade across Kuti and Kerong. The first object was achieved by giving Tibetans control

over wool, yak tails and leather artifacts that were to be exported to India. Two Tibetan contractors who were given the monopoly over this valuable trade to India during this period were: Khampa Chang Chopson Jung Tasi and Spung Chunga. In the year 1930 A. D. the Potala Lama gave the monopoly of wool and yak tails to Khampa Bhunima, a wool contractor for seven years. The Nepalese, however, could carry on only private trade in wool and yak tails. This privilege, was, however, adversely affected by the fact that the Tibetans who traded with the Nepalese were severely punished.⁵⁶ To facilitate the Tibetans in their monopoly in Trans-Himalayan trade the Nepalese were also compelled to sell their wool, yak tails and leather goods to the Tibetans. Failure to do so would not only ipso-facto lead to their confiscation but even the Tibetan householder that kept the Nepalese goods was to be punished.⁵⁷ To facilitate the second objective the Nepalese were compelled to sell their wool at a lower rate than the Tibetan contractor,⁵⁸ In addition, imposition of the passport (bearing Nepalese and Tibetan seals) upon Nepalese traders, and the stoppage of goods bound to Nepal were all actions intended to achieve the same effect. In short, the policy of Tibetan government since 1915 A. D. was to prevent the Nepalese traders from engaging themselves in salt and wool trade.⁵⁹

By the turn of this century, Tibet's direct access to India significantly reduced Nepal's intermediary role in Trans-Himalayan trade. Tibet, overjoyed by a sense of mastery over the Trans-Himalayan trade, felt that she could afford to disregard her commitments to Nepal as guaranteed by the treaty of 1856. If Nepal could impose her own terms and conditions on Trans-Himalayan trade before, Tibet could do the same as the twentieth century unfolded. However, Tibet went a step further than merely imposing her terms and conditions on Nepal. Her behavior in the second and third decades of this century towards Nepal was aimed not only at eliminating Nepal out of the Phari route but also at considerably slowing the volume of trade with Nepal via the traditional routes of Kuti and Kerong; and, if possible, even at bringing it to a halt. Such an attitude of Tibet in the twentieth century towards her southern neighbor must, however, be explained within the general framework of historical antecedents, in particular, the humiliating Treaty of 1856 A. D.

that Nepal had imposed on her. To add to this the Nepalese disregard for Tibetan customs and laws in Lhasa as well as the poor inter-relation between the Nepalese and Tibetan community in Tibet also contributed greatly is shaping Tibet's foreign policy towards Nepal.⁹⁰ It is not within the scope of this study to go into the inter-relations between the Nepalese and Tibetan community in Tibet, which could easily be a subject of a lengthy study by itself.

Foot Notes

1. *Foreign political Consultation* No. 24 of 1830. B. H. Hodgson, British Resident, Kathmandu, to George Swinton, Political Section, GI, March 8, 1874, NAI.
2. John Edgar's report, that was based upon his visit to Sikkim-Tibet border in the winter of 1874, exploded the myth of Tibet's riches in gold and the brilliant scope of the British merchandise in Tibet. On the contrary, the report argued that Tibet was a poor, sparsely populated country where the demand for British luxury goods would be actually confined to a microscopic segment of the Tibetan community. The report then went on to say that the only export the Tibetans could provide was cow and sheep both of which could not survive the Indian tropical sun. The Indian merchants, thus, had to be content with wool and butter. See, Report of John Edgar, K. W. *Foreign Political A*, Feb., 1874, *Consultation* No. 32. W. H. Hershel, commissioner, Cooch Bihar Division, to Sec. Government of Bengal, May 13, 1874. The extracts from Edgar report is, too, found in K. W. *Foreign Political A*, Feb. 1875, *Consultation* Nos. 24-37. This report did play a significant role in shaping the mind of the British bureaucracy in India. For example, C. U. Aitchinson, the Sec. GI, Foreign Dept. closed the above report with the following assertive note: "the value of this trade has been greatly overestimated and the difficulties both physical and political to the development of it been greatly underestimated and the best thing we can do is to drop the subject for the present". A note by C. U. Aitchison in "Extracts from Edgar's Report".
3. *Foreign Political-A, Proceedings* No. 132 of 1879. C. E. R. Girdlestone. to A. C. Lyll Sec. GI, Foreign Dept., June 30, 1879, NAI.

4. *Foreign Political-A, Proceedings* No. 104-1 A, June 1873, NAI. C. E. R. Girdlestone, to C. U. Aitchison, June 26, 1873.
5. *Foreign Secret Consultation* No.129, September, 1876, p. 3, NAI.
6. *Foreign Political-A, Cons.*, No. 104-A, May 1875. C. E. R. Girdlestone to C. U. Aitchison, p. 2, NAI.
7. *Foreign Political-A, Cons.* No. 104-A, May 1875, "Alleged Illicit Traffic in Opium Through Nepal", Daniel Wright, Offg. Resident, Nepal; FMAN, Poka No. 36, "Correspondence in the Time of Bir Shumsher.", Kazi Rana Bikrum Rana to *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher Jestha, badi 8, 1947 V. E. (May 1888). A similar account is found also in a *Bada Patra* (A, major official instruction) from *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher to Indra Bikrum Rana. Chaitra sudi 4, 1956 (April 1900).
8. C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Vol. XIV (New Delhi: Central Publishing Branch, 1929), p. 17; Charles Bell, *Tibet Past and Present* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 233.
9. *Pioneer*, "Our Trade with Tibet", July 3, 1896, pp. 5-6.
10. The Tibetans imported in 1895, 812,000 yards of cotton cloth, while in 1895 her imports were diversified to include 2,000 umbrellas, 1,400 grosses of matches, 3,112 cases of kerosene, 125 clocks and 63 *maunds* of oilmen's store. As regards her exports in 1894 alone she exported 3,000 *maunds* of wollen bales, which were used to manufacture English and American blankets and carpets. See *Pioneer*, 1896, pp. 5-6.
11. *Foreign Secret E, Consultation* No. 403, July 1904. Trans. of a letter from the Nepalese *Vakil*, Lhasa dated Poush, 10, 1960 (Dec. 24, 1903), Ravenshaw, Resident Kathmandu, to Sec. GI, Foreign Dept., March 4, 1904, NAI.
12. FMAN, Poka No. Pa 36, "Correspondance in the Time of *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher." *Vakil* Captian Indra Dhoj Pandey Chhetri to *Maharaja*, Bhadra sudi, 14, 1956 (August 1899); Poka No Cha 104, Lt. Colonel Rana Bikrum Rana Bahadur to *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher, Bhadra badi 14, 1956 (August 1899).
13. FMAN, Poka No. Cha 104 Rana Bikrum Rana Bahadur to *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher, Shrawan badi (?) 1953 (July 1896).
14. *Secret Consultation, Proceeding* No. 327, May, 1908, Extracts from despatch No. 45. dated Chengtu or September 5, 1907, NAI.

15. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File on Thakali Dhorje Khachchara. See the *bintipatra* (petition) by Nepalese merchants to *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher, Baishak 30, 1980, V. E. (April, 1923)
16. FMAN, Poka No. 88, "Salt Trade: 1962-1999 V. E. (1906-1943). *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher to Vakil Mahabir Gadtola Chhetri, Jestha badi 5, 1953 (My 1896).
17. *Ibid.* The rate of exchange of rice was as follows:

One mana first class (superior rice)	=	two manas of salt
One mana good rice	=	one mana of salt
One mana of mixed rice	=	exchange rate to be negotiated at the spot.

(*adhibijwala*)
- * The records of FMAN indicates that this convention had also been codified into a *sanad* (treaty), but the exact date cannot be traced.
18. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1962-1999". *A Summary of Salt Trade Dispute in Mustang*. Jit Bahadur K. C. to Bada Kazi, Nepal. Jestha 26, 1965 (June 1908); Jit Bahadur to *Maharaja* Chandra, "Salt Coming from Thakdan Custom Check-Post in Mustang", Ashad 32, 1963 (July 1906).
19. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade, 1962-1999 V. E." *A Summary of Salt Trade Dispute in Mustang*. Jestha 26, 1965 (June 1908).
20. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1962-1999 V.E." *Summary of Salt Trade Dispute in Mustang*. *Maharaja* Chandra to Jit Bahadur, *Vakil* Lhasa, Ashad 32, 1963 (July 1906); *Raja* of Mustang to *Subba* Mani Lal Gurung, Ashad 32, 1903 (July 1907).
21. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1962-1999 V. E." *Maharaja* to Jit Bahadur Baishak 21, 1965 (May 1908).
22. This provision is found nowhere in the original texts found in NAI, IOL and FMAN and MAN. However, this provision is frequently talked about in many of the later records of FMAN. This portion of the treaty is either the ammended version of the treaty or a secret understanding between the two governments that was brought into writing later on. See Poka No. 89 of FMAN relating to "Salt Trade: 1962-1999 V. E."
- * Nepal had already established the *Ditha* Office in Kuti by 1896, though the treaty of 1856 had permitted only the stationing of a of a *Bhardar* in Lhasa. Tibet in the beginning protested against the establishment of a *Ditha* Office but later on went along with it. FMAN, Poka No. 88, "Salt Trade", *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher to Mahabir Singh Gadtola Chhetri, Jestha badi 5,

1953 (May 1896)

23. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade in Kuti 1902-1977 V. E. (1846-1921 A. D.) From Vakil Captain Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja Chandra Shumsher*, Poush 10, 1976 (Dec. 1919)
24. FMAN, Poka No. 89, A copy of the Treaty of 1894 V. E. (1838 A. D.) More information on the treaty is found in Poka No 88 "Salt Trade". From Thakali Indra Bahadur Representative of the Forty *Mahajans* in Kuti to *Maharaja Chandra Shumsher*, Chaitra 24, 1970 (April 1914), Thakali *Ditha Nil Raman Uprety* to *Maharaja Chandra*, Chaitra 24, 1970 (April 1914). The expression *Thakali* that is attributed to all the Nepalese *dithas* in Kuti does not denote caste as one would normally suppose. A Curious diplomatic manoeuver is associated with this epithet. When Tibet objected to the keeping of the Office of the *Ditha* in Kuti, (the Treaty of 1856 was silent on this issue). Nepal evaded the whole issue by telling the Tibetans that the terms *Ditha* and *Thakali* were the same. Thus all *Dithas* in Kuti, even brahmans, for example, Nil Raman Uprety, came to be known as the *Thakali Dithas*.
25. FMAN, Poka No. 88, Conversation between *Vakil Jit Bahadur* and *Kazis of Kasyal*, Ashad 9, 1968 (June 1911)
26. FMAN, Poka No. 89, Nepalese Commander-in-Chief, *Bhim Shumsher* to *Dhebas* of Kuti, Falgun 18, 1871 (March 1915); *Maharaja Chandra* to *Thakali Ditha Nil Raman Uprety*, Falgun, 1, 1971 (Feb. 1915).
27. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1964-1994 V. E. (1908-1938 A. D.). *Ditha Dil Bahadur* to *Maharaja Chandra* Poush 1, 1972 (Dec. 1915).
28. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1964-1994 V. E." *Ditha Dil Bahadur* to *Maharaja Chandra*, Aswin 6, 1972 (Sept. 1915).
29. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1964-1994 V. E." *Maharaja Chandra* to *Vakil Captain Lal Bahadur Basnyat Chhetri*, Bhadra 6, 1974 (August 1917).
30. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1964-1994 V. E. Commander in-Chief, *Bhim Shumsher* to the two *Dhebas* of Kuti, Bhadra 6, 1974 (August 1917).
31. FMAN Poka No. 89 "Salt Trade: 1964-1994 V. E." *Thakali Indra Bahadur Shrestha* to *Mharaja*. Kartik (?) 1975. Another letter with the same content was addressed to the *Maharaja* by the *Thakali*, Aswin 20, 1975 (Oct. 1918).

32. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1964-1994 V. E." Bhim Shumsher to two *Dhebas* of Kuti, Ashad 5, 1975 (June 1918); see, too, the undated conversation the Tibetan Envoy Chitung and Bada Kazi Marich Man Singh (probably 1919), also a letter from Bada Kazi Marich Man to Chitung, Shrawan 14, 1978 (July 1912). A letter from *Maharaja* Chandra to *Thakali Ditha* Harikant Uprety, Ashad 5, 1975 (June 1918).
33. FMAN, Poka No. 88, "Salt Trade: 1964-1994 V. E." *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher to *Vakil* Captain Lal Bahadur Basnyat Chhetri, Falgun 21, 1977 (March 1921).
34. Chitung Sekha, who had just returned from leading a religious group of Lamas and Sherpas to Kathmandu, was chosen to be a Tibetan envoy in this diplomatic mission. For more information on this subject, see a letter from *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher to Lowenchen, Jestha sudi 3, 1978 (May 1921).
35. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1964-1994 V. E." A letter from the two *Dhebas* of Kuti and five Naibu merchants dated twentieth day of the twelfth month (1919 ?); see, also, the Nepalese trans. of a Tibetan letter from the Naibu subjects to the *Maharaja* of Nepal dated the twenty sixth day of the twelfth month (1919 ?); a letter from the two *Dhebas* of Kuti and the five Naibus to *Maharaja* Chandra dated twentieth day of the fifth month (1921 ?).
36. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1962-1994 V. E." *Maharaja* Chandra to *Ditha* Amrit Lal, Kuti, Magh 15, 1977 (Jan. 121); trans. of a letter in Tibetan characters from Lowenchen, Chyakarug year, month one day twenty seven (Falgun badi 12, 1977 or Feb. 1921).
37. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1962-1999 V. E." *Maharaja* to Lowenchen Jestha 31, 1979 (June 1922)
38. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1962-1999 V. E." *Vakil* Captain Lal Bahadur Basnyat Chhetri to *Maharaja* Chandra Magh 15, 1978 (Jan 1922).
39. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1962-1999 V. E." Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja* Chandra, Ashad 15, 1980 (June 1923).
- * One muri of salt is equal to 91 kilograms.
40. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1962-1999 V. E." *Vakil* Captain Rana Gamvir Singh Gharti Chhetri to *Maharaja* Chandra Shrawan 23, 1886 (August 1929); from Bhim Shumsher

to Lt. Jakah Bahadur Basnyat: Chhetri, Kartik 8, 1986 (Oct. 1929)

41. See Appendix E.

* A bundle Known as *bhari* consisted of a load a person could carry. One bundle normally consisted of twelve leather-bound sub-bundles.

42. FMAN, Poka No 89, See an Istihar issued from the Office of Potala Trans. by Nepalese *Vakil* Office, Lhasa, Dated Tibetan Bhatuk Year (1973 V. E. or 1917 A. D.).

43. FMAN, Poka No. 89, "Salt Trade: 1964-2001 V. E." Report on a talk with the Nepalese merchants in Lhasa. Major Captain Jit Bahadur K. C. to *Maharaja* Chandra Shumsher, Poush 22, 1962 (Jan. 1906)

44. FMAN, Poka No. 19, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/ Chambar (Yak Tail). A letter from the government of Tibet to the Nepal government relating to the interpretation of the Treaty of 1856, dated the Fourth Day of the Tenth Month (Kartik 3, 1970 Nov. 1913)

* Rin Jin Topke is sometimes spelt as Ram Jin Topke.

45. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/ Chambar. *Subba* Rana Gamvir Singh to *Maharaja*, Marga 2, 1970 November, 1913); A *Binti patra* (petition) No. 53 or a report on the conversation of the *Vakil*, and the Kazis. Vakil Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja* Chandra, Marga 8, 1970 (Nov. 1913); also see an undated letter from Vakil Lal Bahadur Basnyat to the *Maharaja* and the Kazis of Kasyal.

46. FMAN, Poka No. 88, "Salt Trade: 1964-201 V. E. Major Captain Jit Bahadur to *Maharaja*, Poush 22, 1962 (Jan. 1906).

47. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar. Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja* Chandra, Marga 8, 1970 (Nov. 1913)

48. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar. Letter No. 55 (Bintipatra). Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja* Chandra, Poush 1, 1970 (Dec. 1913).

49. *Ibid.*, Poush 12, 1970 (Dec. 1913).

50. *Ibid.*, Poush 14, 1970 (Dec., 1913).

51. FMAN. Poka No. 90. File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar.

52. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar. "A Copy of the *Karkay* Relating to the Permission to Nepalese Subjects to Carry Wool and Yak Tails via Phari to Hindustan", Tibetan Era Samrija, 18th day of the First month (Kartik

- 6, 1971 or Oct. 1914). Trans. from the Tibetan Character to Nepali by *Naib Subba* Ran Gambir Singh Gharti Chhetri. The English trans. is mine. A Memorandum signed by the *Thakalis* of Lhasa and the thirty-two *mahajans* at the Office of the Nepalese *Vakil* promising to abide by the new Tibetan *Karkay*. Kartik 22, 1971 (Nov. 1914).
53. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar. Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja* Chandra Magh 29, 1971 (Feb. 1914).
54. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar. Lal Bahadur Basnyat to *Maharaja* Chandra Marga 20, 1973 (Dec. 1916). For an account on confiscation and imprisoning of Nepalese Merchants in Faring, see a letter from Kalu Karma-charya to *Maharaja*, Kartik 9, 1973 (Oct. 1916).
55. *Ibid.*, Ranagamvir to the *Maharaja*, Jestha 26, 1988 (June 1931).
56. FMAN, *Avilekhalaya* New Poka No. 3, Vakil Captain Rana Gamvir Singh Gharti Chhetri to *Maharaja* Bhim Shumsher, Poush 22, 1986 (Jan 1930).
57. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar, Kha. Letter No. 29, Ranā Gamvir Singh to *Maharaja* Bhim Shumsher; Jestha 26, 1988 (June 1930); Letter No. 16. "A Letter Relating to the Granting of Contract to Tasi Limbu Khamba". Ranagamvir Singh to *Maharaja* Bhim Shumsher, Jestha 18, 1987 (June 1930).
58. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar, Kha, *Maharaja* Chandra to wakil Lal Bahadur Basnyat, Magh 24, 1973 (Feb 1917).
59. FMAN, Poka No. 90, File No. 1970/71 V. E. Wool/Chambar, Kha, Vakil Office, Lhasa to Tibetan Government, Aswin 24, 1973 (October 1916); *Maharaja* Chandra to Kazis of Kasyal, Chaitra 7, 1974 (March 1917).
60. In one of the plays seen by Charles Bell and his Tibetan friends in Lhasa in 1921 A. D. the judge of the dead holds a court in the stage and tells the Nepalese "You have cheated many charging them exorbitantly for goods of small value." For more on high-handedness of the Nepalese merchants and diplomats in Tibet, in particular, their utter disregard for Tibetan laws on fishing and smoking in Lhasa see Charles Bell, *Tibet: Past and Present* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 337-39, pp. 237-240.

PART VII
THE POLITICAL STATUS OF NEPAL: 1850-1930

The Status of Nepal through Sino-British Eyes

The study of Nepal-Tibet relations from 1850 to 1930 brings a crucial issue to the forefront, namely, how Nepal viewed her political status in the world and how the world looked at her political being. The term world is, however, used in a limited sense, for Nepal's diplomatic horizon in this period did not stretch beyond British India, Tibet and China, or, in other words, Nepal's diplomacy really revolved around Anglo-Chinese axis with "special relations" with Tibet. It is, thus, not possible to study Nepal-Tibet relations in this period of eighty years without bringing China and India into the picture. In short, China and India served as two independent variables that determined and, at times, even shaped Nepal's relations with Tibet.

The most perplexing question that haunts the mind of a student of international relations in this period is the nature of Nepal's semi-satellite relationship with China and India. This study reveals in more than one way that Nepal's semi-satellite relations with China, though clear and visible, was, in fact, symbolic and superficial; while that with India, though distant and less defined, was more real and significant. The reasons are not far to seek. But above all the decline of Chinese power in Asia and Nepal's proximity with British India was responsible for the existence of this kind of relationship. However, China always considered Nepal to be her feudatory; but Nepal at every instance had underplayed her feudatory allegiance to China. To be illustrative, in 1913 the Republic of China asked Nepal to join the Union of the Five Races of China.¹ The Nepalese Premier, however, asserted politely and yet firmly that Nepal could

not even conceive the fantastic idea of joining the Republic. His answer, in part, ran

I am sorry that Nepal is an ancient Hindu kingdom, desirous of preserving her independence and separate existence. She cannot entertain the idea of joining the Union of the Five Races, said to constitute the Republic of China.²

The Chinese claim of the suzerainty over Nepal hinged over two factors: Nepal's quinquennial missions to China with "tributes", and the acceptance of Chinese robes, titles and honors by the Nepalese kings and prime ministers. It would therefore be appropriate to examine these two factors at length.

1. Nepal's "Tribute" Missions to China

The Chinese do not appear in the Nepalese scene until the fourteenth century. In 1381 the King of Nepal received a seal from the Emperor of China and from 1427 presents were regularly exchanged between Nepal and China.³ In the beginning of the eighteenth century, three kings of the "Nepal Valley" sent to the Emperor of China a gold leaf of petition and a "tribute" consisting of different products and artifacts.⁴ However, the well-publicized Nepalese quinquennial missions to China began only after the First Nepal-Tibet War of 1888. The Chinese sincerely believed that the institutionalization of the quinquennial missions to China symbolized Nepal's feudatory status. They further argued that these five-yearly missions had been meticulously observed by Nepal. It always consisted of 27 persons carrying the specified number of artifacts and arriving on the border on the same day, as prescribed by the treaty. Thus in order to meet the deadline the mission would not be allowed to halt even if a member of the mission was in a dying state. The dying member would be put in a *doli* (carriage) or tied to a horse and the journey would be continued. Again any deviation in the number of artifacts, the composition of the entourage or the date of arrival would be regarded as a serious breach of the treaty and the whole mission would be returned.⁵ These missions continued

till 1908. In the first decade of this century Nepal was the only country sending "tributes" to China, which, according to one source, was the last living relic that symbolized China's once overlordship of the vast regions of East Asia. Even as late as 1911 China did lay her claim over the suzerainty over Nepal. For instance, the statement made by the Government of China to the British Charge d' Affaires in Peking, while attributing feudatory status to Nepal, classifies Bhutan and Sikkim falling outside the sphere of her suzerainty.⁶

But Nepal though respecting the Emperor as the father-figure, always refrained from accepting the feudatory status. It has been generally accepted that the origin of the quinquennial missions was the outcome of Nepal's humiliation and defeat in the second Nepal-Tibet war of 1792. It was, in fact, regarded as one of the conditions imposed by the victorious Tibeto-Chinese army. However, a careful scrutiny of the Chinese patents conferred to the Monarch of Nepal in 1790 indicates that the first five-yearly mission to China was sent in 1788; and thus it seems more an outcome of victory rather than one of defeat of 1792.⁷ The artifacts sent by Nepal to China with these missions have been referred to by the Chinese records as "tributes". But this Chinese expression is at best controversial, for the Nepalese records call these so-called "tributes" "*saugats*" (presents). Thus the *saugats* sent by Nepal in these missions in no way compromised her independent status. It should be rather placed on the same footing as the homage and respect paid by the rulers of Ceylon and other islands of South-East Asia to the Gupta Emperor of India, Samudra Gupta, in the fourth century A.D.⁸ Furthermore, Nepal always viewed the missions to China as goodwill delegations, which were gestures of friendship and respect, rather than manifestations of a vassal status. A study on Nepal-China relations reveals a number of pertinent facts. First, China gave top priority to Nepalese missions. All the expenses of the Nepalese mission were paid by the Chinese exchequer. The Nepalese mission, was escorted by a Chinese officer whose chief duty was to provide all the comforts needed by the mission. Orfeur Cavenagh, astutely and humorously observes:

To such an extent this compliance is carried that even gratification of their sensual desires is not forgotten and arrangements made accordingly.⁹

The mission stayed for forty-five days in Peking during which the high officers of the team had five to six audiences with the Emperor. Each member of the mission, including the ten servants, received buttons, feathers, robes and other artifacts according to his rank.¹⁰

Secondly, China never interfered with the domestic and foreign policies of Nepal. For example, Nepal fought the Anglo-Nepalese war (1814-16) without the Chinese permission and waged war with Tibet three times against the wishes of the Chinese Emperor. Thirdly, the presents sent by Nepal to China were of trifling value; but those received by Nepal from the Emperor in return consisted of extremely valuable silk, satin, porcelain-ivory goods and tortoise.¹¹ Fourthly, these missions provided wonderful opportunities for trade, specially from 1852 to 1900. The principal item of trade was the precious opium, which the mission took to China under diplomatic immunity. It is to be noted that the families of the ruling elites of Nepal, including that of the Premier, were involved in this narcotic trade. Fifthly, Nepal continued to send the five-yearly missions to China till the first decade of this century for she found that the Chinese "semi-satelliteship" was a convenient tool, which could be used as a protection from the evil designs of the government of British India. Nepal hoped that even a distant China would serve as a shield to protect her from British subjugation.

Lastly, Nepal did never religiously follow the timetable of the quinquennial missions. There were moments when Nepal decided not to send the mission at all. Thus she could, if circumstances necessitated, fix her own timing and the hour of departure of the mission rather than follow the rigorous schedule fixed by the Treaty of 1792. For instance, the missions were discontinued after 1852, resumed in 1867 and then, were stopped forever after 1908 without any permission or understanding of the Chinese. Probably the main reason behind the continuation of the Nepalese missions to China was the successful nature of the commercial speculations. However, it appears from the conversation between Bhairav Bahadur, the chief of Nepalese mission, and the British Minister in Peking, that by the

turn of the century the Chinese had imposed severe restrictions on the sale of opium. The Nepalese leader in 1908 made a prophetic remark, namely, that the future Nepalese missions to China would be of "doubtful utility". The words of the Nepalese leader came true and Nepal never sent any more missions to China.¹²

Nepal was so far from the Chinese influence that there were moments when China felt that Nepal was outside her sphere of influence; and treated her as a subject of the English. As early as 1876 the Chinese Emperor, while rejecting the Russian proposal of encouraging Nepal to invade India expressed his inner feelings which in part ran

Nepal.....is the subject of the English barbarians. Were we to suggest that it should place its resources at Our disposal for an attack upon India it would certainly decline and the only result would be to open the door to their demands and redemptions.¹³

2. Reception of Chinese Titles, Robes and Plumes by Nepal

A second reason why China considered Nepal as a tributary state was that Nepal always took pride in receiving Chinese titles, robes and honors. The usual practice was that whenever there was a change in Nepalese premiership or when a Nepalese Prime Minister performed a notable feat the Chinese send their titles and robes of honor. Once the Nepalese Premier assumed the high office the Emperor sent the Chinese robe, styled *Kang Wang Syan*, to be delivered through the Nepalese Monarch. The robes were accompanied by Chinese officers and sepoys. As soon as the Chinese escort touched the Nepalese soil there was rejoicing in Kathmandu. Dances and music were performed by the soldiers, civilians, and the merchants to celebrate the happy occasion. A Nepalese escort brought the Chinese team to the Royal Place of Kantipur (Kathmandu). As gun salutes boomed in the air the robes were placed on the throne. They were then presented to the Prime Minister as commanded by the Chinese Emperor amidst a ceremony attended by the Monarch as well as the members of the council of nobility. The Prime Minister then bowed in a kneeling posture facing North-East and

circumambulated the throne thrice, expressing his delight to the Emperor. The Premier Jang Bahadur too received a plume decorated with the coral beads, which was a glowing tribute to his heroic feat in crushing the Indian Revolt of 1857.¹⁴ Again, after signing the peace treaty with Tibet in 1856, Jang Bahadur received the Chinese title of “the Brevet of Rank of the General of the Banner” (a title generally attributed to feudatories), with an instruction that he should continue to exert himself with his whole strength.¹⁵

Not only the Nepalese prime ministers but also the monarchs received Chinese titles. The patent of March 5, 1790 bestowed upon Rana Bahadur Shah the title *Ertini Wang* (Prince of Law), which was equivalent to *Fang Wang* (*Dharmaraja*).¹⁶ It was, however, only in the first decade of this century that Nepal became aware of the fact that the Chinese titles and honors, which she was so fond and proud of,¹⁷ really implied, at least from the Chinese perspective, China’s suzerainty over Nepal. *Maharaja* Chandra, thus asked Manners Smith, the British Resident in Kathmandu, to furnish him with the exact English translations of the titles *Ertini Wang* and *Thong-pim-ma-ko-kang* used by the Chinese to address the Nepalese Monarch and the Prime Minister respectively and thus, help him in finding out whether any of these titles implied in any way Nepal’s feudatory status.¹⁸ The translations that came from the British mission in Peking made Nepal very unhappy. Edmund Backhouse, the translator of the titles pointed out that both the titles were those that were conferred on rulers, ministers, feudatories as well as the supporters of the Lamaist hierarchy.¹⁹ Nepalese fondness and quest for the Chinese honors and titles apparently had to pay its price. Even as late as 1910 China, while placing Sikkim and Bhutan as countries having only friendly relations with China, categorically classified Nepal as her feudatory.²⁰

The Chinese perception of Nepal did help in more than one way to shape the British attitude toward Nepal. In the beginning, Britain went along with Nepal’s “tributary status” to China. However, toward the turn of the twentieth century, the Chinese assertive claim of the suzerainty over Nepal, compelled the British government to take moves in two directions: first, to repudiate Chinese claim of suzerainty over Nepal, and the second, to devise some means to

control the foreign policy of Nepal. The British Government in India sincerely felt that respect and obedience paid by Nepal to the Chinese-Emperor as "the father figure" in treaties and despatches did not indicate Nepal's vassal status. The Viceroy of India even suggested once to Lord Sailsbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, to inform the Chinese Tesung-li-Yamen, through the British Minister in Peking, that the Nepalese submissive expressions to the Chinese Emperor did not symbolize a feudatory status, but that it was a purely complimentary style of expression.²¹ The letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ran in part

I have to request you to inform the Chinese government that the submissive expressions in the letters from Nepal are not regarded by Her Majesty's Government as an acknowledgement of vassalage, or, indeed, any thing more than a purely formal and complimentary style of address.²²

In this connection, the British looked upon the Nepalese quinquennial missions to China as "a curious relic of the past" to which no importance was to be attached.²³ By the close of 1910 Nepal did change her style of expressions to the Chinese Emperor. The wordings were less submissive and humble in tone, and thus more in line with Nepal's independent status. The Nepalese Premier too instructed his *Vakil* in Lhasa that the Amban should be told that the changes were made by Nepal in conformity with modern usages.²⁴ If the first step of the British was to disassociate Nepal from the sphere of Chinese influence then the second was to move in such a way so as to keep the foreign policy of Nepal within her palm. The resident in Kathmandu was even in favor of a new treaty with Nepal. The question of a new treaty with Nepal was fully considered by the Governor General and his Council. The resident, however, was asked not to move in that direction. The British Government of India noted in 1911 that a new treaty with Nepal was not necessary, for relations with Nepal were already defined by treaties and usages so as to give us a measure of control we require.²⁵ It is true that even if the idea of signing a new treaty with Nepal was abandoned, the attempts made by the British Government in India to control or

influence Nepal's foreign and domestic policies became increasingly apparent as the twentieth century unfolded.

The first attempt in this direction was the inclusion of Nepal as one of the native states of India in the *Imperial Gazetteers* of 1907. This was in sharp contrast to the status of Nepal attributed by the *Imperial Gazetteers* of 1881, which, while confirming Nepal's independent position goes on to say

Nepal as an independent territory is beyond the scope of this book but some account can be expected in the *Imperial Gazetteers* of India.²⁶

The Nepalese Premier reacted in a very sentimental way to the inclusion of Nepal in the list of Native State of India. The British resident, Manners Smith, however, comforted the *Maharaja* by saying that the inclusion of Nepal in *the Imperial Gazetteers* in the list of Native States was not intended to hurt the feelings of Nepal, rather it was an effort to define as far as possible "the relation between Nepal and the Government of India, "that had been brought by the force of circumstances. The deliberations by the Governor General and His Council too concluded with the note that though the changes made in the *Imperial Gazetteer* were "unnecessary and unfortunate", yet they could not be altered for they were already made.²⁷ But the Government of India promised to defend Nepal in case of an unprovoked invasion from any quarter and see that the changes in administration brought in Tibet would not affect the rights of Nepal in that country.²⁸ This promise was, however, conditioned by two factors. First, Nepal had to follow the advice of the British Government when given and secondly, she always had to maintain a correct and friendly attitude toward the British Government.²⁹ Thus by the first decade of this century Nepal had come within the orbit of the semi-satellite relationship with India.

Nepal's semi-satellite relationship with British India became more evident when the British refused to give the representative of the Monarch of Nepal the status of an "ambassador". The British, however, argued that the title of an "ambassador" was given only to the representatives of countries like France, Germany, Russia Italy, Austria, Turkey, Spain, Japan, United States and the United

Kingdom. However, if a representative was deputed from the ruling family of Nepal to India or Great Britain the British would give him the status of an "envoy."³⁰

The British political interest over Nepal stemmed from two sources: first, Nepal occupied the central position in the sensitive Trans-Himalayan region and secondly, the drifting of Nepal toward China would make the redistribution of the Indian army, which contained 20,000 Gurkhas, a necessity. The British, who were haunted by the "Indian Revolt" of 1857 could afford to take no chances.

Thus as the twentieth century began to unfold China's even symbolic overlordship of Nepal faded into the background and political ties with the British developed to such an extent that it gave the British almost a total control over Nepal's foreign affairs and even domestic issues at times. The highly publicized treaty of friendship between Nepal and Great Britain of December 21, 1923 gave to Nepal the "unequivocal" British recognition of Nepal's independence. But at the same time the scope of her independence vis-a-vis the British was limited by the treaty. The third clause of the treaty required Nepal to take advice from the British in her relations with China, Tibet, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Again, her right to import arms and ammunitions was limited by a convention which required Nepal to furnish to the British envoy in Kathmandu a detailed list of war materials she imported. Thus even the treaty of 1923,³¹ though it gave to Nepal a halo of independence, in practice, brought little change in the extent of control the British had exercised over the affairs of Nepal prior to the signing of the treaty. Nepal, right to the end of the British Raj in India, was in very close working relationship with the British and did not even hesitate to champion the British cause as her own by fighting wars for them in different parts of the world. However, the slow exit of Nepal from the semi-satellite relation with China and even the treaty of friendship with India of 1923 gave little comfort to Nepal, for she became more and more dependent on the British.

Nepal's semi-satellite relationship with China in this period of study was less real and more psychological. If Nepal's missions to China were motivated by the desire of profit, then obviously her continued respect and mark of gratitude to the Chinese Emperor

stemmed from her desire to balance herself against India. The periodic sending of *saugats* to the Emperor was also an outcome of her desire to thwart the British design of getting a strong diplomatic foothold in Nepal. Nepal sincerely felt that even the acceptance of the Emperor as a father-figure was a convenient kind of overlordship which left her fully independent in her foreign and domestic affairs. Nepal was always very keen in maintaining the traditional relations with China because even her acceptance of the Emperor as a father-figure gave her full independence, while her nearness to British India could mean total subjugation

It is the geographical location, and historical as well as cultural antecedents that have shaped Nepalese-Tibetan views about her two neighbors. The rulers of "Modern Nepal" right from the days of Prithvi Narayan Shah onwards have looked upon British India as a greater threat to Nepal's existence than the distant and apparently benign China. Even today her intimate cultural affinity with India coupled with her "India-locked" character has made her more dependent on India than over before.³² A contrasting view was held by Tibet. Tibet always looked upon China with fear and apprehension. With India, however, Tibet had more comfortable relations. More than once India formed a haven for Tibetan political refugees, including the Dalai Lama himself.

Foot Notes

1. Instructions to the proposed Special Chinese Delegation to Nepal, which was to request the mountain kingdom to join the Union of the Republic of China. See, *Foreign Secret E* (external), *Proceedings* No. 240 of 1913, undated, p. 3, also, undated letter received by General Chung at Yatung in the same proceedings, p. 3. NAI.
2. Reply of the *Maharaja* Chandra to General Chung's Camp *Secret E. Proceedings* No. 240 of August 1913, March 16, 1913, pp. 3-6, NAI.
3. Sylvain Levi, *Nepal: Historical Study of the Hindu Kingdom*, Vol. I. English trans. from the original French in the Kaisher Library, p. 70.
4. A note prepared by the Foreign Department of the Government of India, in 1911, "Historical Note on Relation between Nepal and China", see *Secret E Proceedings* No. 250 of July 1911, NAI.
5. For more on rules and regulations that governed the Nepalese quinquennial missions to China see Captain Orfeur Cavenagh, *Rough Notes On the State of Nepal: Its Government, Army and Resources*, Vol. I (Calcutta: W. Palmer. 1851), pp. 164-65.
6. Chinese claim over suzerainty over Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Conversation between the Chinese Government and the British Charge d' Affaires in Peking, contained in a despatch from C. A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim, to Sec. of State GI Nov 10, 1910, *Secret E, Proceedings* No. 120 of January 1911, NAI.
7. See Patents conferred to the Nepalese Monarch by the Chinese Emperor in 1790, trans. Edmund Backhouse, a British student in Oriental Languages in Peking, in 1911. See *Secret E, Proceedings* No. 250. From J. N. Jourdan H. M. Minister in Peking to Viceroy, India, not dated.
8. For more on this theme see Radha Kumud Mookerjee, *Gupta Empire* (Bombay: Hindi Kitabs, 1952), pp. 26-27.
9. Orfeur Cavenagh, *Rough Notes*. . . . *op. cit.* p. 64.
10. See Special Decree from the Emperor of China to *Maharaja* of Nepal, Feb. 23, 1911, FMAN, E 10, Poka No. 3; also Appendix I,

11. *Foreign Political A, Consultation* No. 163 of July 1886; also *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 919 of February 1905, NAI.
12. See Conversation between the Kazi Bhairab Bahadur and J. N. Jourdan, British Minister in Peking. *Secret E.*, No. 709 of July 1908. From J. N. Jourdan to the Earl Minto, Simla, undated p. 15, NAI.
13. *Foreign, K. W. Secret Dept.*, Nos. 129 of Sept. 1875, "Office Note: Proposed Mission from China to Nepal", pp. 2-3.
14. FMAN, Poka No. 57. "Arrival of *Gajurs* (plumes) and Medals in the Time of *Maharaja Jang Bahadur*", Baishak badi (?), 1928 V. E. (1871 A. D.). See also letter No. 14, From *Maharaja Bir Shumsher* to Spain Tarin Amban, Magh badi 1, 1946 (Jan. 1889).
15. See trans. of the Chinese Patent of July 5, 1870 by Edmund Backhouse, *Secret E, Proceedings* No. 250 of July 1911. From J. N. Jourdan to Viceroy of India, March 1911. NAI.
16. Patent of March 5, 1790, trans. Edmund Backhouse, a student of Oriental Languages in Peking, runs as follows: "Rana Bahadur 'Prince of the Law' we hereby confer upon you the jewelled red button as bestowed upon princes, a coat of robes, four badges embroidered with dragon, four official coats of demi-length, a necklace of 108 beads of amber, a girdle of purse and various fittings to match". *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 264 of July 1911. NAI.
17. There also was a time when the Nepalese *Maharajadhiraja* Rana Bahadur Shah recommended Chinese robes and titles for his distinguished *Vazir* (Premier) Bhimsen Thapa, See Poka No. Ga 57, FMAN.
18. A letter from *Maharaja Chandra* to J. Manners Smith Nov. 29, 1910, *Secret E, Proceedings* No. 181 of Jan 1911. See also the telegram from Viceroy of India to Secretary of State for India, London, Nov. 16, 1910, NAI.
19. See *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 250 of 1911, *op. cit.*
20. See Chinese claim of suzerainty over Nepal. *Foreign Secret E*, of Jan. 1911, *Proceedings* No. 120 of 1911, NAI.
21. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 32 of Nov. 1896. "Tribute Missions from Nepal to China". A. Godley, Under-Secretary of State for India to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, October 11, 1895, NAI.
22. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 32. of Nov. 1895. Sailsbury,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, to N. O' Connor, Minister in Peking, October 15, 1985, NAI.

23. *Foreign Secret E*, "Nepal's Quinquennial Missions to China, Proceedings No. 220 of October, 1911. Letter from the British Resident, Kathmandu, Sept. 25, 1911 to GI, NAI.
24. *Foreign Political E*, Proceedings No, 15 of Nov. 1910. J. Manners Smith to GI, Foreign Dept., August, 11, 1910, NAI.
25. Foreign Secret E, Proceedings No. 693 of July 1911, NAI.
26. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council, *The Imperial Gazetteers of India*, Vol. IV (Administrative) (Oxford: Henry Frowde, 1907) pp. 58-103; W. H. Hunter, *The Imperial Gazetteers of India*, Vol IV (London: Turber & Co., 1881)p. 103.
27. *Foreign Secret E, Proceedings* No. 693 of July 1911, "Status of Nepal in Relation with the British Government", p. 2.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
31. For a full text of the treaty of 1923, as well as the speeches made by the Premier of Nepal, *Maharaja Chandra* and the British Envoy, W. F. T. O' Connor during the signing ceremony in Kathmandu, see *Gorkhapatra*, Poush 9, 1980 (December 24, 1923), pp. 3-7. For the draft, proposed and ammended version, see FMAN, E. 1, Poka No. 1.
32. For an essay on the "India-locked" nature of Nepal, see Martin Ira Glassner, "Transit Problems of Land-locked States and the Special Case of Nepal", *Foreign Affairs Journal*, 1976, No. 2, pp. 61-72.

CONCLUSIONS

As one comes to the close of this study one is bound to be impressed by the dichotomous and harmonious trends in the foreign policy of Nepal and Tibet. It is true that the specific nature of the foreign policy pursued by these two Himalayan neighbors differed according to time and circumstances in different phases of history, yet the common elements that have shaped the external affairs of these two countries are more impressive and significant. Their spatial location in the central Himalayan mountain system has always been a key element in shaping the structure, style and content of the foreign policy of the two countries, or in other words, it is the physical setting that has determined Nepal's and Tibet's role in South Asian and East Asian politics. This is more true today than it was ever before. The rugged landscape pattern and the physical isolation resulting from it gave to both these countries an ethno-centric view of this planet. Nepal and Tibet have thus throughout history followed a foreign policy of "splendid isolation", thereby prohibiting not only the penetration of the Western man but also of their ideas into their 'sacred' soil. The price both these countries paid for their seclusion was heavy both from the point of modernization and of economic development. While the world had stepped into the shoes of "mass-culture"* as manifested by the forces of

* It is difficult to define the term "mass-culture" which has today become synonymous with "modernization." However, both these expressions really denote the secularization of the human society, which began with the ideas of progress and the enlightenment of Western Europe in the eighteenth century. "Modernization" today has become the dominant tendency of our times and, politicization, its driving force. For more on "modernization" and "mass-culture" see Samuel H. Beer, *Modern Political Development* (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 59-94; Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780-1950* (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 295-238.

secularization, mass-thinking and mass-production as early as the eighteenth century, Nepal and Tibet were happy to live in a state of medieval chivalry even till the middle of this century. The basic feature of the political cultures of both these mountain states is, thus, the feudal sense of legitimacy characterized by the lack of penetration, integration, national identity and unequal distribution.

Kathmandu, having been the entrepot of the Trans-Himalayan trade from the medieval to modern times, has added a significant dimension to Nepal-Tibet relations. The foreign policy of any country is determined by her national interest and Nepal and Tibet were no exceptions to this rule. However, the national interest of both these countries often clashed and collided with each other. This explains, in a meaningful way, the armed hostilities, as well the suspicions, doubts and fears that hovered over the two countries for ages. Even in periods of peace, for example between 1856 and 1930, Nepal and Tibet were often on military alert, which necessitated partial or total mobilization of their national resources.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to point out the date or even the century for the beginning of Nepal-Tibet relations, for it goes back to pre-historic and proto-historic times. However, in the period of remote antiquity Nepal-Tibet relations must have been confined to socio-cultural contacts. But the seventh century A. D. constituted a watershed which led to the institutionalization of Nepal-Tibet economic and political relations. If on the political front Nepal and Tibet emerged as allies and friends during war and peace, then, on the economic sphere the growth of the powerful states of Nepal and Tibet did pave the way for the growth of a strong artery of commerce that linked South Asia and East Asia across Central Nepal.

However, with the passing of the strong man in Tibet, Song-Tsen-Gampo, China and Tibet began, to assume hostile postures, which eventually led to the closing of the newly opened Trans-Himalayan route. In the eighth century A. D. Nepal did form a venue of cultural communication between the two countries, when Nepal extended her invitation to two Indian spiritual divines* to come to

* The two Indian spiritual divines were, Santiraksita, and Padma-sambhava.

Tibet to preach the good news. In the later medieval period we find Nepal asserting herself by stretching her political and economic limbs across Tibet. Accordingly, in the middle of the seventeenth century a treaty between Kathmandu and Lhasa gave Nepal both political and economic advantages over Tibet, including a joint control over Kuti and Kerong, the privilege of minting coins for Tibet as well as the Tibetan promise to direct the Trans-Himalayan trade via Kathmandu. It is true that Nepal's control over Kuti and Kerong lasted only for twenty five years yet her right to mint coins for Tibet lasted for more than a century. However, in the latter Malla period greed and exigency of the time compelled the Malla rulers to debase the coins for Tibetan export, which became the immediate cause for the first and the second Nepal-Tibet wars.

Nepal-Tibet relations turned into an open armed confrontation during the years between 1788 and 1792. Nepal and Tibet fought two wars during this short period, which in one way or other dragged the two major Asian powers into the conflict, namely, India and China. These wars served as lessons to both the countries and they decided to follow the principle of live-and-let-live for more than half a century (1793-1853). The diplomatic relations between Nepal, Tibet and China was, however, kept alive through missions and political despatches. But the period of peace was too artificial to be permanent and enduring. The period of peace and tranquility was more an outcome of Nepal's political and economic turmoil between 1800 to 1846 than of her commitment to live in peace with her northern neighbor. However, with the rise of a powerful personality like Jang Bahadur in the political horizon of Nepal she began to adopt an independent posture in South Asian politics. Above all, she decided to settle her economic problems with Tibet by extending her political arms across the Himalayas up to the watershed. Thus before the year 1852 came to a close Nepal-Tibet disputes had emerged from the backdrop into the forefront dramatically. It did not take long for Nepal to discover more than one reason to go into war with Tibet, which varied from border disputes and violation of Nepalese commercial rights in Tibet to the ill-treatment of the Nepalese mission en route to China.

The Third Nepal-Tibet war (1855-1856) came to a close with the

Treaty of 1856. This treaty, which was possible only due to far reaching compromises made by both the contracting parties, did have far reaching consequences. This last war between Nepal and Tibet can be analyzed from historical perspective as well as in retrospect. The treaty that closed the Third Nepal-Tibet war, when analyzed from the historical perspective, reveals both positive and negative features. Negatively speaking, the two principal war aims of Nepal, namely, the annexation of the border towns of Kuti and Kerong and the effort to direct the entire flow of Trans-Himalayan trade to Tibet via Kathmandu were not realized. On the positive side the ten thousand rupees Nepal was able to extract from Tibet as a *salami* (tribute ?) and the promise Nepal made to come to Tibet's help if she was invaded by a foreign power had two-fold significance. First, Tibet was reduced to a semi-satellite status and secondly in the process Nepal too assumed the traditional Chinese role of the protector of Tibet during moments of external threats. This was in sharp contrast to the provisions of treaty of 1792, which had given to China the domination over Nepal-Tibet relations. The Tibetan minister had agreed to the provision permitting Nepal to emerge as the protector of Tibet for he wanted to use Nepal's military assistance to Tibet to overthrow the Chinese yoke from the country. Jang Bahadur, probably, even hoped that once the Chinese envoy was expelled from Lhasa his *Vakil* would replace the Amban. However, the provisions of the treaty were observed by the Tibetans only for one year since then they became a dead letter. The treaty only became a source of friction between the two governments for many more years to come. Again, the ten thousand rupees Nepal was able to extract annually from Tibet hardly compensated for the loss of 6,683 568 rupees in the war. The clauses relating to the Nepalese commercial rights in Tibet were not new but almost identical to those of the Treaty of 1792.

The treaty, however, can be better understood and evaluated in retrospect. The post-war decades between 1862 to 1896 really formed an anvil for the testing of the Treaty of 1856. The civil war of 1862 in Tibet, the diplomatic crisis of 1872 between Nepal and Tibet and the riots of Lhasa of 1883 provided three major occasions for this testing. A careful scrutiny of these decades shows how fragile was the

nature of the Treaty of 1856 that was so meticulously drawn up by the two countries. It was, in fact, too weak to stand the test of time. Far from cementing the traditional friendship between the two countries it only brought fear and jealousy above the surface. The Tibetans sincerely believed that the treaty was imposed by the Nepalese upon them. Thus the history of Nepal-Tibet relations between 1857 and 1950 was one of persistent violation of the Treaty of 1856 by both the contracting parties. As the twentieth century unfolded both the parties began to interpret the provisions of the treaty to suit their mood and national interests. While analyzing the treaty in retrospect one gets the queer feeling that Jang Bahadur had little reason to celebrate so jubilantly the victory of Nepal in the Third Nepal-Tibet war. His desire to extend Nepal's boundary up to the watershed by annexing Kuti and Kerong was not accomplished nor were the border problems permanently checked. Indeed, the treaty was more a sign of relief than the embodiment of territorial and material benefits that follow a triumphant war.

The period between 1900 and 1930 was one of challenges, hopes and frustrations in the diplomatic relations between Tibet and Nepal. The turn of this century took Nepal by surprise, for Tibet had been converted into a cockpit of international tensions, where the two superpowers, Russia and Britain, competed for a commercial foothold. Nepal soon began to feel the pinches of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Tibet. The result of this changed context was that Nepal's political influence in Tibet was eroded and her commercial privileges too crumbled down. However, Nepal did manage to adjust in this strong tide of misfortune, and through her diplomatic endeavors was able to remain a strong element in Tibetan politics. Three elements namely, the opening of the Phari route, the decline of the Chinese suzerainty in Tibet and the attempt by Russia to fill the political vacuum, served to disturb the political status quo in the Trans-Himalayan region.

The first three decades of the twentieth century thus saw a crisis in Nepal-Tibet relations as reflected by the Gyalpo affair, the *Khachchara* problem and the border disputes. Besides, new stress and strain appeared in the relations as commercial issues emerged with changed significance and sharper contour. The period between 1880

and 1930 was to see the breakup of Nepalese hegemony in the Trans-Himalayan trade. The cause for this breakdown was the opening of the Phari route that linked directly India and Tibet in the 1890's. This new trade route made obsolete the existing trade routes of Kuti and Kerong via Kathmandu. As Nepal was no longer an intermediary in the Trans-Himalayan trade Tibet began to adopt an independent attitude towards Nepal. Nepal's traditional trading rights in Tibet were, accordingly, ignored and the salt trade crisis occurred in Mustang, Kuti and Kerong. A study of the salt trade crisis in different parts of Nepal shows that Tibet was determined to eliminate Nepal out of the Trans-Himalayan trade in the third decade of this century. It is difficult to explain the changed mood of Tibet in this period. But this has to be explained within the general framework of historical antecedents, in particular, the humiliating treaty that Nepal had imposed upon Tibet in 1856. Besides, Nepalese disregard of the Tibetan laws and customs too helped to shape an adverse Tibetan attitude towards Nepal during the first three decades of this century.

However, in spite of this setback, Nepal did carry out a limited amount of trade with Tibet by transferring her merchants from Kathmandu to Kalimpong. But she maintained her political importance in the affairs of Tibet by playing the role of mediator during the Tibet-China conflict between 1908 to 1913. It is true that the economic and political relations between the two countries were disturbed by the Gyalpo Affair, the *Khachchara* problem and the border disputes from the dawn of the twentieth century to 1930, yet they were more or less satisfactorily settled by the close of the third decade of this century. Two factors were responsible for the fading away of the political and economic differences between Nepal and Tibet after 1930. They were the rise of political awakening in Nepal and the growth of Chinese influence in Tibet which diverted the attention of both these countries from foreign affairs to domestic politics. Thus the volatile atmosphere in Nepal-Tibet relations slowly gave place to a relative peace and tranquility.

Appendix A*

Memorandum of the Military force & CA of the Nepal state as now existing (1848 A. D.)

Artillery	Regular Infantry	Irregular Infantry	Polkee	Field guns & Swivels	Annual recruit.
2 Regiments About 1,1000 rank and file	15 Regiments About 18400 rank and file	About 15,000 rank and file	About 2000 in Turac	About 160 field guns at various places in the capital. About 80 guns and swivels in forts & gurhees.	30 to 32,000 Tokas of which about two thirds in Tunkhas Jageer.

Nepal Residency Office
the 31 August, 1847

Sd/-C. Thoresby.
Resident, Nepal.

* This table is extracted from foreign consultation No. 392, Dec. 30, 1848. NAI.

Appendix B*

Table No. 2

Number of troops left in the Valley and the Tarai during the Nepalese expedition to Tibet (1855-56)

In the valley of Nepal at Kathmandu and other Places		Strength	Grand total	Remarks.
Juggut Dull Regiment		783		There are also 300
Roodra Dhoje	do	633		Sepohees stationed as guards at various grain depots between
Gooman Bhujum	do	783		
Bhyroo	do	501	Total 4,861	Kathmandu and Panber.
Ram Dull (4 Companies)	do	260		
Ghat Khaminee Pershad (6 Companies)	do	451		

Separate Companies Under Sirdars	do	1,450	
In Taria			
Runonath Regiment		1,001	202 These two com- panies are emp- loyed in
Shumsher Jung	do	1,001	the collections of reveenue.
Nepal Residency, 12th May, 1855			sd. G, Ramsay Resident.

* This table is taken from a letter sent by the Resident of Nepal. No. 28-12, May 1885, *Foreign Secret Consultation*, No. 24, of 1885, p. 2, NAI.

Appendix C*

Table No.2

Detail of non-fighting men exclusive of servants, coolies attached to the Nepalese Expedition for the invasion of Tibet. (1855)

	Kerong Column	Kooti Column	Lammo Baggar Column	Wallangchung Column	Moostang Column	Joomla, Column
Draftsmen	4	2	1	1	11	1
Bydas or Physicians	10	4	1	2	1	2
Naos or Surgeons	20	8	1	4	1	4
Ironsmiths	20	6	3	5	3	5
Carpenters	20	6	3	5	3	5
Leather Workers	30	9	3	6	3	6
Persian Moonshees	1	9	3	6	3	6

English Writers	1	9	3	6	3	6
Bhoo tea Moonshees	4	2	1	1	1	1
Bhoo tea Interpreters	4	2	1	1	1	1
Chinese Moonshees	2	2	1	1	1	1
Chinese Interpreters	2	1	1	1	1	1
Bunnyas Sweepers Meat Sellers	200	100	1	1	1	1
Band Men	180	65	6	48	8	68
Grand Total	500	207	19	74	20	94

Nepal Residency 12th May 1855, Sd. G. Ramsay Resident.

* This table is extracted from a letter sent by the Resident, Nepal, No. 28-9, 28 May, 1885, *Foreign Secret Consultation*, No. 24 of 1885, p. 1. NAI.

APPENDIX D*

The Nepalese version of the Text of the Treaty of Chaitra Sudi 3, 1912 (V. E.) or March 1856**

The *Bhardars* (Nobles) of Gorkha Government and those of the Government of Bhot (Tibet) have by our own free will decided to sign this document. If war commences on the account of the fact that one party to this treaty breaks the *ahad* (agreement) then the violator of the *ahad* will have sinned against God. We have signed this *ahad* with God as a witness.

Clauses of The Treaty

1. *Pratham Kura* (Article One); The Government of Bhot is to give to the Gorkha Government a *salami* of rupees 10,000 annually.
2. *Doshro Kura* (Article Two): Gorkha is to render assistance to

* This treaty is extracted from a copy of the *Ahad* preserved in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kathmandu. See New Unnumbered *Poka* (Bundle) titled "Correspondance with Chin and Lhasa". The sub-*Poka* (Bho 5), which contains the treaty is labled as "The Conversation between *Maharaja* Jang Bahadur Rana and the Resident Ramsay."

**The Nepal-Tibet Treaty of March 1856, preserved in the National Archives, New Delhi, is the only version of the treaty that is at present available to a research scholar. The Nepalese version of the text of the treaty, however, has not been available for us for scrutiny and analysis. Although the Nepalese version, is basically the same as that found in National Archives, New Delhi, or the one in the India Office Library, London, yet it differs a little bit in the details of the clauses, for example, the article nine. Again the use of expressions like *salami* and *Bharadar* can too be interpreted in a different way than the traditional translation given by the British Residency in Kathmandu. An attempt has thus been made to give in the text of the treaty as many original Nepalese words as possible.

- Tibet, as far as possible, if she is invaded by a foreign power.
3. *Teshro Kura* (Article Three): Bhot is not to impose *jagat mahasul* (custom duties) that had been hitherto levied upon the *Gorkha* subjects throughout the territory of Tibet.
 4. *Chouthon Kura* (Article Four): The Government of Gorkha is to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories of Kuti and Kerong and Jhung and return to the Tibetans the sepoy, sheep and yaks captured during the war, when the conditions of the treaty were fulfilled. The Tibetans, in return, are also to give back to the Gorkhali cannons and also the Sikh prisoners-of-war who had been captured in 1841 in the war between Bhot and the Dogra ruler.
 5. *Panchoun Kura* (Article Five): Gorkha is permitted to station a *Bhardar* (envoy) in Tibet, instead of a *Nayak* that had been stationed there previously.
 6. *Chhaithoun Kura* (Article Six): Gorkha is allowed to keep their *kothis* (trade-marts) in Lhasa with the right to trade in jewels ornaments, grains and clothes.
 7. *Satoun Kura* (Article Seven): The Gorkha *Bhardar* in Bhot is authorized to settle disputes between the Gorkha subjects and the Gorkha Kashmiris. But the disputes between the Gorkha subjects and the Bhotes are to be settled by the representatives of both Governments. The Nepalese *Bhardar* was prohibited from settling disputes between the Bhotes.
 8. *Athoun Kura* (Article Eight): Gorkha and Bhot Government are henceforth to return the criminals that escaped into each other's territory.
 9. *Nawoan Kura* (Article Nine): The life and property of the Gorkha merchants were to be protected by the Government of Bhot. If the Bhot looter can not restore the looted articles of the Gorkhalis the Bhot Government would compensate for the loot. The Gorkha Government was to act in a similar fashion and protect the property of the Bhotes in the country of the Gorkha.
 10. *Dasaun Kurar* (Article Ten): The Gorkha and Bhot Governments are to protect the life and property of those subjects who had helped the enemy during the war.

APPENDIX E*

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND TIBET OF SEPTEMBER 7, 1904

The Convention of 7th. September 1904 between Tibet and Great Britain was to remove the difficulties that had risen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the trade regulations of 1893. It consists of nine articles.

I

The Government of Tibet respects the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet of the said Convention; and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II

The Tibetan Government undertakes to open trade-marts to which all British and Tibetan subjects shall have right of free access at Gyantse, Gartok and Yalung. No restrictions on trade were to be imposed on existing routes.

III

Ammendment to the regulation of 1893 is reserved for the separate consideration of the two Governments.

IV

The Tibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues other than that provided for in the tariff mutually agreed upon.

V.

Tibet shall keep the roads of Yalung, Gyantse and Gartok clear.

* Source: *Foreign Secret E. Proceedings* No. 936 of February 1905, NAI.

VI

The Tibetan Government shall pay as war indemnity to the British a sum of 50,000 rupees in seventy-five annual instalments of Rs. one lakh each from 1st January 1906.

VII

As security to the above indemnity the British Government shall keep Chumbi Valley until the trade-marts have been effectively opened for three years.

VIII

Tibetan Government agrees to insure free flow of communication from Gyantse and Lhasa.

IX

The Government of Tibet agrees that without previous consent of British Government

- (a) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, or mortgaged to any foreign power.
- (b) No such power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs.
- (c) No representatives or agents of any foreign power shall be admitted in Tibet.
- (d) No concession for roads, telegraphs mining or other rights shall be given to foreign powers. If such rights are given to foreign power, the same right should be given to the British.
- (e) No Tibetan revenue either in cash or in Kind shall be paid to a foreign power or a subject.

Younghusband

(Seal) Dalai Lama

APPENDIX F*

A CONVENTION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND BRITAIN ON TIBET (1907)

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognize the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and Great Britain, due to promimity with the region, has made the following arrangements.

Article I: The two contracting parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and abstain from interference in internal administration.

Article II. Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Thibet except through intermediary of the Chinese government. This, however, does not include the commercial relationship and religious relationship between the Budhist subjects of Russia and Thibet.

Article III. The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send representatives to Lhasa.

Article IV. The two contracting parties engage neither to seek or obtain any concessions for rail-roads, telegraphs and mines or other rights in Thibet.

Article V. The two governments agree that no part of revenues of Thibet whether in kind or cash shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

Note: This convention was signed in St. Petersburg on 18 (31st.) 1907. The signatories were: A. Nicolson and Iswolsky

APPENDIX G*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PERUSAL OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. MANNERS-SMITH, V. C., C. I. E. MARCH, 1910

For some time past the flow of events in Tibet has been anything but smooth and the state of affairs there has gradually changed from what it was before, till a sudden and rapid development which has taken place there within the last few months has rendered it uncertain, and perhaps unsafe, to venture an opinion as to how matters may turn out in the near or some distant future. All important information that I could gather from various sources as to the course of events in and concerning Tibet, had from time to time been forwarded to you confidentially and these would have shown the trend that things were taking there. Having an extensive contiguous boundary and an intimate trade relations from a very long time with Tibet and consequently possessing considerable stake in that country with valued political rights and privileges and a standing position of no small importance, Nepal is naturally anxious and desirous that her interests there might not suffer in any way. The question, which is one of vital importance to this country, has been exercising the minds of this Government and has been looked at from all possible standpoints to determine how best to safeguard her rights, privileges, and position in case these or any of these be threatened from any source. Conscious of being unfettered in any way to seek redress for any grievances against Tibet, the Government of Nepal could afford to view with calmness the progress of events there so long as it did not disturb the state of things which obtained previous to this unsettled condition, reversion to which would in itself go a good deal to guarantee our vested interests and set at rest any further speculation on the subject. As matter stands a minute examination of the general position has become imperative, because of the uncertainty of what may happen at any time in view of the present unsettled state of things in that country.

* Source: *Foreign Secret Proceedings* No. 387 of April 1910, NAI.

The Ambassadors at Lhasa have given a general assurance to our Representative of their good intentions: but the difficulty arises to what extent these assurances which may be taken to be of a rather vague and limited character, can be relied upon, the more so when the Tibetans, rightly or wrongly which only futurity will determine, accuse the Chinese of bad faith and evil designs of scheming for the usurpation of all powers from their hands. The one thousand soldiers being imported into Tibet are expressly intended for police work and to do guard duty both of which purposes, the Tibetans maintain, can be served with better facility and equal efficiency by their own people. While considering the probable motive of China in this matter, I happened to think of the "Amended Tibet Trade Regulations of the 20th April 1908, concluded between Great Britain and China," and on referring it was found that in it, having made China responsible for the maintenance of telegraph lines and postal communications to the trade-marts, an engagement was taken from her in Clause XII to arrange effective police measures at the marts and along the routes to the marts, on the due fulfilment of which only Great Britain undertook to withdraw its Trade Agent's guards at the marts and to station no troops in Tibet. Though the clause does not definitely state that Chinese soldiers should be requisitioned for the duties enumerated therein, yet it is quite possible that it was perhaps to hasten the withdrawal of the British guards in question, whose presence in the country she could not look upon with equanimity, that China, not relying upon the slow-moving Tibetans, has drafted her own troops for the purpose or it will not be surprising if the move has resulted from a desire to convert Tibet into one of her provinces, as the report went, to realise her suzerainty so pointedly mentioned in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and in that case the apprehension of the Tibetans that many more troops might follow must be considered to have some foundation. Be that as it may, the fact remains there that the Chinese and Tibetans are slowly drifting apart and this may throw this country into a vortex of trouble, or China may, with her superior strength and existing position in the country and by the moral support given her by the treaties with other Powers, bring Tibet under her absolute sway. At all events, there is of course our treaty with Tibet which should protect our

interests from being meddled with or injured not only by the Tibetans but also by the Chinese, the then Amba at Lhasa having recognised and accepted its terms and expressed his assent to its conclusion and subsequently intimated the approval of His Majesty the Emperor of China also to it. The Tibet Government, whether its absolute autonomy is preserved or it passes into the hands of the Chinese, is expected any way to respect the terms of the said treaty, but if these just expectations are not realised the Government Nepal will have, as a matter of course, to take proper care and try to preserve and maintain its rights by every possible peaceful means and friendly negotiations, or in the event of diplomacy failing, by all the other resources at its command. I hope and pray that such a contingency may never arise, but should it become inevitable, it is only prudent that this Government should be aware of the exact interpretation of the treaties that exist among the Powers. In Article II of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 27th April 1906, China has undertaken not to permit any other Foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet as against the negative obligation on the part of Great Britain of not annexing the Tibetan territory or interfering in its administration. And in Article I of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Great Britain and Russia engaged to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet implying a negative obligation on each. Now if the territorial integrity of Tibet is threatened from quarters other than India and Russia, say from the Nepal side do these articles quoted above bring any positive obligation upon Great Britain or Russia to intervene ? Again in Article III of the said Anglo-Chinese Convention the word "state" which perhaps is more elastic than the word "power" is used apparently in place of "power" used in Article IX (d) of the Convention of 1904. Is this substitution supposed to bring Nepal under this article ? The interpretations of these articles seem to be closely related to our interests and were not, so far as we know, made clear at the time when these treaties were concluded, and the Government of Nepal would feel highly obliged by your kindly furnishing them with the same.

Nepal,
The 11th March 1910. }

Chandra Shum Shere

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX H*

**TRANSLATIONS OF TIBETAN PAPERS RECEIVED WITH
LETTER FROM RESIDENT IN NEPAL, NO. 71,
DATED THE 14TH MAY 1910**

**Proclamation issued by Tin, the Commissioner of Police in
Lhasa, and his Assistant Yui Chen.**

The aim of the Police Department is not to annoy and trouble the people but to further their happiness. As the work is heavy and varied, it is difficult to make every body contented in one day. The following Regulations are framed by the Board of Dependencies to suit the present circumstances of the country and must be observed. Irregularities as follow have been committed:-

- (1) All the proclamations that have been issued up to date have been damaged, torn or destroyed.
- (2) People who quarrel in the streets do not cease quarrelling when ordered to do so.
- (3) People commit nuisances in front of their houses.
- (4) People interfere when not required to do so.
- (5) Riding and baggage animals do not proceed along the middle of the streets, but tread on goods and children in the bazars.
- (6) People make noises after nine o'clock at night.
- (7) People dispose secretly the corpses of those who have not died natural deaths.
- (8) People disobey public proclamations.
- (9) People disobey orders to sweep their premises.
- (10) People keep dirty things and the rotting carcasses of ponies, donkeys, birds and dogs in the streets and on their premises.

Bear in mind all the above-mentioned irregularities. Anybody, who is guilty of them in future, will be punished very severely. Remember this. Dated the 26th day of the 2nd month of the 2nd year of the reign of Shon-tong (5th April 1910).

Proclamation issued by Len Amban.

When the Sze-chuen troops were coming to Tibet, the people of Kong-bu (a) destroyed their storehouses at Gyam-da (b) and plundered and destroyed property indiscriminately. I, the great Minister, enquired into the matter and found that the Tibetan officials forced the people to do this, and that the people did not do this of their own accord. Therefore no further enquiry is necessary. It is clear from the records that orders have been issued that the Chinese officials should protect the law-abiding people of that place. The Tibetan officials should issue notice accordingly to the people of Nga-po. Gyam-da is the place, where all the people of Kong-bu buy and sell grain and other kinds of merchandise. But, if this trade is stopped, Tibetans will be injured. As the troops are in that country, all the traders, large and small, who take to Gyam-da for sale eatables, rice, grain and other merchandise, will be protected and their property will not be stolen.

Therefore this proclamation is issued. The officers in charge of Gyam-da, Jo-mo-jong, Sho-ka-jong and Tse-la-gang, the monks of the monasteries and all the people must obey this. Everybody should come to trade as before and not entertain suspicion. Orders have been issued to the troops to pay in full for everything that they buy. It is very important that all traders should believe what I have written, and should not listen to rumours or feel doubt.

Dated the 28th day of the 2nd month of the 2nd year of the reign of Shon-tong (7th April 1910).

Orders issued by Len Amban, the great Resident Minister of

- (a) A sub-province averaging seven days east of Lhasa divided into Upper and Lower Kong-bu. Lower Kong-bu is sub-tropical and rainy, growing maize and kindred crops.
- (b) The chief town is Kong-bu.

Tibet, who was appointed by the Emperor of China and holds the rank of Pu-tu-tung and the Peacock Feathers.

It is against law to possess guns without permission. Ten-jor, Dor-je and other Tibetan officials, who were dismissed last year, distributed according to their own wishes many guns of different kinds. To press the monasteries to give assistance to the Tibetan troops is a serious breach of the law. I, the great Minister, am very glad that you monks, who from the beginning acted according to law, did not listen to the evil advice of the Tibetan officials.

The monasteries are not allowed to keep rifles without magazines or those with five-chambered magazines, that were distributed by the Tibetan officials, nor are monasteries allowed to keep guns belonging to landlords. Enquiries must be instituted at once, and all the guns must be brought to my Yamen. It is not necessary to bring up the prong-guns that are with the monks for their selfprotection when they go out, but the abbots of the monasteries must enquire and find out how many such prong-guns there are in each monastery. These guns and the gunpowder for them must be kept in the charge of the abbots and issued only when the monks go out. This will make future enquiry easy. I, the great Minister, will protect this country.

Therefore this order is issued and the Gan-den monastery must obey it. Bear this in mind.

Dated the 3rd month of the 2nd year of the reign of Shon-tong (March-April 1910.)

APPENDIX I*

SPECIAL DECREE FROM THE EMPEROR OF CHINA TO THE MAHARAJA OF NEPAL**

(Dated, Ch'ia Lung, 55 th, year, 1st. moon, 20th. Day or February 23,1911)

“.....On your son we confer, the brevet of duke, the ordinary coral first-class button, a silken robe, a coat of demi-length, a necklace of 108 beads of coral, a girdle, purse and appendages. On your seinor minister Hari Bahadur Shahib (?) we confer the blue button and coat and robes of corresponding rank”.

“In token of your desire to be enriched among the tributaries of our dynasties, you Ranabahadur, your son and you respective minister have sent to Us as tribute 4 complete rolls of Nepalese embroidered stuff, 4 tea silver *samovars* weighing 50 ounces a piece and silver wine beakers of the same weight, a pair of cloisonne incense burners and a pair of carved tea-cups. These we have duly examined decided to accept. On the head of your tribute mission, Harisahib, we confer the fourth blue button, a sable robe, a fur made up of breast of white fox, a coat embroidered with dragons, a necklace, girdle and appurtenances to match. To each of the ten servants of the retinue we confer a sixth class of white button, a peackock's feather, a snuff bottle, three rolls of silk, a tinder-box and five sacrificial bowls. On the second member of the mission we confer the fourth button, a sable robe, a coat embroidered with dragons, appurtenances to match, and we confer the sixth class button, a peackck's feather, ten boxes of tea, three rolls of silk and a snuff bottle on each member of his suite. We are the supreme lord of all under heaven and show the same generous condescension to all. Our imperial protection is

* Source: FMANE. 10, Poka No. 3,

** This special decree in Chinese was rendered into English by E. Backhouse in the British Mission in Peking, upon the request of Nepal.

no respecter of persons and knows no boundaries. Even the humblest of our subjects is entitled to the same measure of our enfolding affection”

“.....We have shown to you exceptional condescension and, in return, you must display full reverence and respect for the law and maintain its ordinances. Such is the most important charge which we now make to you Ranabahadur ! In our good pleasure we have especially announced unto you this important imperial mandate. In future do obey our orders to maintain peaceful relation with the Dalai Lama and Panshen Lama and the existing regulations. Your people are to observe harmonious relations with the Tibetans and you are to carry on your trade in a spirit of mutual forbearance and justice. What has it profited you by entering upon hostilities ?”

“That Heaven may bless you, Our feudatory, with every happiness is needed Our most earnest prayer.”

APPENDIX J*

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAHARAJA CHANDRA SHUMSHER AND RESIDENT H. SHOWERS (March 26, 1912)

- RESIDENT: Are you not going to help reinstate the Dalai Lama ?
- CHANDRA: What do we have to do to reinstate him ?
- RESIDENT: If you send a force to Tibet, this will greatly help him.
- CHANDRA: It is not easy to send troops to Tibet, for all supplies have to be collected within Nepal or in short the entire nation has to be mobilized.
- RESIDENT: I think that if you send 1500 troops it would have the intended effect. Do you think this would be difficult ?
- CHANDRA: It might be recalled that during the Younghusband Mission the British spent three crores of rupees to take 2,000 troops to Tibet out of which only 700 reached Lhasa.
- RESIDENT: We are accustomed to spend more but I am sure that you will not incur so much expenditure.
- CHANDRA: The problem of supplies and transport is tremendous. In the time of *Maharaja* Jang Bahadur the expenditure of Nepal ran to 27 *lakhs* but Nepal could not penetrate further than a few day's march beyond the frontier.
- RESIDENT: Could not Tibet provide food for 1500 Nepalese troops ?
- CHANDRA: Tibet is a barren Land. In the border areas of Tibet people live entirely upon the food sent from Nepal.
- RESIDENT: Can you send 1500 troops to Tibet immediately ?
- CHANDRA: Not immediately.
- RESIDENT: How long do you think it will take ?
- CHANDRA: It will take at least one year.

* This conversation is extracted from FMAN. E,10 Poka No.3, The translation from Nepali is mine.

APPENDIX K*

A SUGGESTIVE LIST OF THE COLLECTION OF GRAINS FROM THE HILL AREAS OF WEST NOS. 1 AND 2 IN THE YEAR 1969 V. E.** (1912 A. D.)

Grains to be collected from the Hill areas of West No. 1 and 2

Commodities	Amount Needed	Col. from W. 1	W. 2
<i>Ghee</i> (clarified butter) in <i>dharnis</i>	10,000	5,000	5,000
Wheat in <i>muris</i>	1,400	700	700
Corn in <i>muris</i>	2,400	1,200	1,200
<i>Kodo</i> (millet) in <i>muris</i>	3,000	1,500	1,500
	15,800	7,900	7,900

Notes on further collection of commodities from West No. 1

Commodities	Quantity
Rice (in <i>muris</i>)	8,000
<i>Satu</i> (powdered cereals) in (<i>muris</i>)	4,000
Chile (in <i>muris</i>)	200
Tobacco (in <i>muris</i>)	3,200
Grass (in <i>dharnis</i>)	150,000
Corn powder (in <i>muris</i>)	8,000
<i>Masa</i> (black cereal) (<i>in muris</i>)	2,600
Salt (in <i>muris</i>)	260
Sugar (in <i>dharnis</i>)	2,500
<i>Durkha</i> (hard cheese)	800,000

* This table is extracted from MAN, Book No.159 V.E.1969 or 1912 A D. The files in this book are related to the transportation and collection of goods and cereals towards Kutu and Kerong during the possibility of war between Nepal and Tibet in the year 1912 A. D. pp. 11-12.

**The mobilization of Nepalese resources for war in 1912 was due to the fact that Nepal felt that she would be drawn into the China-Tibet war if the hostilities became more acute in the Tibetan plateau.

APPENDIX L*

THE ANNUAL AND PROPOSED EXPENDITURE OF THE THAKALI ADDA AT
GYANTSE (1913) IN RS (N. C.)

Expenditure in Salary and Other Heads							
		Current Expenditure	Proposed Expenditure	Amount Increase in Previous Budget.			
Asami	Jawan	Expenditure Per Head	Total Expenditure Per Head	Total	Expenditure	Total	
					Per Head		
Lieutenant	1	1,200	1,200	1,800	1,800	600	600
Taharir Mukhiya	1	400	400	600	600	200	200
Hudda	1	150	180	180	180	30	30
Sepoy	6	120	720	144	864	24	144
Stationery			30		30		
Intelligence			270		300	30	30
Rent of Office			6,2111		150		871
			(Kala Mohars)		(Kal Mohars)		
Total	10		2,982,111		4,284		1,3091

* Source: This table is extracted from E 10, Poka No. 3, FMAN

APPENDIX M*

ESTIMATED EXPENSE FOR THE ARMY MOVING TOWARDS KUTI, KERONG
AND OLANCHUNG IN 1912 A. D. (IN RS.)

	Colonel <i>Khadars</i> and Doctors and <i>subbas</i>	Olanchung	Kuti	Kerong	Total No	Per Head	Total
1.	55	16	87	66/71/2	57,482/20/2		
2.	15	4	23	34/64/2	7,996/6/2		
3.	160	48	256	30/30/2	77,134/8		
4.	34	—	34	197/65/1	4,680/1812		
5.	5,544	1,562	8,668	91/30/1	791,410/7		
6.	89	30	149	56/78/9	8,460/39/1		
7.	1	—	1	153/87/2	153/87/2		
8.	28	9	46	107/52/2	4,946/94		
9.	86	31	148	56/78/1	8,403/81		
10.	15,988	3,430	22,848	19/78/1	45/990/56		
	22,000	5130	32260	1,412,657/49/1			

* Source: Book No. 160. A Copy of the Manuscript titled "An Estimated Expenditure of the Army Moving Towards Olanchung, Kuti and Kerong in 1912 A. D. or 1969 V. E." P. 2. MAN.

APPENDIX N*

APPOLOGY ON THE GYALPO AFFAIR DESPATCHED BY THE TIBETAN GOVERNMENT

Appendix I to Notes

Apology Despatched by the Tibetan Government to the *Maharaja* of Nepal, March 6, 1930.

“We found that our previous letter of apology recounted a few facts of what actually occurred to satisfy the *Maharaja*. In compliance with your telegram this apology is submitted for the reason that Gyalpo and his wife were arrested and removed from the Nepalese legation by the Tibetan police officers and men. They have acted foolishly. Such acts are abhorrently disgraceful. Tibetans and the Nepalese have long lived in brotherly union and Tibetan Government therefore expresses their sincere regret and submits this apology. This letter of regret is submitted by the Tibetan Government so that friendship may continue for ever. We beg that the all-knowing *Maharaja* will accept this apology in the same friendliness of spirit with which it was offered. And we request that for the future you will kindly consider untiringly (sic) preservation for ever and value of agelong brotherly-like friendship between Nepal and Tibet. Submitted on the 6th. day of the 1st. month of the Iron Horse Year..”

Apology Prescribed by the Prime Minister of Nepal in His Telegram to His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, October 3, 1929.

“Know ye all present that the Government of Tibet valuing the agelong friendship with the Government of Nepal with whom they have lived so long as brothers do hereby express their sincere regret for reprehensible behaviour of some of their officials who have very foolishly and rashly violated the sanctity of the Nepalese Legation and forcibly arrested there one Gyalpo, who had since

* Source: Appendix I to Notes, *Foreign Political*, File No. 228-X, 1929, NAI.

died in their custody. For these outrages which are abhorrent to every known law, human and divine, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who having heard of this deplorable incident has punished the officials concerned, and the Government of Tibet, while discovering the acts of the guilty officials offer an unqualified apology for the outrages done and tender this written expression of regret to the Government of Nepal through the representative present here with the hope that it will be accepted in the same friendly spirit in which it is offered."

Apology Suggested by the Government of India

"Attaching great value to agelong friendship with the Government of Nepal with whom they have lived so long as brothers and being anxiously desirous of maintaining and strengthening the bonds of amity and mutual respect Government of Tibet do hereby express their sincere regret for the incident which occurred when the Tibetan officials contrary to custom of nations forcibly removed Gyalpo from the Nepalese Legation, and tender this expression of their sentiments to Government of Nepal in the hope that Nepal Government will accept it in the same friendly spirit in which it is offered and will thereafter join with them in inquiring in such a manner as may be convient to both into general merit of the case.

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E 1 Poka No. 12. This *poka* is devoted to the rise of Jang Bahadur and the assessment of his personality.

E 10, Poka No. 3. An excellent survey of Nepal's role as a mediator in the Tibet-China dispute between 1908 to 1913 is contained in this bundle.

New Poka "Chin ra Lhasa ko bich Lekhapadi" (Correspondence between China and Lhasa). This *poka* is distinguished by the fact that it is not numbered. But it contains a number of sub-*pokas*. and a sub-*poka* titled Bho 6 contains valuable materials on the Third Nepal-Tibet War (1855-56) and the conversation between the *Maharaja* and the British Resident George Ramsay in Kathmandu. *Poka No. Ga 56.* This package is devoted to the arrival of the robes, plumes and titles sent by the Chinese Emperor to the Nepalese *Maharajadhiraja* and the *Maharaja* Prime minister.

Poka No. Ga 57. It is devoted to the description of the Nepalese *Maharajadhiraja* and the *Maharaja* Prime minister.

Poka No. Ga 57. It is devoted to the description of the Nepalese mission to China in 1852 and its extremely sad plight while returning home.

Poka No. Pa 36. "*Maharaja Bir Shumsher ko Samae ma Bhaeko Lekha Padi*(Correspondence in the time of *Maharaja* Bir Shumsher). This is a repository of documents on Nepal's internal history and foreign policy in the time of Prime Minister Bir Shumsher.

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Book No. 155 This is copy of documents related to the state of military alert in Nepal, when Tibet and China were at war with each other in 1969 V. E. (1912 A. D.).

Book No. 156. This is a copy of documents pertaining to a list of armaments and artifacts associated with war that was to be manufactured in the year 1969 V. E. (1912 A. D.).

Book No. 157. This book contains a copy of manuscripts relating to the manufacture of armaments, including cannons at Sundarijal in 1969 V. E. (1912 A. D.)

Book No. 158. The theme of this book is the collection of grains, armaments and other commodities associated with war as a precautionary measure during the escalation of conflict between Tibet and China in the year 1969 V. E. (1912 A. D.).

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Book No. 191. The thematic content of this book basically includes the records of the arms and armaments needed by Nepal during the possibility of war with Tibet in the year 1973 V. E. (1916 A. D.).

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year 1973 V. E. (1916 A. D.).

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